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Introduction
The macroeconomic approach to the labor market aims at explaining aggregate labor mar-
ket phenomena that have been present in many industrialized countries such as the United
States or the western European countries in the postwar period. These phenomena include
the permanent and simultaneous presence of unemployment and unfilled job vacancies as
well as the fact that aggregate hours worked, employment and unemployment strongly
co-move with the business cycle. At the same time, the amount and composition of labor
supplied to the market and employed in production have substantially changed over the
last decades. Understanding the driving forces and economic mechanisms that lead to the
outcome in the labor market is of high importance to grasp the business-cycle fluctuations
as well as the evolution of long-run growth of the economy as a whole.
A large strand in the macroeconomic labor literature builds on the seminal work of Dale
Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides (see Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides
(2000)) who employ search frictions in the labor market in order to explain the parallel
existence of unemployment and unfilled vacancies in equilibrium. In their model, posting
a vacancy is costly for firms, and matching in the labor market takes time depending on
the tightness of the labor market, i.e., the ratio of unemployed workers seeking employ-
ment and open vacancies required to be filled. Firms and workers who meet in the labor
market bargain over the wage given their economic conditions such as labor productivity
or unemployment benefits.
The dynamic version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model aims at replicating the procyclical
fluctuations of employment and countercyclical fluctuations of unemployment respectively.
Here, shocks to labor productivity increase the incentive for firms to post vacancies and
therefore decrease unemployment. This means that the fluctuations in the labor market
are prominently driven by labor demand. Building on this baseline model, a variety of
issues have been raised in recent years in order to improve the empirical performance of
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the model, i.e., its ability to replicate the employment and unemployment fluctuations it
aims to explain. For example, the introduction of rigid wages is conjectured to improve the
model with respect to the volatility of the key variables (see Shimer (2005a) or Hall (2005)).
Another issue of importance is the question whether the data support the assumption of
a constant job separation rate, i.e., the probability with which an employed worker is
separated from an existing employment relationship (see Fujita and Ramey (forthcoming)
or Ramey (2008)).
A related part of the literature incorporates search-and-matching in the labor market as in
Mortensen and Pissarides into a general macroeconomic real-business-cycle (RBC) setup
(see Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) and also denHaan et al. (2000)). This research
was initially motivated to improve upon the empirical performance of the RBC model.
In contrast to the standard model, it provides a more sophisticated framework which
links the developments in the labor market to the key macroeconomic aggregates such as
output, capital investment and consumption. Fluctuations in the basic RBC model are
(mainly) driven by shocks to technological progress or more generally aggregate supply.
As labor productivity shocks in the more general setup of the Mortensen-Pissarides model
are widely interpreted as technology shocks (Shimer (2005a)), the RBC framework indeed
provides the natural framework to link the cyclical movements of the labor market variables
to the induced driving force of the business-cycle. However, the RBC paradigm about
the cyclical movements of the variables and the sources of the business cycle is heavily
disputed in the literature (see for example Gal´ı (1999)). In the tradition of this dispute,
Chapter 1 challenges the conventional view that cyclical labor market dynamics are mainly
driven by technology shocks by highlighting the role of shocks to the aggregate demand
(here preference shocks) as a complementary source of fluctuations in employment and
unemployment. Based on this analysis, Chapter 1 also contributes to many of the issues
raised with respect to the Mortensen-Pissarides model such as its empirical performance,
or the endogeneity of job separations.
Another part of the macroeconomic labor literature has focused on the long run develop-
ments of labor demand. Also here, technological progress constitutes the main determinant
of the labor demand of firms in the medium to long run. A wide literature has documented
that this demand has shifted in favor of higher rather than lower educated workers in re-
cent decades, so-called skill-biased technological progress (for example Katz and Murphy
(1992) or Autor et al. (1998)). Analyzing these shifts in the composition of inputs to ag-
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gregate production via a growth decomposition framework reveals not only the skill-bias
of technological progress but also the degree of substitutability or complementarity be-
tween high and low skilled labor as well as capital in aggregate production (Krusell et al.
(2000)). Building on aspects of the above mentioned RBC literature as well as results and
methods of Chapter 1, Chapter 2 investigates the implications of skill-biased technological
change for the business cycle. Over and above linking the conventional driving forces of
business-cycles and long-run growth to the developments in the labor market, Chapter
2 therefore attempts to identify sources of cycles and growth that originate in the labor
market itself.
Apart from labor demand, aggregate labor market supply evolves as a complex result of
individual economic choices which are potentially affected by wages, labor market policies
such as unemployment benefits or labor taxes, but also preferences for education and skills
or social norms and culture. Shifts in the magnitude or composition of labor supply and
consequently labor input are an important factor of actual and potential economic growth.
In fact, this highlights the importance of the underlying heterogeneity between different
workers in the labor force for the aggregate developments. Like labor demand, labor supply
has shifted towards a higher ratio of high skilled workers in the recent decades (see again
Katz and Murphy (1992) or Autor et al. (1998)). This may be due to the aforementioned
increase in skill demand, but is also attributable to an increased preference for education.
Together with compositional changes with respect to skill, the age composition of aggregate
labor supply has also changed. As more and more young persons tend to stay in education
longer, they enter the labor force later in life, but are also better educated. Further,
changes in the age composition of the population towards a higher share of older persons
also affect the age composition of the labor and work force.
In addition to growth, skill supply shifts have also importantly affected the business-
cycle fluctuations of employment as shown in Chapter 2. Apart from this, the labor
force in the aforementioned literature (and the first two chapters of this dissertation) was
assumed to be constant. However, fluctuations in labor market participation behavior
are present in the data, affect the aggregate labor supply and play an important role for
the labor market business-cycle fluctuations (for a recent study on this, see Veracierto
(2008)). In the presence of labor market frictions as assumed in Chapter 1, a rise in labor
market participation initially increases the pool of unemployed and therefore decreases the
probability to find a job. Participation may increase over the cycle in response to rising
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wages, i.e., higher opportunity costs of staying out of the labor force. This effect strongly
depends on the underlying wage elasticity of the labor supply and is often associated with
the so-called “added worker” effect of persons, often females, in a liaison with a working
partner.
In addition to cyclical fluctuations, labor market participation has substantially increased
over time, especially for females. This rise in participation has often been associated with
cohort effects. Cohort effects generally encompass any factor associated with a particular
birth year and constitute unobserved sources of labor supply shifts between different gen-
erations of workers. These shifts are often reflected in choices made early on in life such as
marriage, maternity leave and/or education and are related to changes in the underlying
preferences or cultural factors. Chapter 3 attempts to disentangle shifts in labor market
participation that are due to movements of the business cycle or a change in labor market
policies from those that are due to unobserved cohort effects.
In general, the subsequent analysis is positive and policy applications will be referred to,
but not addressed explicitly. However, as this dissertation aims at achieving a better
understanding of the movements of hours worked, employment, unemployment and labor
market participation over the business cycle and along their long-run trends, its results are
highly relevant for both the conduct and the evaluation of labor market policy, and also
fiscal and monetary policy. The following chapter summaries will provide more detailed
insights into the particular questions addressed and the results obtained in this dissertation
and will also illustrate the differences and connections between the respective chapters.
Chapter 11. The standard workhorse model to study business-cycle movements into and
out of employment and unemployment is based on a dynamic version of the Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) model with search-and-matching in the labor market. The question
whether this model is able to replicate the business-cycle fluctuations in U.S. time series
data has been one of the most controversially discussed issues in the recent macro-labor
literature. Shimer (2005a), one of the most important contributors to this debate, has
documented that the model does not mirror the high volatility of the job finding rate and
unemployment that is observed in the data.
Chapter 1 re-addresses the empirical performance of the model by relating the business-
cycle fluctuations in the labor market variables to the sources of the cycle. In particular,
1This chapter is based on the working paper “New Evidence, Old Puzzles: Technology Shocks and
Labor Market Dynamics” (Balleer (2009))
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the dynamics in the standard frictional labor market model stem from fluctuations in labor
productivity and “a change in labor productivity is most easily interpreted as a technol-
ogy or supply shock” (Shimer (2005a)). This points towards a representation of the labor
market dynamics within a real-business-cycle (RBC) and growth model in which technol-
ogy shocks are the main driving forces of labor productivity. However, other disturbances
such as demand shocks may affect labor productivity as well. In Chapter 1, I disentangle
different types of technology (supply) and non-technology (demand) shocks using a struc-
tural VAR with long-run restrictions similar to Gal´ı (1999). I then assess the empirical
performance of the standard model based on second moments that are conditional on
technology shocks rather than on overall unconditional moments.
I document that a baseline model that is driven by technology shocks and is conventionally
calibrated performs well to replicate the standard deviations in the key labor market
variables that are conditional on technology shocks. This means that much of the criticism
that has been uttered with respect to the performance of these models based on overall
unconditional moments does in fact not apply. However, the model is not able to replicate
the positive correlation between unemployment and labor productivity that is conditional
on technology shocks. This result displays a new puzzle in the macro labor literature that
is in many ways parallel to the existing “hours puzzle” with respect to the RBC model
without labor market frictions (Gal´ı (1999)). In addition, I show that non-technology
shocks are necessary to explain both the overall volatility in the labor market and the co-
movement of the labor market variables with labor productivity. I test the effect of demand
shocks in the form of shocks to the marginal-rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure, generally referred to as preference shocks, in the macroeconomic labor market
model. I document that these shocks can help to explain the overall volatility in the labor
market variables, but are not suitable to analyze the conditional correlations in the data.
Conventional technology shocks commonly referred to as a source of the business cycle may
either be factor-neutral or biased towards new investment rather than consumption goods
(investment-specific technology shocks). Motivated by observed variation in the data, I
propose a new identification scheme to separate different types of technology shocks that
are neither neutral nor investment-specific in Chapter 1. I show that these remaining
technology shocks play an important role for the business-cycle variance of the labor
market variables. While it is difficult to interpret these technology shocks in the theoretical
framework of this chapter, when assuming a Cobb-Douglas production technology, Chapter
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2 provides a more general context in this respect in order to further explore these shocks.
Chapter 22. Like the preceding chapter, Chapter 2 builds on the evidence that technology
shocks have been an important driving source of the US business cycle in the last two
decades. At the same time, the US as well as many other industrialized countries, have
seen a strong parallel increase in the price and quantity of skill. This fact has been taken
as evidence for an increase in skill demand driven by technological progress that is biased
towards making skilled labor more productive (see Katz and Murphy (1992) or Autor et al.
(1998)). This means that newly developed technologies require relatively more educated
and fewer uneducated workers. Chapter 2 attempts to relate these two phenomena by
exploring the implications of skill-biased technological change for the business cycle.
Existing studies on skill-biased technological change have focused on slow moving trends
in annual data. As annual data are not suitable to analyze business cycle fluctuations,
we construct a quarterly series for the skill premium and the supply of skilled workers for
the US from the Current Population Survey outgoing rotation groups. Measuring neutral
and investment-specific technology shocks using long-run restrictions in a structural VAR
similar to Chapter 1 then allows us to assess the relationship between technology and
the skill premium, and hence skill-bias, over the business cycle. Over and above this
assessment, Chapter 2 adds a different angle as it proposes a structural VAR to identify
skill-biased, and complementary also skill-neutral, technological change directly. This
strategy allows to explore potential sources of the business cycle that originate in the
labor market.
We document that cyclical improvements in technology significantly increase the skill
premium. This effect is realized in full within a year, providing evidence in favor of skill-
biased technological change and its potential importance for business cycle fluctuations.
Further, skill-biased and skill-neutral technology shocks have different implications for
other aggregate variables. In particular, a positive skill-biased technology shock leads
to a much larger reduction in total hours worked than a skill-neutral technology shock
and may therefore provide an explanation to the “hours puzzle” already mentioned in
Chapter 1. Apart from this, the results from Chapter 2 are instructive with respect to the
relationship between the inputs to aggregate production. In particular, high and low skilled
labor are not perfect substitutes in production. It is documented that investment-specific
technology shocks have a significant negative effect on the skill premium and, conversely,
2This chapter draws on joint work with Thijs van Rens (Balleer and van Rens (2008)).
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skill-biased technology shocks raise the relative price of investment goods. This evidence
directly contradicts the hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity, suggesting instead
that capital and skill are in fact substitutes in the aggregate production process.
Chapter 2 highlights the role of non-technology shocks for the business-cycle dynamics in
the labor market. These shocks are different in nature than the non-technology shocks
investigated in Chapter 1. Here, shifts in the ratio of high to low skilled workers in the
aggregate labor supply affect the composition of the pool of workers available to firms. If
the two groups of workers differ in their productivity, these shifts affect the composition
of aggregate employment, aggregate productivity and the wage premium. This means
that shocks to the relative supply of high skilled workers may mistakenly be measured as
technology shocks. In Chapter 2, we propose a strategy to separately gauge these skill
supply shocks in the structural VAR. This cleans the measure of technology shocks from
the potential influence of the skill supply shocks. We furthermore document that skill
supply shocks play an important role for the business cycle movements of hours worked
as they account for around 30% of the business cycle variance of this variable.
Chapter 33. Similar to the US, the euro area labor force participation rate, defined as the
ratio between the labor force and the working age population, has increased from below
65% in the early 1980s to 70.9% in 2007. The participation rate of females in the euro
area has increased by more than 15 percentage points over this time period, to 63.3% in
2007, compared to the participation rate of 78.6% for males. The large increase in the
propensity of the euro area population to work or to search for and be available for jobs has
been one of the main driving forces of the substantial increase in euro area labor supply
that has accelerated since the mid-1990s. This strong increase has significantly reduced
the gap in the use of labor input between the euro area and the United States, and has
substantially contributed to output growth and welfare in the euro area. A number of
determinants could have factored into this rise in participation, including reforms in the
labor market, changes in cultural attitudes towards work (particularly for women), as well
as demographic factors. As demographic factors will become less favorable with population
ageing increasing in the future, positive participation trends within age and gender groups
will be important for sustaining potential growth in the euro area.
3This chapter is based on the working paper “Labor Force Participation in the Euro Area: A Cohort-
Based Analysis” which is joint work together with Jarkko Turunen and Ramon Gomez-Salvador (Balleer
et al. (2009))
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Chapter 3 uses a cohort based model of labor force participation to analyze determinants
of participation for disaggregated groups of workers in the euro area and the five largest
euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands). The model is
used to decompose the evolution of time-series of age-specific participation rates into the
impact of the business cycle, observed structural determinants of participation and other
unobserved determinants captured by fixed effects that are specific to ages and cohorts.
Chapter 3 documents that analyzing participation behavior both between (age and gender
effects) and within (cohort effects) detailed age and gender groups is particularly useful for
modelling trends in euro area aggregate participation rates and projecting them forward.
The results suggest that age and cohort effects can explain a substantial part of the recent
increase in labor force participation rates in the euro area, although not the surge since
early 2000s. Cohort effects are particularly relevant for women, with those born in the
1920s and 1930s less likely and those born in the late 1960s and early 1970s more likely to
participate in the labor market over the life-cycle. There is substantial variation in cohort
effects across the five largest euro area countries that are analyzed. Depending on the
country, the estimated cohort profiles suggest an increase of 10 to 30 percentage points in
female participation rates. In addition, a number of observed determinants, such as labor
taxes, union density, unemployment benefits and the average number of children have had
an impact on labor force participation rates, although the specific impact varies across
age and gender groups and countries.
We use the results from the cohort model in order to consider different scenarios of future
labor market participation. As cohort effects have increased for those born before the
mid 1970’s, but have then stabilized at a constant level, they continue to positively affect
future participation as long as these groups still remain in the labor force. Looking forward,
demographic factors will negatively affect participation as population ageing increases. We
document that positive cohort effects are not large enough to compensate for the downward
impact of population ageing on future labor force participation rates in the euro area.
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Chapter 1
On the Implications of Technology
and Non-Technology Shocks for
Aggregate Labor Demand
1.1 Introduction
U.S. business cycles are characterized by large movements into and out of employment.
The standard framework commonly used to study these movements comprises search-and-
matching in the labor market as first presented by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In
the dynamic version of this model, business-cycle fluctuations of labor market variables
originate in fluctuations of labor productivity. These dynamics can be characterized by
gross worker flows, i.e., the flow of unemployed workers filling an open job vacancy and
employed workers separating from an existing employment relationship. The question
whether the standard model is able to replicate the business-cycle fluctuations in U.S.
time series data has been one of the most controversially discussed issues in the recent
macro-labor literature.
Shimer (2005a) has fuelled the debate by criticizing the standard model with respect
to its empirical performance. His criticism was based on comparing second moments
generated from the model to second moments in worker flow data calculated from the
U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS). He showed that the model did not mirror the
high volatility of the job finding rate and unemployment that is observed in the data. In
addition, the correlation between the job finding rate and the unemployment rate with
labor productivity is much too high in the model.
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While the dynamics in the standard frictional labor market model stem from fluctuations
in labor productivity, “a change in labor productivity is most easily interpreted as a
technology or supply shock” (Shimer (2005a), p. 25). Hence, labor market dynamics can
be represented within a real-business-cycle (RBC) and growth model as in Merz (1995),
or Andolfatto (1996). In these models technology shocks are the main driving forces of
labor productivity. However, other disturbances such as demand shocks may affect labor
productivity as well. Within this context, Gal´ı (1999) demonstrated how to separately
identify technology and non-technology shocks in time series data via restricting their
long-run effects in structural vector-autoregressions (SVARs).
Against this background, this paper re-addresses the empirical performance of the stan-
dard search-and-matching model of the labor market in which fluctuations are driven by
technology shocks. The empirical performance of the model is assessed based on second
moments that are conditional on technology shocks rather than on overall unconditional
moments.1 Since conditional and unconditional moments substantially differ in this case,
the judgement of the model that is based on unconditional moments may be very mis-
leading. The results provide answers to various issues of importance to the standard labor
market model. First, one can gain important insights into the failure of the model to
generate sufficient volatility on the unconditional level as documented by Shimer. Second,
in addition to the moments conditional on technology shocks, this analysis provides in-
formation about the importance of non-technology shocks and the dynamics induced by
these shocks. Put differently, unconditional dynamics may encompass various different
dynamics on the conditional level. Since the identified shocks are structural, the results
deliver a meaningful guidance for the formal modelling of the labor market dynamics.
Third, if the identified shocks are in fact shocks to the business cycle, their effect on the
rate of job separations sheds light on the validity of assuming a constant job separation
rate in a business-cycle model.
Two main findings emerge. With respect to volatility, the standard deviations of the job
finding rate and the unemployment rate that are conditional on technology shocks are much
lower than the unconditional ones. In addition, these standard deviations are, in fact, close
to the standard deviations that are generated within a commonly calibrated version of the
1I am not the first to address conditional moments with respect to labor market dynamics. Michelacci
and Lopez-Salido (2007), Ravn and Simonelli (2006), Fujita (2009) and many others all have also used
SVARs in order to investigate the effect of different shocks on worker and job flows. I will refer to differences
in the focus as well as methods and results below.
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standard model that is driven by technology shocks. Consequently, the Shimer critique
of the model with respect to its lack of volatility does not apply when the empirical
performance is based on conditional moments. Since the technology shocks generate only
a part of the overall volatility in the data, non-technology shocks play a substantial role
for this volatility as well. In order to replicate the unconditional moments in the data, the
standard model should therefore be augmented by additional non-technological sources
of fluctuations rather than with respect to a better propagation of technology shocks as
suggested in the literature. I show that shocks to the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure, so-called preference shocks, may work in this respect. Further,
job separations significantly move after both types of estimated shocks. This means that
it is not reasonable to assume the job separation rate to be constant over the cycle.
With respect to the conditional correlations, the co-movement of the job finding rate
with labor productivity that is conditional on technology shocks is negative, while the
conditional correlation of unemployment with productivity is positive. Put differently, job
finding falls after a positive technological innovation while unemployment increases. In
the standard labor market model, a positive technology shock of the same size leads to an
increase in labor productivity and, hence, to an increase in the job finding rate and a fall
in unemployment. This result constitutes a “job finding puzzle” from the viewpoint of the
standard model that is comparable to the so-called “hours puzzle” documented in Gal´ı
(1999). Since technology shocks play a considerable role for the business cycle variance of
the job finding rate and unemployment, this result is a much more serious challenge to the
empirical performance of the standard model than the Shimer volatility in unemployment
puzzle. Hence, this result supports models which are able to incorporate these effects.
Since the correlations of these two variables with productivity that are conditional on
technology shocks are of opposite sign as the respective unconditional moments, non-
technology shocks are necessary again to fully describe the overall dynamics in the data.
However, I show that preference shocks are not suitable to explain the remaining variation
in the data.
This paper presents results for different types of technology shocks and different types
of measures for the labor market dynamics. Based on Gal´ı (1999), technology shocks
are the only shocks that have a long-run effect on labor productivity. This assumption
holds in the RBC framework with frictional labor markets that is presented in Section
1.2. The identification of these standard Gal´ı technology shocks within a structural VAR
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as well as their conditional moments that are estimated including the Shimer worker flow
data are presented in Section 1.3. In addition, Fisher (2006) has motivated the separate
identification of factor-neutral and investment-specific (or capital-embodied) technology
shocks from the data. In the model, both of these shocks positively affect labor productiv-
ity in the long-run, while investment-specific technology shocks have a negative long-run
effect on price of investment goods relative to consumption goods in addition. Section
1.4 presents the identification of these two shocks based on assumptions derived from the
model and documents the results. Note that the identification employed uses an additional
assumption on the effect of investment-specific technology shocks on labor productivity
that goes back to Fisher. This assumption has an important effect on the results and has
been neglected by many other authors in similar studies (such as Canova et al. (2007)
and Ravn and Simonelli (2006)). Here, even though investment-specific technology shocks
provide an additional source of volatility in job finding and unemployment, they are not
large enough to explain the high volatility in the data. Further, investment-specific and
neutral technology shocks generate very similar dynamics in the worker flow data and
hence support the findings from the Gal´ı identification.
Moments conditional on neutral and investment-specific shocks from the Fisher identifi-
cation are presented for job flow data in Section 1.5.2. Data on job flows are generally
viewed as an alternative to worker flows in order to assess the empirical performance of a
model with a frictional labor market. Using recent data collected by Davis et al. (2006),
the volatility result outlined above prevails. The job finding puzzle vanished however
when incorporating job flows rather than worker flows in the estimation. Again, non-
technological disturbances are necessary in order to fully understand the overall dynamics
in the data.
Complementary to the Gal´ı and Fisher identification, Section 1.6 proposes a new and
alternative identification strategy for technology shocks which attempts to shed light on a
few issues that arise from the estimation of technology shocks and their potential impact
on the results. First, I document that the identified standard Gal´ı technology shocks
have a positive and significant effect on the relative price of investment. This means
that the Gal´ı technology shocks are neither truly neutral technology shocks nor are they
investment-specific technology shocks. Rather, these shocks are negatively biased towards
new investment. Neither the Gal´ı nor the Fisher identification accommodates this variation
in the data. Second, the Fisher identification of technology shocks employs an assumption
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which fixes the effect of the investment-specific technology shock on labor productivity
and consequently the correlation between this shock and the neutral technology shock.
I propose a mixture of long-run zero and sign restrictions to distinguish positive produc-
tivity shocks with positive from positive productivity shocks with negative effects on the
investment price. On the one hand, this provides an identification of investment-specific
technology shocks alternative to the Fisher identification. Thereby I can test the critical
Fisher restriction for its validity. On the other hand, I identify a new kind of technology
shocks, namely positive technology shocks that are negatively biased towards investment.
These shocks have so far not been taken into account in the literature as it is not clear how
to interpret them. However, they are shown to play a significant role for the dynamics of
the labor market variables. For both types of technology shocks following from this iden-
tification, the general results with respect to the empirical performance of the standard
model based on moments conditional on these shocks continue to hold.
1.2 A standard labor market model
1.2.1 The model
The standard labor market framework referred to in the following nests search-and-
matching in the labor market within a real-business-cycle (RBC) and growth model as
in Merz (1995). The model comprises the subsequent equations:
max
{Ct,Nt+1,Vt,Kt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
χ ln(Ct)− N
1+φ
t
1 + φ
)
subject to
AtK
α
t N
1−α
t ≥ Ct +Xt + aVtZt
Kt+1 ≤ (1− δ)Kt + ItXt
Nt+1 = (1− ψ)Nt + µV 1−ηt (1−Nt)η
At = exp(γ + εat)At−1
It = exp(ν + εit)It−1.
The posting of vacancies Vt creates a cost a and thereby search frictions. Employment next
period is determined by those jobs that remain after exogenous separation ψ and the new
job matches that are formed in this period via a commonly used Cobb-Douglas matching
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function with matching elasticity η. The labor force is assumed to be constant, so that
unemployment in period t can be measured by 1 − Nt. Job finding per period can be
described by Ft = µ( Vt1−Nt )
1−η and thus co-moves with labor market tightness, defined as
the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. The social planner representation can be derived
from a decentralized problem in which workers and firms bargain over the wage. In order
to meet the Hosios condition, the bargaining weight is implicitly set equal to the matching
elasticity in this setup.
As in Fisher (2006), growth is exogenously generated by two types of technological
progress. At represents general purpose technology in the production function and will
be called neutral technology in the following. It is referred to as investment-specific tech-
nology as makes new investment goods relatively cheaper than consumption goods and
hence drives the real price of new investments down.2 Through the capital accumulation
equation it favors new investments, leads to new capital formation and hence positively
affects output and labor productivity. As in Fisher, output, consumption, investment
and labor productivity grow with the rate αν+γ1−α along a balanced growth path, while the
capital stock grows at rate ν+γ1−α . Employment, unemployment and vacancies are station-
ary3. Shocks to these two types of technology generate business cycle fluctuations in the
model. Note that each one of these technology shocks also constitutes a labor productivity
shock. Through its positive effect on labor productivity, job finding rises after a positive
technology shock, while unemployment falls. Following from the two laws of motion for
technology, the investment-specific technology shock has a permanent effect on the rel-
ative price of investment, and both technology shocks have permanent effects on labor
productivity. These two properties will serve as identifying restrictions in the estima-
tion and hence, this framework serves as the suitable setup for the subsequent empirical
investigation.4
2This can also be described as 1
Pt
. Greenwood et al. (2000) derive this one-sector representation of the
model from a two-sector version with a consumption and an investment sector. Empirically, investment-
specific technological progress is believed to be responsible for the persistent fall in the real price of
equipment goods from 1955 until 2000 as measured by Cummins and Violante (2002) among others.
3Hence, vacancies are multiplied by Zt = A
1
1−α
t I
α
1−α
t in the budget constraint.
4Note that DeBock (2006) also presents a search-and-matching model with investment-specific tech-
nology shocks. However, the shocks are transitory in his framework and therefore not in line with our
identification of technology shocks applied later. Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) describe a search-
and-matching model with permanent neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. Their model is
much more complicated than the standard model here and aims at describing different results in the data.
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The labor market model outlined above differs in many respects from the standard
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model that provides the basis for the Shimer model.
Utility is not linear, but follows the standard assumptions in the RBC literature. In ad-
dition, due to the explicit modelling of capital and capital accumulation (i.e. savings) as
well as output fluctuations, the RBC setting aims much more at imitating real fluctua-
tions outside the labor market. This will be important for potential extensions in order
to augment the performance of the model with respect to other variables and to other
shocks. However, as in Shimer, this study focusses on the second moments of the central
variables that this model wants to explain, that is the dynamics in the job finding, job
separation and unemployment rate.
Both the Shimer model and the model outlined above lack many features that have been
shown to be important to replicate overall dynamics in the data such as nominal or real
rigidities outside the labor market. The standard labor market model serves as a baseline
model in order to contrast its empirical performance based on unconditional moments
with moments conditional on labor productivity shocks, that is, technology shocks. It is
straightforward to add any other non-technological source of variation on productivity,
e.g. demand shocks. As long as extensions of the model do not affect the validity of the
identification, the empirical results documented below remain equally valid. In Section
1.3, I will consider preference shocks which move the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure. In the model, this means that the parameter χ will be replaced
by a stochastic process of the form ln(xt) = ρx ln(xt−1) + εxt.
1.2.2 Empirical performance based on neutral shocks
Due to the difference to the Shimer model, I re-consider the empirical performance of the
model outlined above. To keep the framework as simple as possible, I start with considering
neutral shocks as the only source of variation in the model. For this, I calibrate the model
and generate artificial time series from the model, compute the respective second moments
and compare them to the unconditional ones in the data. I choose a set of standard
parameters for the calibration: a capital share in production of α = 13 , the time discount
factor of β = 0.99 and capital depreciation of δ = 0.02. The Frisch labor supply elasticity
is pinned down by φ = 1 and χ = 1. In line with Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment is set to η = 0.46. The
constant of the matching function (µ = 1.5) and the cost of posting vacancies (a = 0.02)
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are calibrated such that the steady state labor market tightness is equal to one and the
respective job finding rate equals the mean quarterly job finding rate of 1.5 in the worker
flow data used later in the estimation. The same data delivers the mean quarterly job
separation rate of ψ = 0.09.5
The first and second column of Table 1.1 compare the second moments in the data to those
that are generated from the model driven by neutral shocks only. Hence, εit = 0. The
growth rate and standard deviation of the neutral technology shock εat are then calibrated
to match the standard deviation of labor productivity which results in γ = 0.0035. Both
the artificial and the data series are detrended with a very smooth HP-filter (λ = 105) as
in Shimer in order to relate my results directly to his. In the actual data, the job finding
rate and unemployment are a lot more volatile than the job separation rate. From this,
Shimer concludes that unemployment fluctuations are mainly driven by fluctuations in the
job finding rather than the job separation rate. Furthermore, the standard deviation of
the job finding rate and unemployment are about ten times as large as the one in labor
productivity. All series are highly autocorrelated in the first lag.
The comparison with the model moments mirrors the Shimer volatility in unemployment
puzzle. First, the standard deviations of job finding and unemployment generated in
the model are very small compared to the ones in the data. Second, the correlation of
unemployment and job finding with productivity is too high in the model compared to
the data.6 Shimer concludes that there exists no internal propagation mechanism of labor
productivity shocks in the model, since the real wage strongly reacts to labor productivity
shocks and hence weakens the incentives for firms to post vacancies. In order to improve its
empirical performance, Shimer and also Hall (2005) have therefore proposed to introduce
rigid wages into the standard framework.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and many other authors have argued that Shimer’s volatil-
ity in unemployment puzzle disappears for a different calibration of the model, more pre-
cisely for a different calibration of the outside option of the workers in the wage bargaining.
This parameter is not considered here. Within the framework used above, the parameters
are chosen such that the volatility in the job finding rate and unemployment is as high
5For more details on the data and the sample, see Section 1.3.1.
6Table 1.7 shows that these result do not depend on the choice of the smoothing parameter in the
HP-Filter.
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as possible7. Put differently, the aim of this study is not to find a calibration such that
the model driven by technology shocks matches the unconditional moments in the data.
Rather, the output from this model in the standard calibration is to be compared to the
moments that are conditional on technology shocks.
1.3 Moments conditional on technology shocks
In the model, business cycle fluctuations of labor productivity, job finding and unemploy-
ment originate in movements of technological progress. It is therefore straightforward to
evaluate the empirical performance of the model based on second moments conditional
on technology shocks rather than on unconditional moments. In the data, shocks other
than technology shocks play a role for the overall fluctuations as well. Thus disentangling
the technology shocks from other shocks potentially serves three purposes. First, I can
investigate the dynamic relationships (correlations and impulse responses) between the
variables of interest that are conditional on technology shocks. Second, since these may
be different from the unconditional ones it may therefore be possible explain the failure
of the model on the unconditional level. Third, it is possible to assess the importance of
technology shocks for the unconditional data dynamics.
1.3.1 Identification and estimation
The effects of technology shocks on labor market variables can be investigated within
a structural VAR framework with long-run restrictions based on Blanchard and Quah
(1989). The main idea is to find a mapping that transforms the residuals from a reduced
form VAR into structural residuals such that the latter can be interpreted as certain types
of shocks such as technology shocks. These mappings typically involve assumptions on the
variance-covariance matrix of the structural shocks as well as restrictions on the effects of
these shocks on the variables in the VAR.
Based on Gal´ı (1999), technology shocks are identified via the central assumption that
they are the only shocks that positively affect labor productivity in the long-run. In addi-
tion, the technology shocks are orthogonal to each of the non-technology shocks estimated.
7Investigating sensitivity of this result to the choice of parameter values, it is possible, for example, to
increase the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment to the value proposed by Shimer of λ = 0.72
which clearly decreases the volatility of job finding and unemployment.
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Table 1.1: Historical decomposition of Gal´ı identification
Uncond. Model Conditional Moments
Sample I II Technology Residual
A: Standard Deviations
JFinding 0.1542 0.0536 0.0417 0.0548 0.1229
(0.04,0.08) (0.10,0.14)
JSeparation 0.062 0.0503 0.056
(0.04,0.06) (0.05,0.06)
Unemployment 0.1786 0.0519 0.0404 0.0881 0.1409
(0.06,0.12) (0.12,0.16)
Productivity 0.0156 0.0156 0.0116 0.0116 0.0166
(0.01,0.02) (0.01,0.02)
B: Autocorrelations
JFinding 0.9128 0.9071 0.9061 0.9189 0.8869
(0.86,0.95) (0.86,0.90)
JSeparation 0.6336 0.9256 0.6158
(0.89,0.95) (0.59,0.66)
Unemployment 0.9218 0.845 0.8443 0.9131 0.9109
(0.88,0.93) (0.90,0.92)
Productivity 0.8507 0.8701 0.868 0.8927 0.9206
(0.86,0.92) (0.90,0.94)
C: Cross-Correlations
JFind.,Prod. 0.0567 0.8625 0.8522 -0.436 0.6739
(-0.66,-0.10) (0.52,0.77)
JSep.,Prod. -0.4392 0.3544 -0.6703
(0.11,0.48) (-0.74,-0.59)
Unemp.,Prod. -0.1858 -0.7776 -0.7668 0.4613 -0.8014
(0.17,0.63) (-0.88,-0.70)
JFind.,Unemp. -0.9558 -0.9272 -0.9266 -0.9041 -0.9359
(-0.96,-0.75) (-0.95,-0.91)
JSep.,Unemp. 0.6845 0.885 0.6302
(0.80,0.92) (0.56,0.69)
JFind.,JSep. -0.4404 -0.596 -0.3167
(-0.76,-0.19) (-0.40,-0.19)
Notes: All series are detrended with the smooth HP-filter as in Shimer (2005a). For the conditional
moments, the series are simulated with the respective shock operating only. The point estimate is the
median, the confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution. Calibration I
of the model matches the unconditional standard deviation of labor productivity, calibration II matches
the same moment, conditional on technology shocks.
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These assumptions are implemented by including labor productivity in first differences and
ordered first in the VAR and then applying a Cholesky decomposition to the long-run hori-
zon forecast revision variance8. It has to be noted that many structural disturbances other
than technological innovations can affect labor productivity in the short and medium run,
but that technology shocks can be distinguished from non-technology shocks with respect
to their long-run effects on this variable. With this approach, I do not exactly estimate the
model outlined above. Rather the conditional moments obtained should hold for a broad
class of different model specifications that fulfill the identifying assumptions. The long-run
assumption about the nature of technology shocks holds in the model presented as well
as in many other models, such as the neoclassical growth model or the New Keynesian
model9.
All identification alternatives presented in the following are based on the same reduced-
form VAR which contains labor productivity, the job finding and separation rate. For
later comparison with alternative identification schemes, the relative price of investment
is added to the VAR. The reduced-form VAR is estimated within a Bayesian framework
with a Minnesota prior, similar to Canova et al. (2007). The Minnesota prior incorporates
a unit root in the levels of the variables included in the VAR and a fixed residual variance
which determines the tightness on own lags, other lags and potential exogenous variables
as well as the decay of the lags. Using the latter parameter, this prior allows us to generate
sensible results for a large number of lags, as Canova et al. outline. This addresses an
often cited criticism on the VAR approach (e.g. by Chari et al. (2008)) which states that
in theory one should employ a VAR with an infinite number of lags (here eight lags will
be employed) in order to correctly identify technology shocks using long run restrictions.
Except for the decay, I will use a relatively loose prior in the estimation10. Further, the
VAR is estimated with a trend as suggested by Canova et al. (2006). Here, the trend is
a dummy that is deterministically broken at 1973:2 and 1997:1. These dates have been
considered as break points in the growth literature and replicate the turning points in the
job separation rate and unemployment series.11
8See the Appendix A.1 for further details.
9It does not hold in endogenous growth frameworks.
10The prior variance of the coefficients depends on three hyper-parameters φ1 = 0.2, φ2 = 0.5 and
φ3 = 10
5, that determine the tightness and decay on own lags, other lags and exogenous variables. The
decay parameter is set to d = 7.
11See Fernald (2007b) for empirical evidence on the trend breaks. Section 1.4.3 presents robustness
checks to this specification along various dimensions including different priors, different break points for
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The baseline specification is estimated using quarterly time series data for the U.S. over the
sample 1955:1-2004:4. The job finding and separation rates are taken from the worker flow
data produced by Robert Shimer12. Labor productivity (output per hours of all persons) is
the standard non-farm business measure provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The real price of investment consists of a price index for equipment and software and a
consumption price deflator that is chain weighted from nondurable, service and government
consumption. The standard data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
have been criticized not to take into account the price-per-quality change in the investment
goods of interest (see Gordon (1990)). I use the quarterly series generated by Fisher (2006)
that is based on the measure of Cummins and Violante (2002) and that takes these flaws
into account13. Labor productivity and the relative price of investment are included in
growth rates in the VAR, while the job finding and separation rates are included in levels.
Under the assumption of homogenous workers and a constant labor force, the unem-
ployment rate can be approximated by the steady state unemployment rate u˜ = jsjs+jf .
Linearizing this relationship, one can also deduct the impulse-response of unemployment
from the responses of the job finding and the job separation rates. Shimer’s assumption
that the job separation rate does not move over the cycle and, therefore, does not play a
role for the fluctuations of unemployment has been criticized by Fujita and Ramey (forth-
coming) among others. In fact, the job separation rate is more strongly correlated with
labor productivity than the job finding rate as can be seen from the first column in Table
1.1. I include the job separation rate in the VAR in order to test this criticism.
1.3.2 The Shimer puzzle
Table 1.1 depicts the historical decomposition of the actual time series into the technol-
ogy and non-technology (or residual) components. These component series are generated
assuming the exclusive presence of the respective shock and using information on the first
lags in the sample. Detrending the resulting series with the smooth HP-filter as in Shimer
then delivers the business cycle components of interest. The historical decomposition doc-
uments the ability of the single shocks to replicate exactly those moments in the data that
the trend and no trend as well as different lag lengths in the VAR.
12This is the worker flow data officially posted on the website of Robert Shimer and documented in
Shimer (2005b). For additional details, see http://home.uchicago.edu/∼shimer/data/flows.
13The series by Jonas Fisher was extended by Ricardo DiCecio. I thank both for making their data
available to me.
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have been used for judging the empirical performance of the model.14
Volatility is measured by the standard deviation in panel A. The standard deviations of the
component series of the job finding rate and unemployment that are driven by technology
shocks are less than half of the overall sample volatility. In fact, if the model is calibrated
to match the standard deviation of labor productivity that is conditional on technology
shocks (calibration II in column 3 of Table 1.1), the standard deviation of the job finding
rate generated in the model is close to and lies within the confidence bands of the standard
deviation that is conditional on technology shocks.
The model assumes a constant job separation rate over the business cycle. The estimated
standard deviation of the job separation rate that is conditional on both technology shocks
and non-technology shocks is, however, significantly positive. If business cycles are driven
by technology shocks, this result undermines the assumption of a constant separation rate
over the cycle. Instead, this result favors a theoretical context with endogenous rather
than exogenously fixed job separation as in denHaan et al. (2000).
Addressing the empirical performance of the model with constant job separation never-
theless, one should therefore consider the volatility of unemployment that is driven by the
job finding rate only, setting the job finding rate to its mean value throughout the sample
period. The unconditional standard deviation of 0.1525 is then contrasted with the 0.0548
conditional on technology shocks and 0.1237 conditional on non-technology shocks (see
first row in Table 1.2). The standard deviation in unemployment that is generated by the
model therefore lies within the confidence bands conditional on technology shocks. As a
result, the technology-shock driven model works well to replicate the volatilities in the job
finding rate and unemployment that are conditional on technology shocks in the data. As
a consequence, the Shimer critique does not apply.
While the model works well to generate the volatility that is conditional on technology
shocks, it, however, still fails to explain the overall volatility in the sample. In fact, a
large part of the volatility still remains to be unexplained in the “residual” disturbances
as depicted in the last column of Table 1.115. In order to replicate the dynamics in the
14Note that the second moments resulting from these series do not add up to the unconditional moment.
Note also that all results discussed also hold for HP-filtered data using the standard parameter of λ = 1600
as can be seen in Table 1.7 in Section 3.4.
15In a parallel developed paper, Barnichon (2008) also shows the importance of non-technology shocks
for worker flows. He argues that these remaining shocks are monetary policy shocks.
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overall data, the standard search-and-matching model should consequently be augmented
by additional non-technology sources of volatility, generally referred to as demand shocks.
Hall (1997) has proposed a candidate for these residual shocks, namely preference shocks
or shocks to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.16 As
mentioned in Section 1.2, it is easy to incorporate these kinds of shocks into the model.
After a positive preference shock, agents in the economy want to consume and work more,
hence they are willing to accept a lower wage in order to become employed which increases
the incentive for firms to post vacancies and decreases unemployment. Panel A and B of
Table 1.2 depict the unconditional and conditional moments in the data (assuming a
constant job separation rate) as well as the moments from the model that is driven by
preference shocks only. The model is calibrated to match the standard deviation of labor
productivity that is conditional on the non-technology shocks which involves ρx = 0.5 and
σx = 0.2. Preference shocks are suitable to generate high volatility in these two variables
as suggested by Hall.
1.3.3 The “job finding puzzle”
The autocorrelations conditional on technology shocks are close to the unconditional ones.
The model lacks some persistence with respect to the job finding rate as the autocorre-
lation is a bit too low compared to the one in the data. Generally however, the model
performs well in replicating the conditional and unconditional autocorrelations. The con-
ditional co-movement of the variables is depicted in panel C of Table 1.1 and also in the
impulse-responses to a one-standard deviation technology shock in Figure 1.117. Most
prominently, job finding falls after a positive technology shock and the conditional corre-
lation between job finding and productivity is negative. Regardless of the job separation
rate, unemployment increases after the fall in job finding and the correlation of unemploy-
ment and productivity is positive. These two effects are opposite to those in the overall
sample and the exact contrary to what the standard model proposes. Hence, this result
16Hall decomposes macroeconomic variables into fluctuations that originate in technology, government
spending and preference shocks. He bases his decomposition on equations derived from a standard RBC-
model, he does not use structural VAR techniques for his analysis. He shows that preference shocks account
for most of the fluctuations in hours worked. His results are therefore similar to the results documented
here.
17The response of unemployment is calculated from the linearized relationship between the approximated
unemployment rate and the responses of the job finding and separation rates according to uˆt =
f
(s+f)2
sˆt−
s
(s+f)2
fˆt, where s and f are the mean values of the two rates respectively.
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Table 1.2: The role of job separation and preference shocks
Unconditional Model Conditional Moments
Sample Pref. Shocks Technology Residual
A: Standard Deviations
JFind. and Unemp. 0.1526 0.1314 0.0548 0.1238
(0.04,0.08) (0.10,0.14)
Productivity 0.0156 0.0165 0.0116 0.0165
(0.01,0.02) (0.01,0.02)
B: Autocorrelations
JFind. and Unemp. 0.9128 0.832 0.9207 0.8873
(0.85,0.95) (0.86,0.90)
Productivity 0.8507 0.9184 0.8902 0.9208
(0.86,0.92) (0.90,0.94)
C: Cross-Correlations
JFind.,Prod. 0.0489 -0.7702 -0.4347 0.662
(-0.64,-0.07) (0.53,0.76)
Unemp.,Prod. -0.0489 0.892 0.4332 -0.6626
(0.07,0.64) (-0.76,-0.53)
Notes: All series are detrended with the smooth HP-filter as in Shimer (2005a). Unemployment is calculated
with a job separation rate that is constant and set equal to its mean value over the sample. For the condi
tional moments, the series are simulated with the respective shock operating only. The point estimate is
the median, the confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution. The model
is driven by preference shocks only and is calibrated such that it matches the conditional standard deviation
of labor productivity.
challenges the conventional dynamics in the standard search-and-matching model in a
similar fashion as the results in Gal´ı (1999), known as the “hours puzzle”, have challenged
the RBC paradigm with frictionless labor markets.18
A variance decomposition adds up the impulse-response coefficients from the estimation
to a certain conventional business cycle horizon. This statistic reports the respective con-
tribution of each shock to the overall variance and therefore also highlights the importance
of the shocks relative to each other. Decomposing the business cycle variance of the Gal´ı
identification into the contribution of technology and non-technology shocks, technology
shocks explain up to 17% of the business cycle variance of job finding and over 20% of the
variance of unemployment. Hence, an appropriate model should take these dynamics into
account.
18Researchers have questioned that the identified shocks can in fact be interpreted as technology shocks.
Section 1.3.4 shows robustness for this finding using an alternative measure of technology derived by Basu
et al. (2006).
23
Figure 1.1: Impulse-responses to Gal´ı technology shocks
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Notes: Responses in percentage points to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
Gal´ı has explained the drop in hours worked within a sticky price New Keynesian frame-
work. Can the natural extension of this framework including search-and-matching in the
labor market equally explain the drop in the job finding rate? In the case of hours, fixed
demand in the short run leads firms to adjust hours worked after a positive technology
shock. Since it is much more costly to adjust employment rather than hours worked, it
is not clear that the same mechanism works equally well in this context. In their speci-
fication with real rigid wages, Blanchard and Gal´ı (2006) document that unemployment
increases after a positive productivity shock. Here, labor market tightness and hence the
job finding rate move together with unemployment replicating the dynamics documented
above. Barnichon (2008) uses a similar reasoning to generate the fall in labor market
tightness which he documents in a similar SVAR-framework as the one presented here.
However, as conjectured, his model is not able to generate the large fall in labor market
tightness and strong increase in unemployment that we see in the data.19
There exist explanations for this empirical finding different from a New Keynesian setup.
Chapter 2 documents that the shocks that have been identified as neutral technology
shocks in the Gal´ı identification are in fact positively biased towards new skills (as they
have a positive effect on the wage premium of high to low skilled workers). Consider a
framework in which two types of workers are used in production and are to some degree
substitutable. After a positive skill-biased technology shock, high-skilled workers become
19In contrast, Krause and Lubik (2007) present a framework in which job finding falls after a positive
productivity shock mentioning that the resulting dynamics are counterfactual. This is no longer true based
on conditional moments. In Christoffel et al. (2006), vacancies fall and unemployment increases after a
positive productivity shock, resulting in an fall of labor market tightness and the job finding rate.
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more productive than low-skilled workers and overall labor productivity increases. Low-
skilled workers will then be substituted out of employment. The job finding rate for
low-skilled workers will drop, while it will potentially increase for high-skilled workers. If
the negative effect on low-skilled is larger than the positive effect on high-skilled workers,
the overall job finding rate drops and unemployment increases.
Regardless of the mechanism, a model driven by technology shocks is again not suitable
to explain the overall dynamics in the data. Rather, non-technology shocks are needed
in order to model the unconditional dynamics in the data. Reconsidering the preference
shocks from above, these kinds of shocks have been popular in the RBC-literature in order
to explain the empirical correlation of labor productivity with hours20. Table 1.2 docu-
ments that the correlations of the job finding rate and unemployment with productivity
that are generated by preference shocks in the model are opposed to the ones conditional
on non-technology shocks in the data, however. After a positive preference shock, agents
want to consume more and hence decrease investments. Capital falls and, after an initial
increase, output falls as a consequence. Due to the increase in employment, labor pro-
ductivity falls which induces a negative correlation of this variable with the job finding
rate and a positive one with unemployment. Hence, preference shocks are not suitable to
explain the conditional correlations within this setup. It has to be noted that in a New
Keynesian setup, the induced correlations are different and preference shocks could repli-
cate the empirical dynamics. A distinction between skill-biased and skill-neutral shocks
could also provide two shocks that match the conditional correlations in the data.
As exhibited in Figure 1.1, job separation significantly increases after a positive technology
shock contributing to an even larger increase in unemployment. A rise in job separation
after a positive innovation in technology might be due to the fact that not all of the
existing job matches can freely use this new technology. Hence, technological innovation
is embodied in new jobs, or specific to existing vintages. Canova et al. (2007) employ a
vintage human capital in order to model the “Schumpeterian creative destruction” after
a neutral technology shock. As is documented in greater detail in Section 1.4.3, the effect
of job separation is not robust neither when considering different sub-samples nor to the
in- or exclusion of a trend in the estimation.
20See for example Bencivenga (1992) on the Dunlop-Tarshis observation.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse-responses to BFK technology shocks
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Notes: Responses in percentage points to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
1.3.4 Are the estimated shocks really technology shocks?
Many researchers have questioned that the structural residuals that are identified from a
Gal´ı-style VAR are in fact estimates of technological progress. Supporting the findings
from Gal´ı, a recent piece of evidence from Basu et al. (2006) has documented that their
measure of technological progress, derived as a “sophisticated” Solow residual from a very
different exercise, also induces a contractionary effect on hours worked. Here, I use this
measure in order to support the effect of technology on the job finding and separation
rate from my estimation in two different ways. First, I incorporate “true” total-factor-
productivity (TFP) instead of labor productivity into my SVAR with long-run restrictions.
Neutral technology shocks are then the only shocks that move TFP in the long run.
As depicted in Figure 1.2, the effects of these shocks on the job finding rate, the job
separation rate and unemployment are very similar to the ones from the estimation with
labor productivity. Second, as suggested by Basu et al. (2006), I regress four lags of their
technology measure (dz) on job finding and job separation. Here, I detrend the two rates as
in the VAR by regressing them on a dummy trend broken at 1973:2 and 1997:1. Table 1.3
shows the results, for impulse-responses, one could simply add the estimated coefficients.
Here, TFP has a negative effect on the job finding rate. The effect on the job separation
rate is also negative, but since this effect is small (and insignificant), unemployment still
increases after a shock to TFP.
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Table 1.3: Regression on BFK measure
Dependent variable Regressor
dz dz(-1) dz(-2) dz(-3) dz(-4)
JFinding -0.6250* -0.3429 -0.4441* -0.5339* -0.3447
JSeparation -0.1473 0.0305 -0.0835 -0.1753 -0.1848
Notes: The star * denotes significance based on one standard error bands.
1.4 Different shocks: Fisher identification
Fisher (2006) based on Greenwood et al. (1997) has addressed the issue that fluctua-
tions in labor productivity might be generated not only by factor-neutral technolog-
ical progress, but also by investment-specific technological innovations. Consequently,
investment-specific technological progress satisfies the identifying assumption for the Gal´ı
technology shocks and hence invalidates the interpretation of these shocks to be factor-
neutral. Fisher proposes a strategy to separately estimate neutral and investment-specific
technology shocks and documents that the two shocks might have different effects on
macroeconomic variables. Further, investment-specific technological progress contributes
to a larger extend to growth and cyclical fluctuations of macroeconomic variables (in
particular of output and hours worked) than neutral technology. Investment-specific tech-
nological progress thus provides a potential additional source of variation in the job finding
rate and unemployment.
In the original Shimer framework, it is not possible to distinguish between these two
sources of variation in labor productivity, while the model in Section 1.2 does differentiate
between these two shocks. As mentioned before, the labor market dynamics that are
induced by the two technology shocks are actually very similar, i.e., job finding increases
and unemployment falls after both technology shocks. However, since the formation of
capital takes time, productivity increases with a lag in response to investment-specific
technological progress. This increases the overall standard deviation of the job finding
rate and unemployment in the model in which both types of technology shocks operate
(see second column of Table 1.8 in the Appendix to Chapter 1). Further, the correlation
between the job finding rate and productivity is smaller than in the model with neutral
shocks only. However, these effects are not large enough to replicate the unconditional
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data moments, hence the Shimer critique still holds.21
1.4.1 Identification
In order to identify the two types of technology shocks, Fisher imposes the assumption
that investment-specific technology shocks are the only shocks that (negatively) affect the
relative price of investment in the long-run and that are additionally allowed to affect labor
productivity in the long-run. (Investment-)neutral technology shocks are then the only
remaining shocks that affect labor productivity in the long run. Note that this assumption
is true in the model outlined in Section 1.2.
It is easy to implement these two assumptions ordering the first differences of the relative
investment price and labor productivity first in the reduced-form VAR and applying a
Cholesky decomposition to the long-run forecast revision variance. However, the effect
of the investment-specific shocks on labor productivity is estimated to be negative in our
baseline specification. This means that all or at least a part of the identified investment-
specific shocks are not technology shocks according to the Gal´ı definition and more im-
portantly not positive shocks to labor productivity as the ones in the model and referred
to by Shimer. Fisher addresses this problem by introducing the additional assumption
that positive investment-specific shocks increase labor productivity by a fixed proportion
to their effect on the investment price. Derived from the production function in the model
this proportion is set to α(1−α) . This additional assumption comes at a cost as it not only
strongly restricts the long-run productivity effect of investment-specific shocks to a certain
value but also implies a positive and fixed correlation between the investment-specific and
neutral technology shocks.22
There exist several a few studies that consider the responses of worker flows to both neutral
and investment-specific technology shocks based on the Fisher identification. The work
by Canova et al. (2006) is closely related to the analysis in this section of the paper. The
estimation of the reduced form VAR in a Bayesian framework with a Minnesota prior is
21In this simulation of the model, the growth rates and standard deviations of the two types of technology
shocks are calibrated to match the moments of labor productivity and the investment price which results
in γ = 0.0074 and ν = −0.0117 for our sample. The mean growth rate of labor productivity then equals
1
1−αγ +
α
1−αν.
22See Figure 1.6 for a comparison of the responses of the restricted and the unrestricted Fisher iden-
tification. See the Appendix A.3 for more details and the implementation of this identification scheme.
Parallel to the model calibration I use α = 1
3
.
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taken directly from them. However, Canova et al. employ the Fisher identification without
the additional third restriction. Equally, Ravn and Simonelli (2006) identify technology
shocks without the third restriction in a framework which also incorporates fiscal and
monetary policy shocks. Adding the third restriction delivers quite different dynamics
induced by the investment-specific technology shock. I will discuss this issue further in
Section 1.6 in which I also propose a test for the third restriction. Complementary to
these studies, there exist many contributions in the literature that estimate medium or
large scale DSGE models which incorporate search-and-matching in the labor market.
Here, technology shocks are usually identified based on a combination of short-run sign
restrictions as in Fujita (2009) or Braun et al. (2006). While these shocks should generally
depict the same dynamics as the technology shocks identified in this paper, this is not
always the case and depends on the fact that the co-movement between labor input and
productivity in the short run is explicitly used for identification.
1.4.2 Results
The historical decomposition of the standard deviation supplements the results from the
Gal´ı identification, see Table 1.8 in the Appendix to Chapter 1. Both types of technology
shocks, as well as both technology shocks taken together, generate standard deviations
in the job finding rate and unemployment that are much smaller than the unconditional
standard deviations, but quite close to the ones produced from the model. Again, sources
other than technology are necessary to understand the unconditional volatility in the
data.23
With respect to the conditional dynamics, Figure 1.3 depicts the responses of the job
finding and separation rate as well as unemployment to positive one standard deviation
technology shocks from the Fisher identification. Note that the responses to the neutral
shock are very similar to the responses derived from the Gal´ı identification. Job finding
drops after both types of technology. This effect is stronger and more persistent after a
neutral technology shock than after an investment-specific shock. The job separation rate
does not significantly react to an investment-specific technology shock. The falling job
finding rate positively affects the unemployment rate, but the effect is again not as strong
as for the neutral technology shock. Consequently, the contrast between the conditional
23Note that here, the two technology shocks are not orthogonal. Hence, the historical decomposition is
not truly a decomposition. Technology shocks and the residual disturbances are orthogonal, however.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse-responses to Fisher technology shocks
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Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
dynamics in the data versus the ones in the model still exists, but is weaker in case of the
investment-specific shocks. This is also reflected in the conditional correlations in panel C
in Table 1.8. The conditional correlation of job finding and productivity is much lower than
the one conditional on a neutral shock, the correlation of unemployment with productivity
has the same sign as the unconditional one, both of these figures are insignificant. The
investment-specific technology shock therefore moderates the effect of the neutral shock.
Both technology shocks taken together however still generate dynamics that are opposite
to the unconditional dynamics and that are not replicated in the model.
Table 1.6 in the Appendix to this chapter exhibits the contribution of the shocks to the
forecast error variance of the variables in this small VAR. The neutral shock is much more
important for the variances of the labor market variables than the investment-specific
shock. This highlights again the importance to replicate the dynamics of this shock in an
appropriate model. Together, the technology shocks explain between 45% to 60% of the
variance of job finding and unemployment.24
24This result is similar to Canova et al. (2007) who, in spite of an alternative identification of investment-
specific technology shocks, document that employment effects can mainly be attributed to neutral tech-
nology shocks.
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1.4.3 Robustness
This section investigates the robustness of the main results from the Fisher identifica-
tion. As documented above, the neutral shocks from the Fisher identification and the
Gal´ı identification are very similar in fact. The robustness analysis focusses on the two
main results: The low standard deviation conditional on neutral and invest-ment-specific
technology shocks in job finding and unemployment and the drop in the job finding rate
after positive innovations of both types of technology. Table 1.4 summarizes the results.
The first set of robustness checks deals with the prior and the lag length in the estimation
of the reduced form VAR. Clearly, the baseline specification with the Minnesota prior is
different from a standard OLS specification with 2 to 4 lags in the VAR. In the Minnesotay
prior, a high decay parameter is necessary for a large number of lags to generate both
significant and sensible results. Using a smaller number of lags together with a smaller
decay on these lags, or similarly a flat prior (OLS equivalent) for the estimation of the
reduced form VAR, qualitatively supports the findings in the baseline specification, but is
not significant, however. Further, the results are robust to relaxing the assumption of a
fixed residual variance within a Normal-Wishart prior structure. The prior suggested by
Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) employs the same mean for the coefficients as the Minnesota
prior and generalizes the Minnesota prior in terms of a non-diagonal, unknown residual
variance. Compared to the Minnesota prior, the coefficient variance additionally weights
the effect of the exogenous variables on a variable with its respective variance and fixes
φ1 = 1.
The baseline specification includes a broken dummy-trend into the specification which is
not uncontroversial. In fact, the question of whether or not to include a trend into the
specification is closely related to the debate on how to specify hours worked in a similar
structural VAR. Here, it has been shown that if specified in first differences or HP-filtered,
hours worked fall after a positive Gal´ı-type technology shock, while they increase after
the same type of shock if specified in levels (see Gal´ı (1999) and Christiano et al. (2003)
respectively). The fall in hours worked after a positive technology shock contradicts the
standard RBC paradigm and has become famous as the “hours puzzle” in the literature.
In fact, a trend as the one applied here takes out slow-moving components from the series
and is therefore related to taking first differences of the labor market variables. Canova et
al. (2006) argue that if the variables are specified in levels, long-run restrictions may pick
up the slowly moving components of the variables, even though they aim at explaining
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Table 1.4: Robustness of the Fisher identification
Conditional Standard Deviation Impulse Response
Job Finding Unemployment Job Finding
i-shock n-shock i-shock n-shock i-shock** n-shock
Baseline 0.0627 0.0667 0.0692 0.0972 -,sign. -,sign.
Baseline specification with Minnesota prior changed to
4 lags, decay 7 0.0651 0.071 0.0808 0.1129 -,sign. -,sign.
12 lags, decay 7 0.069 0.0702 0.847 0.1053 -,sign. -,sign.
8 lags, decay 4 0.579 0.0477 0.0745 0.0689 -;+,not sign. -,not sign.
3 lags, decay 1 0.0533 0.0567 0.0706 0.0809 -,not sign. -,not sign.
Flat prior (OLS equivalent) with
2 lags 0.0511 0.0609 0.727 0.0971 -,not sign. -,not sign.
3 lags 0.0533 0.0649 0.0737 0.0899 -;+,not sign. -,not sign.
K and K prior* 0.651 0.0738 0.689 0.1037 -,sign. -,sign.
Trend specification
no break 0.0667 0.0595 0.058 0.0494 -,sign. -,sign.
Fisher subsamples without break
1955:I-1979:II 0.0828 0.0853 0.0784 0.0895 -,sign. -,sign.
1982:III-2004:IV 0.0352 0.059 0.0777 0.0402 -;+,sign. -,sign.
Fujita and Ramey subsample without break
1976:III-2004:IV 0.0424 0.0699 0.0622 0.0528 -;+,sign. -,sign.
Notes: **Describes the effect on impact. Here, -;+ indicates initial drop, then hump-shaped increase.
*Kadiyala and Karlsson prior with Minnesota structure, same parameters as in baseline specification.
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business cycles fluctuations.
Figure 1.11 shows the results for the baseline specification without the dummy breaks.
The job finding rate still decreases after positive innovations of both technology shocks.
This means that the “job finding” puzzle is is robust to including a trend or not in the
specification. Note further that job separation now falls significantly after both shocks.
In fact, it falls by such a large extend that the unemployment rate falls in the longer
horizon which reflects the result from the hours debate. In addition, the results from the
entire sample are compared to results for subsamples suggested by Fisher (2006). Here,
no trend is incorporated into the specification, the results are robust to an inclusion of
trend breaks as in the baseline specification, however. In the latter sample, investment-
specific technology shocks induce an initial fall in the job finding rate and a subsequent,
(borderline) significant increase. Job separation does not react to a neutral shock, but
decreases significantly after an investment-specific technology shock. Hence, these shocks
do generate dynamics different from the neutral shocks in this sample.
1.5 Alternative variables
1.5.1 Alternative worker flows
The worker flow data of Shimer and the respective business-cycle facts are not uncon-
troversial in the literature. Fujita and Ramey (forthcoming) have also calculated worker
flows from the CPS. The Fujita and Ramey dataset does not encompass the same sample
as the one by Shimer; it ranges from 1976:3 to 2004:425. As stated by the authors, the
standard deviation of the job separation rate is higher and the one of job finding is lower in
their data series compared to Shimer. This suggests a larger role for the first series in the
dynamics of unemployment. Job separation is also more persistent. The correlations of
the job finding and separation rates with productivity are much lower than in the Shimer
series. Figure 1.4 shows that the responses in both datasets are quite similar. Note that
job separation decreases after a positive technology shock. However, this is mainly due to
the subsample rather than the difference in the measurement of the data. In fact, results
for the job separation rate are not robust to subsample choices or different specifications.
25I thank Shigeru Fujita for making the data available to me.
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Figure 1.4: Shimer versus Fujita-Ramey
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Notes: Solid lines depict Shimer data, broken lines show Fujita and Ramey data.
Responses in percentage points to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
1.5.2 Job flows
Instead of worker flows, so-called job flow data have often been used to assess the empirical
validity of the standard labor market model (similar to Cole and Rogerson (1999) and
Davis et al. (1998)). Note that from the perspective of the standard model job flows and
worker flows are indistinguishable, i.e., when a worker moves into or out of a job, the
job match is automatically created or destroyed. In the data, these two concepts show
quite different unconditional business-cycle moments however, and hence it is interesting
to consider conditional moments in job flows complementary to the above.
Here, I use data from Faberman (2006) which encompasses the fluctuations of jobs defined
as small size units (“plants”) that are created and destroyed within the U.S. manufactur-
ing sector26. The resulting rates are usually referred to as job creation and destruction
rates and both are measured in percent of employment. Unemployment dynamics are
approximated by unemployment growth which results from taking the difference between
the job destruction and creation rate. In the following, the same exercise as in the Fisher
identification in Section 1.4 is repeated by using job flows rather than worker flows. Table
1.5 presents the conditional and unconditional moments from this set of data together
with the familiar moments from the model.
Note that in this sample, that job destruction is about twice as volatile as job creation.
Both series are less persistent than the worker flows, while the cross-correlations between
the variables are qualitatively similar, but quite different in value from the ones in the
26The data is also described in Davis et al. (2006). I thank Jason Faberman for making the data available
to me.
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Table 1.5: Historical decomposition from Fisher identification - Job flows
Uncond. Model Conditional Moments
Sample Inv. Tech. Neu. Tech. All Tech. Residual
A: Standard Deviations
Creat. 0.0765 0.0775 0.0455 0.0336 0.041 0.0732
(0.0717) (0.04,0.06) (0.03,0.04) (0.03,0.05) (0.07,0.08)
Dest. 0.1311 0.0547 0.0473 0.0583 0.1214
(0.04,0.08) (0.03,0.07) (0.04,0.07) (0.11,0.13)
Unemp. 1.0612 0.0708 0.3921 0.2604 1.7027 3.9574
(0.0657) (0.25,0.57) (0.17,0.40) (1.27,2.17) (3.78,4.16)
Prod. 0.0156 0.0156 0.0174 0.0191 0.013 0.01
(0.0129) (0.01,0.02) (0.02,0.02) (0.01,0.01) (0.01,0.01)
B: Autocorrelations
Creat. 0.6177 0.8655 0.8254 0.9051 0.8226 0.6383
(0.8671) (0.75,0.90) (0.81,0.96) (0.76,0.89) (0.60,0.67)
Dest. 0.7222 0.8247 0.6189 0.7751 0.7146
(0.63,0.88) (0.45,0.82) (0.65,0.86) (0.70,0.74)
Unemp. 0.6683 0.8607 0.8133 0.5611 0.9457 0.9455
(0.8632) (0.69,0.86) (0.33,0.77) (0.93,0.96) (0.94,0.95)
Prod. 0.8507 0.8482 0.8563 0.8141 0.864 0.8514
(0.855) (0.80,0.90) (0.77,0.85) (0.85,0.88) (0.79,0.90)
C: Cross-Correlations
JC,P 0.1545 0.5141 0.4224 0.2328 0.2206 0.0636
(0.4087) (0.21,0.57) (-0.12,0.46) (0.08,0.34) (-0.08,0.24)
JD,P -0.4733 -0.4225 0.2207 -0.0073 -0.6159
(-0.65,-0.02) (-0.31,0.43) (-0.22,0.23) (-0.76,-0.45)
U,P -0.4449 -0.4427 -0.5901 0.0538 0.1561 -0.0678
(-0.3506) (-0.72,-0.35) (-0.47,0.37) (-0.13,0.40) (-0.14,0.02)
JC,U -0.7176 -0.8718 -0.6134 -0.3034 0.2599 0.114
(-0.8749) (-0.79,-0.31) (-0.56,-0.05) (0.11,0.43) (0.04,0.19)
JD,U 0.9242 0.7912 0.782 0.3496 0.1383
(0.59,0.90) (0.58,0.89) (0.25,0.45) (0.10,0.18)
JC,JD -0.4187 0.0523 0.4158 -0.0813 -0.3764
(-0.33,0.49) (0.07,0.65) (-0.32,0.22) (-0.42,-0.34)
Notes: All series are detrended with the smooth HP-filter as in Shimer (2005a). The point estimate is the median,
the confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution. The model is calibrated to
match the unconditional standard deviation of labor productivity and the same figure that is conditional
on both technology shocks (in brackets).
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worker flow series. With regard to the empirical performance of the standard model based
on unconditional second moments, this means that while the model now replicates the
standard deviation of job creation (in fact the standard deviation is a little too high in
the model), it does not mirror the volatility of the job destruction rate and hence unem-
ployment. A natural extension of this model would include endogenous job destruction
as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) or denHaan et al. (2000) in order to account for
fluctuations in this variable. The model does not aim at explaining the positive correlation
between productivity and job creation with unemployment.
Conditional on investment-specific and neutral technology shocks, the standard deviation
in job creation is even smaller than the unconditional one. More importantly, the two
technology shocks generate a standard deviation of job destruction and unemployment
that is only about a third of the one in the data. Hence, job destruction does move after
technology shocks, but most of its volatility stems from non-technological disturbances.
This means that endogenous job destruction alone cannot realign the moments from the
model with the unconditional moments. Complementary to this result, technology shocks
explain only up to 17% of the business cycle variance of job creation and destruction as
is exhibited in Table 1.9 in the Appendix to Chapter 1. My result supports the findings
from the previous sections that an additional non-technological disturbance is needed in
order to explain the fluctuations observed unconditionally.
Panel C of Table 1.5 depicts the conditional cross-correlations of the labor market vari-
ables with each other and productivity. Figure 1.7 in the Appendix to this chapter also
visualizes the dynamics induced by the two technology shocks. Most importantly, job
creation and labor productivity are positively correlated after both technology shocks. As
a consequence, the “job finding puzzle” after a neutral technology innovation from before
disappears. Unemployment still increases after a positive neutral shock, due to the strong
increase in job destruction (This is also reflected in the positive co-movement of these
variables with productivity). Even though insignificant, in a model with endogenous job
destruction and vintage technologies, job destruction may increase after a positive shock
to technology if it can only be used in newly formed jobs rendering many existing job
matches technologically obsolete. Then, these effects provide a valid and easy explanation
to the rise in unemployment or parallel the fall in hours after a technology shocks and,
hence, to the hours puzzle documented by Gal´ı (1999). Strikingly, investment-specific
technology shocks induce dynamics that are different from the ones generated by neutral
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technology shocks and that are similar to those expected from the standard model: Job
creation goes up and job destruction falls after a positive innovation in investment-specific
technology. As a consequence, unemployment decreases before converging back to zero.
The responses after the investment-specific shocks exhibit greater persistence than the
ones after a neutral shock.27 However, investment-specific technology shocks are not im-
portant enough to explain the unconditional moments. Again, an additional source of
fluctuations is necessary here.
Are the results from the Fisher identification with worker and with job flows are truly
comparable? Plotting the structural shocks from the two estimations and calculating their
correlation, it is possible to see that the investment-specific shocks are almost identical
in both specifications. The neutral shocks from both estimations are positively correlated
(the correlation coefficient is about 0.6), but not identical. Alternatively, both job and
worker flow data can be included into one common specification. This is also important in
the light of the joint dynamics of these two data concepts which has been an issue in the
literature. The results show that the effects of the neutral shock on job creation and job
destruction hardly change28. To summarize, since the two data concepts not only generate
quite different unconditional statistics, but also react differently to the estimated shocks,
it seems reasonable to try to distinguish the different concepts and model the empirical
dynamics of these two sets of data in a theoretical framework as well.
1.6 Alternative identification
1.6.1 Motivation and identification
This section investigates to which extend the results outlined above in sections 1.3 and
1.4.2 strongly rely on the imposed identification assumption for the technology shocks, or
whether they are robust to an alternative identification scheme as well. To motivate, let
us briefly return to the Gal´ı identification of technology shocks. In fact, the identified Gal´ı
shocks have a significant and positive effect on the relative price of investment. These
shocks are therefore negatively biased towards new investment and mistakenly labelled
27Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) do a similar empirical exercise with job flow data. They document
similar responses after a neutral technology shock, but different responses after an investment-specific
technology shock due a different identification.
28Job creation drops on impact after a positive neutral technology shock, but then rises with a hump-
shape above zero.
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factor-neutral, see Figure 1.8 in the Appendix to Chapter 129.
The Fisher identification separates technology shocks that have an effect on the relative
price of investment from technology shocks that do not have an effect on the relative price of
investment and hence are truly investment-neutral. However, the Fisher identification dis-
regards those shocks that have a positive effect on both productivity and the price. When
estimated without the third restriction on the productivity effect of investment-specific
shocks, these shocks are incorporated into the investment-specific technology shocks in
the Fisher identification. The difference between the results from the Fisher identification
with and without the third restriction documents that these shocks may play an important
role in the overall dynamics of these two variables. More precisely, labor productivity falls
in response to these unrestricted investment-specific technology shocks (see discussion in
Section 1.4). Additionally, these unrestricted shocks produce labor market dynamics that
are quite different from the ones generated by the restricted shocks. Namely, job finding
increases in a hump-shape after a positive investment-specific technology shock and job
separation falls. As a result, unemployment decreases.30 The unrestricted shocks also play
a much larger role for the business cycle variance of the labor market variables than the
restricted shocks.
Against this background, I propose an alternative identification of technology shocks which
separates investment-specific technology shocks from those other shocks. The identifica-
tion strategy imposes the following assumptions:
1. Technology shocks are assumed to be the only shocks that affect the relative price
of investment and labor productivity in the long run.
2. Out of these shocks, investment-specific technology shocks are those shocks that
affect labor productivity positively and the relative price of investment negatively in
the long run.
3. Out of these shocks, the remaining shocks may affect labor productivity positively
and the relative price of investment positively in the long run.
These assumptions are implemented with a mixture of long-run zero and sign restrictions
similar to the Gal´ı and Fisher identifications. I order the relative price of investment and
29Chapter 2 documents that these shocks are not only biased negatively towards investment, but also
towards skilled labor.
30See Figure 1.9 in the Appendix to this chapter.
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labor productivity first in the VAR and impose zero restrictions on the long-run effects
of all but the first two shocks on these variables. Sign restrictions similar as in Peersman
(2005) are then applied to the upper left 2-by-2 system of the long-run horizon forecast
revision matrix according to the restrictions outlined above. The remaining elements of
the long-run effects can then be calculated subsequently.31.
Figure 1.10 in the Appendix to Chapter 1 visualizes the assumed responses of price and
productivity to the two newly identified shocks. Not surprisingly, the new shocks turn
out to be negatively biased towards investment and may consequently called investment-
unspecific technology shocks. Note that the Gal´ı, Fisher and the alternative identification
strategies all offer an alternative decomposition of the long-run variance of the investment
price and productivity32. The Fisher and Gal´ı identification each impose an extra zero
restriction on this system. This means that by construction the Fisher identification
does not deliver shocks that induce the same effect on the price and productivity as the
Gal´ı identification. Thus, the Fisher identification does not provide a decomposition of
the Gal´ı technology shocks. My alternative identification is more closely related to the
Gal´ı identification as this scheme decomposes Gal´ı’s productivity shocks into investment-
specific and -unspecific shocks. I can now test Fisher’s third identifying assumption based
on the effect of the first shock in a more general context in which all shocks are in fact
orthogonal. Further, I can assess the importance of those shocks that resulting from the
unrestricted Fisher identification might have been labelled investment-specific technology
shocks by mistake and can explore their properties. However, it is no longer possible to
distinguish between investment-specific and investment-neutral shocks in this setup.
What are technology shocks that drive the relative price of investment up? In the model
outlined in Section 1.2, shocks that have a positive effect on the relative price of investment
negatively affect labor productivity and, hence, are not technology shocks. As a conse-
quence, the model outlined above does not accommodate these shocks and it is therefore
not clear how to interpret them in this context. Chapter 2 suggests to identify technol-
ogy shocks which originate in the labor market. More precisely, it is documented that
technology shocks that are biased towards skilled labor have a positive effect on the rela-
tive price of investment and could therefore capture the variation of the data documented
31For further details of the implementation of the long-run sign restrictions are contained in Appendix
A.4.
32This is true if the price is ordered second in the Gal´ı identification. The remaining elements of the
first two rows of this matrix are always zero.
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here.33 Once more, this points to the use of a more complex production function with
which it is possible to distinguish between low and high skilled labor in order to replicate
the empirical dynamics.
1.6.2 Results
Table 1.11 in the Appendix to this chapter exhibits the historical decompositions for
this identification scheme. Regarding volatility, the standard deviations conditional on
investment-specific technology shocks are very close to the results from the Fisher iden-
tification. The two identified technology shocks together generate a conditional standard
deviation that is again less than half of the unconditional standard deviation in job finding,
separation and unemployment. This is not surprising, since the alternative identification
is just a different decomposition of the technology shocks from the other identification
schemes.
More interesting in this respect are the labor market dynamics induced by the two new
shocks documented in Figure 1.5 and Table 1.11. For both types of shocks, job finding
drops and unemployment increases supporting the findings of the Fisher and Gal´ı identifi-
cation. There are significant differences between the responses of the two shocks however.
After an investment-specific productivity shock job separation does not move significantly.
Note that the dynamics of this shock are very similar to the ones I have documented for
the restricted Fisher investment-specific technology shocks. Indeed, the estimated rela-
tionship between the effect of this shock on the price and productivity is very close to the
one imposed via the third restriction. After an investment-unspecific shock job finding
does not react on impact and subsequently decreases in a hump-shape, job separation
significantly rises and the rising unemployment inherits the hump-shape from the effects
on the job finding rate34.
The variance decomposition in Table 1.10 in the Appendix to this chapter sheds light on the
33The identification of these shocks originates in the effect of technological progress on the skill premium
in a model which allows for both skilled and unskilled labor in production. The fact that the investment
price increases in responses to these shocks provides evidence for capital-skill substitutability in the data.
34Note that the inverse of this shock is an investment-specific technology shock with a negative effect
on productivity. The resulting dynamics are strikingly close the the ones from the unrestricted Fisher
identification, see Figure 1.9 in the Appendix to Chapter 1 or Canova et al. (2007). This means that
the major part of the unrestricted investment-specific technology shocks consists of shocks that do not
positively affect labor productivity and are consequently not in line with our model.
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Figure 1.5: Productivity shocks from sign restrictions
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Notes: Responses in percentage points to a one-standard deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
relative importance of investment-specific -unspecific technology shocks. The investment-
unspecific technology shock is more important for the business cycle variance of labor
productivity than the investment-specific technology shock. The investment-specific tech-
nology shock explains more of the variance of the relative investment price in the first
two horizons, while the investment-unspecific shock is more important in the longer run.
This means that a substantial part of the dynamics in the unrestricted investment-specific
shocks are not driven by positive productivity shocks and this highlights the importance of
distinguishing between the two types of shocks. The investment-unspecific shock explains
a substantial fraction of the job finding and separation rate and consequently unemploy-
ment. This shock is generally more important for the business cycle variation of the labor
market variables than the investment-specific technology shock. Together, both shocks
explain about 20% of the business cycle variation in job finding and unemployment.
Investment-unspecific technology shocks have not been identified so far. The reason clearly
lies in the fact that they are difficult to interpret in the context of a standard model as
the one outlined in Section 1.2. Here I have shown that they carry some weight with
respect to the dynamics in the labor market. As argued above, these shocks reflect skill-
biased technology shocks as identified in Chapter 2. Skill-biased technology shocks have
a negative effect on total hours worked and thus induce similar dynamics to the shocks
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identified here.
1.7 Conclusion
Starting from the recent ongoing debate on the empirical performance of the Mortensen-
Pissarides search-and-matching model, this study provides an important contribution to
the debate as it judges the empirical performance of the model on basis of moments
conditional on technology shocks rather than on unconditional moments. My analysis
breaks down the second moments of labor productivity, the job finding, job separation and
unemployment rate into the contribution of technology and non-technology shocks. These
shocks are identified within a SVAR framework with conventional long-run restrictions
and a combination of long-run zero and sign restrictions.
I find that technology shocks cannot be the source of the high volatility in the job finding
rate and unemployment present in the data. As a result, the standard deviation of these
variables that is generated from a standard model replicates the volatility conditional
on technology shocks. A large part of the volatility remains unexplained in the residual
from the structural estimation. This residual might be called non-technology or demand
shock. In order to mirror the overall volatility in the data, the model should be augmented
with an additional non-technological source of volatility rather than with respect to the
propagation of technology shocks as proposed by Shimer. Ravn and Simonelli (2006)
identify government spending shocks in a similar SVAR. Their shocks indeed mirror the
dynamics of our “residual” disturbances as they drive labor productivity and labor market
tightness up and unemployment down. Barnichon (2008) argues that these shocks are
shocks to monetary policy. Here, I investigate an idea by Hall (1997) that preference
shocks in the form of shocks to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure are important for labor market dynamics. These shocks in fact add a lot of
volatility to the model.
Technology shocks induce a negative co-movement between job finding and productivity
and a positive co-movement between unemployment and productivity, while the respective
figures in the overall sample are directly the opposite. Put differently, job finding falls and
importantly contributes to an increase in unemployment after a positive technology shock.
This result contradicts the effects generated in the standard search-and-matching model.
Chapter 2 contains evidence that these effects may be explained through a distinction
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between high- and low-skilled labor in production. Since the identified technology shocks
are (possibly) biased towards the productivity of high-skilled labor, low-skilled labor gets
substituted out of production. Further results in the following chapter show that the “job
finding puzzle” vanishes when job flow data rather than worker flow data are employed
in the specification. In any case, additional non-technological disturbances are needed in
order to replicate the unconditional correlation between productivity, the job finding rate
and unemployment.
In different specifications, I distinguish technology shocks that are factor-neutral or
investment-specific as in Gal´ı (1999) and Fisher (2006). I document that the two main
results are robust to these extensions. The role of technology shocks for labor market dy-
namics is further assessed through a distinction of positive productivity shocks that have
either a negative or a positive effect on the relative price of investment. The latter my be
called investment-unspecific technology shocks. First, this identification tests and verifies
a critical assumption in the Fisher identification on the effect of investment-specific tech-
nology shocks on labor productivity. Second, this procedure investigates the relationship
between constrained and unconstrained investment-specific technology shocks. I find that
investment-unspecific technology shocks might by mistakenly labelled investment-specific
in the unconstrained identification. In addition, these shocks play a significant role for
labor market fluctuations. However, these shocks cannot be interpreted in the context of
the standard model. It will be shown in chapter 2 that it is reasonable to assume that
these shocks are the same as skill-biased technology shocks in their paper. Technology
shocks that are skill-biased induce similar dynamics in the investment price and the labor
market as the shocks identified here. This result again provides empirical foundation to
allowing for a more sophisticated production function in this class of model in which low-
and high-skilled labor are substitutable in production.
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Appendix to Chapter 1:
Additional Tables and Graphs
Table 1.6: Variance decomposition in Fisher identification
Investment-specific Shock Neutral Shock
Quarters 1 8 16 32 1 8 16 32
Price 59.27 78.02 86.83 93.30 6.55 4.47 3.07 1.58
(31,79) (52,91) (68,95) (83,98) (1,27) (1,20) (0,14) (0,7)
Productivity 13.50 14.12 12.94 11.46 68.33 76.50 82.49 86.43
(8,19) (11,18) (11,16) (10,13) (50,78) (67,82) (77,86) (84,88)
JFinding 15.92 6.73 6.23 6.28 46.86 42.34 42.98 42.70
(8,23) (4,12) (3,11) (3,11) (28,59) (18,58) (19,58) (19,58)
JSeparation 1.87 3.02 3.46 3.62 19.27 21.26 21.15 21.59
(0,9) (1,11) (1,11) (1,11) (3,41) (4,43) (5,43) (5,43)
Unemployment 15.19 6.38 6.00 6.02 49.44 43.54 43.86 43.48
(8,22) (3,12) (3,11) (3,10) (31,61) (19,59) (20,59) (19,59)
Notes: The values for the investment-specific shock, the neutral shock and the (omitted) residual
disturbances add up to 100 for each variable at each time horizon. The point estimate is the median,
the confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution.
All numbers are percent.
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Table 1.7: Gal´ı identification with standard detrending
Uncond. Model Conditional Moments
Sample I II Technology Residual
A: Standard Deviations
JFinding 0.1019 0.0407 0.0251 0.0327 0.0835
(0.02,0.05) (0.07,0.10)
JSeparation 0.0497 0.0255 0.0444
(0.02,0.03) (0.04,0.05)
Unemployment 0.1181 0.041 0.0252 0.0479 0.0928
(0.03,0.07) (0.08,0.11)
Productivity 0.0105 0.0105 0.0066 0.0066 0.009
(0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01)
B: Autocorrelations
JFinding 0.8137 0.8008 0.8031 0.7939 0.7688
(0.68,0.87) (0.71,0.80)
JSeparation 0.4409 0.7408 0.3913
(0.66,0.83) (0.32,0.44)
Unemployment 0.8345 0.6784 0.6791 0.7325 0.8136
(0.64,0.79) (0.79,0.83)
Productivity 0.6881 0.6651 0.6651 0.7161 0.7286
(0.64,0.80) (0.70,0.76)
C: Cross-Correlations
JFind.,Prod. 0.1443 0.9522 0.9532 -0.7619 0.5986
(-0.87,-0.48) (0.45,0.72)
JSep.,Prod. -0.4826 0.4837 -0.6975
(0.22,0.63) (-0.80,-0.60)
Unemp.,Prod. -0.3051 -0.6943 -0.696 0.7441 -0.8329
(0.55,0.84) (-0.89,-0.72)
JFind.,Unemp. -0.9254 -0.8405 -0.8408 -0.908 -0.8984
(-0.96,-0.75) (-0.92,-0.86)
JSep.,Unemp. 0.6346 0.8453 0.5455
(0.68,0.91) (0.44,0.61)
JFind.,JSep. -0.2947 -0.5102 -0.1169
(-0.71,-0.04) (-0.22,0.05)
Notes: All series are detrended with the HP-Filter with λ = 1600. The point estimate is the median,
the confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution. Calibration I of the
model matches the unconditional standard deviation of labor productivity, calibration II matches
the same moment, conditional on technology shocks.
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Table 1.8: Historical decomposition of Fisher identification
Uncond. Model Conditional Moments
Sample Inv. Tech. Neu. Tech. All Tech. Residual
A: Standard Deviations
Find. 0.1542 0.0775 0.0684 0.0741 0.0671 0.1283
(0.0717) (0.05,0.09) (0.05,0.11) (0.05,0.09) (0.11,0.15)
Sep. 0.062 0.0401 0.048 0.0512 0.0543
(0.03,0.05) (0.04,0.06) (0.04,0.06) (0.05,0.06)
Unemp. 0.1786 0.0708 0.0658 0.0996 0.088 0.1434
(0.0657) (0.05,0.09) (0.06,0.14) (0.07,0.12) (0.12,0.17)
Prod. 0.0156 0.0156 0.0185 0.0184 0.0129 0.016
(0.0129) (0.01,0.02) (0.02,0.02) (0.01,0.01) (0.01,0.02)
B: Autocorrelations
Find. 0.9128 0.8655 0.7116 0.8182 0.8771 0.9009
(0.8671) (0.62,0.82) (0.69,0.89) (0.81,0.92) (0.87,0.92)
Sep. 0.6336 0.9245 0.8984 0.8757 0.6389
(0.85,0.96) (0.83,0.95) (0.82,0.92) (0.59,0.70)
Unemp. 0.9218 0.8607 0.7692 0.8326 0.9045 0.9143
(0.8632) (0.67,0.88) (0.74,0.88) (0.87,0.93) (0.90,0.92)
Prod. 0.8507 0.8482 0.9055 0.8597 0.8909 0.9253
(0.855) (0.85,0.95) (0.80,0.91) (0.87,0.92) (0.91,0.94)
C: Cross-Correlations
JF,P 0.0567 0.5141 -0.1674 -0.5569 -0.3274 0.6979
(0.4087) (-0.38,0.11) (-0.29,-0.70) (-0.55,0.01) (0.57,0.79)
JS,P -0.4392 -0.4355 0.2757 0.2059 -0.6298
(-0.61,-0.21) (0.03,0.46) (-0.02,0.38) (-0.73,-0.53)
U,P -0.1858 -0.4427 -0.0838 0.5323 0.3431 -0.821
(-0.3506) (-0.44,0.19) (0.27,0.67) (0.03,0.55) (-0.89,-0.72)
JF,U -0.9558 -0.8718 -0.8394 -0.9147 -0.8606 -0.9409
(-0.8749) (-0.92,-0.72) (-0.79,-0.97) (-0.94,-0.75) (-0.91,-0.95)
JS,U 0.6845 0.3897 0.794 0.7584 0.5997
(0.06,0.65) (0.60,0.88) (0.58,0.85) (0.51,0.66)
JF,JS -0.4404 0.2296 -0.4877 -0.3075 -0.2893
(-0.12,0.52) (-0.17,-0.69) (-0.58,0.11) (-0.17,-0.38)
Notes: All series are detrended with the smooth HP-filter as in Shimer (2005a). The point estimate is the median,
the confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution. The model is calibrated to
match the unconditional standard deviation of labor productivity and the same figure that is conditional on
both technology shocks (in brackets).
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Table 1.9: Variance decomposition in Fisher identification - Job flows
Investment-specific Shock Neutral Shock
Quarters 1 8 16 32 1 8 16 32
Price 76.39 92.80 96.60 98.39 4.44 0.91 0.42 0.20
(54,90) (82,98) (91,99) (96,100) (0,19) (0,5) (0,2) (0,1)
Productivity 12.15 11.94 11.01 10.50 80.46 85.85 87.87 88.94
(9,15) (11,13) (10,12) (10,11) (73,85) (84,88) (87,89) (88,89)
JCreation 6.32 6.84 7.04 7.05 3.93 10.19 10.45 10.45
(1,14) (3,13) (3,12) (3,12) (0,15) (3,24) (3,24) (3,24)
JDestruction 1.37 4.60 4.66 4.66 15.77 11.79 11.81 11.81
(0,5) (2,12) (2,12) (2,12) (2,40) (4,31) (4,31) (4,31)
Unemployment 1.35 6.12 6.12 6.12 8.20 9.11 9.28 9.27
(0,6) (2,13) (2,13) (2,13) (1,26) (3,21) (3,22) (3,22)
Notes: The values for the investment-specific shock, the neutral shock and the (omitted) residual
disturbances add up to 100 for each variable at each time horizon. The point estimate is the median,
the confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution. All numbers in percent.
Table 1.10: Variance decomposition in sign identification
Investment-specific Shock Investment-unspecific Shock
Quarters 1 8 16 32 1 8 16 32
Productivity 24.66 28.25 29.67 31.68 46.85 59.75 63.89 65.10
(2,59) (3,67) (3,70) (3,74) (18,77) (23,86) (24,91) (24,93)
Price 27.75 35.71 38.80 37.82 11.45 24.53 39.06 51.75
(7,52) (10,61) (9,68) (8,74) (1,36) (4,53) (9,69) (16,82)
JFinding 16.86 6.44 6.00 5.90 3.54 9.88 12.93 13.42
(4,33) (2,18) (2,17) (2,17) (0,14) (3,28) (4,31) (4,31)
JSeparation 2.69 2.98 3.06 3.10 17.87 15.26 14.50 14.51
(0,13) (1,12) (1,12) (1,12) (6,36) (5,34) (5,33) (5,32)
Unemployment 16.38 6.35 5.91 5.83 4.09 10.62 13.61 14.00
(4,34) (2,18) (2,17) (2,17) (0,16) (3,30) (4,32) (4,32)
Notes: The values for the investment-specific shock, the investment-unspecific shock and the (omitted)
residual disturbances add up to 100 for each variable at each time horizon. The point estimate is the
median, the confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution.
All numbers are percent.
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Table 1.11: Historical decomposition of sign identification
Uncond. Conditional Moments
Sample I-Specific I-Unspecific Both Shocks Residual
A: Standard Deviations
Find. 0.1542 0.0456 0.051 0.0643 0.1242
(0.04,0.07) (0.04,0.07) (0.05,0.09) (0.10,0.15)
Sep. 0.062 0.0408 0.0499 0.0527 0.0535
(0.03,0.05) (0.04,0.06) (0.04,0.06) (0.05,0.06)
Unemp. 0.1786 0.0538 0.0742 0.088 0.139
(0.04,0.08) (0.05,0.10) (0.07,0.11) (0.12,0.16)
Prod. 0.0156 0.0122 0.0109 0.0127 0.0156
(0.01,0.01) (0.01,0.01) (0.01,0.01) (0.01,0.02)
B: Autocorrelations
Find. 0.9128 0.8091 0.9436 0.8653 0.9028
(0.70,0.91) (0.90,0.96) (0.79,0.91) (0.87,0.92)
Sep. 0.6336 0.9374 0.8886 0.8634 0.6507
(0.88,0.96) (0.83,0.94) (0.80,0.92) (0.59,0.71)
Unemp. 0.9218 0.897 0.9185 0.8992 0.9137
(0.83,0.95) (0.89,0.95) (0.87,0.92) (0.90,0.92)
Prod. 0.8507 0.92 0.9381 0.8929 0.9225
(0.88,0.97) (0.89,0.98) (0.87,0.92) (0.90,0.94)
C: Cross-Correlations
JF,P 0.0567 0.003 -0.0897 -0.3597 0.7118
(-0.46,0.29) (-0.47,0.21) (-0.53,-0.04) (0.58,0.80)
JS,P -0.4392 -0.1501 -0.1297 0.235 -0.6269
(-0.58,0.33) (-0.51,0.30) (-0.02,0.40) (-0.73,-0.54)
U,P -0.1858 -0.1624 -0.0406 0.3822 -0.8218
(-0.65,0.46) (-0.48,0.44) (0.05,0.56) (-0.91,-0.76)
JF,U -0.9558 -0.7386 -0.8048 -0.8396 -0.9408
(-0.90,-0.55) (-0.92,-0.61) (-0.93,-0.70) (-0.95,-0.91)
JS,U 0.6845 0.6339 0.7937 0.7583 0.5913
(0.33,0.86) (0.64,0.88) (0.64,0.86) (0.51,0.66)
JF,JS -0.4404 0.1652 -0.2492 -0.2512 -0.2781
(-0.46,0.47) (-0.59,0.19) (-0.57,0.04) (-0.38,-0.15)
Notes: All series are detrended with the smooth HP-filter as in Shimer (2005a). The point estimate
is the median, the confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution.
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Figure 1.6: Restricted and unrestricted Fisher identification
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Notes: Responses in percent to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
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Figure 1.7: Job flow responses to Fisher technology shocks
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Notes: Percentage responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
Figure 1.8: Gal´ı identification - price and productivity
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Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
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Figure 1.9: Unrestricted Fisher technology shocks
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Notes: Percentage responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
Figure 1.10: Sign identification - price and productivity
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Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
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Figure 1.11: Fisher technology shocks - no trend
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Chapter 2
On the Implications of
Skill-Biased Technological
Progress for the Business Cycle
2.1 Introduction
The US, as well as many other industrialized countries, have seen a marked increase in
the skill premium over the past two decades. Over the same period, the average education
level of the workforce also rose substantially. This parallel rise in the price and quantity of
skill points towards an increase in the demand for skill that exceeded the increase in the
supply of skilled workers. A commonly accepted explanation for this finding is skill bias
in technological progress: newly developed technologies require relatively more educated
and fewer uneducated workers (Katz and Murphy (1992); Autor et al. (1998); Acemoglu
(2002); Autor et al. (2005) and Autor et al. (2008)).
At the same time, shocks to technological progress have been attributed to be an important
driving force of US business cycles. Conventional technology shocks commonly referred
to as a source of the business cycle may either be factor-neutral or biased towards new
investments (investment-specific technology shocks). In this paper, we relate these two
phenomena by exploring the implications of skill-biased technological change for business
cycle fluctuations. We will consider this issue from two angles: First, we investigate the
relationship between technology and the skill premium, and hence skill-bias, over the
business cycle. Second, we propose an empirical strategy to identify skill-biased, and
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complementary also skill-neutral, technological change directly. Over and above linking
the conventional driving forces of business-cycles to the developments in the labor market,
this paper therefore attempts to identify sources of cycles that originate in the labor market
itself. Our approach allows us to address many important questions in this respect: Does
skill-biased technological progress play an important role for the business cycle? What does
skill-biased technological progress imply for the business-cycle dynamics of macroeconomic
aggregates? How are the production inputs capital, high and low skilled labor related over
the business cycle?
Existing studies on skill-biased technological change, including those mentioned above,
have focused on slow moving trends in the data. These papers use annual data, constructed
from a variety of worker-level data sources. Annual data are not suitable to analyze
business cycle fluctuations and we construct a quarterly series for the skill premium and
the relative supply of skill over the 1979:I-2006:II period, using the Current Population
Survey (CPS) outgoing rotation groups. Every month, about one fourth of workers in the
CPS is in an outgoing rotation group, meaning they are being interviewed for the fourth
month in a row and are therefore being rotated out of the sample. These workers are asked
about earnings and hours as well as education and other personal characteristics. We use
this information to calculate the skill premium as the log ratio of wages of college graduate
equivalent workers over high school graduate equivalents, controlling for experience and
other standard Mincer controls.1
The skill premium is close to acyclical over our sample period. If we think of business cycles
as being driven by technology shocks, one might conclude from this observation that most
of the higher frequency movements in the skill premium are driven by fluctuations in the
supply of skill rather than its demand. Acemoglu (2002) and Autor et al. (2005) reach this
conclusion, although from a different observation: once we detrend the skill premium and
the relative supply of skill, the two series are negatively rather than positively correlated.2
Our estimates confirm that shocks to the supply of skill are an important determinant of
fluctuations in the skill premium. However, we also find significant effects of technology
1Lindquist (2004) also construct a quarterly series for the skill premium from the CPS outgoing rotation
groups, but does not control for multiple education levels and other sources of worker heterogeneity, see
section 2.2.3.
2Acemoglu (2002) regresses the skill premium on the relative supply of skill controlling for a linear trend
and finds a coefficient of −0.74 (table 2, column 1). Autor et al. (2005) detrend the time series and show
graphically that there is strong comovement in both series, but they move in opposite directions (figure 7,
panel A).
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shocks on the premium.
Unconditional correlations are the result of a variety of shocks to the economy, which may
obscure the effects of changes in technology. We use a structural vector autoregression
(VAR) both to estimate the conditional response of the skill premium and the relative
supply of skill to technology shocks and to identify skill-biased versus skill-neutral tech-
nology shocks in the data. In order to control for fluctuations in the supply of skill, we
separately identify skill supply shocks using a short run restriction, assuming that the sup-
ply of skilled workers is predetermined. We then identify the various technology shocks
using long-run restrictions as in Blanchard and Quah (1989).
In a first approach, we assess the overall skill bias in technology shocks, identified following
Gal´ı (1999) as the only shocks that affect labor productivity in the long run. Improvements
in technology significantly increase the skill premium. This effect is realized in full within
a year, providing evidence in favor of skill-biased technological change and its potential
importance for business cycle fluctuations.
This result rises the question whether all technological changes are skill-biased or whether
there is a difference between skill-biased and skill-neutral technology shocks. We propose
a strategy to identify skill-biased technology (SBT) shocks from a long-run restriction,
arguing that SBT shocks are the only shocks that affect the skill premium in the long
run. Skill-neutral technology shocks are all remaining sources of permanent changes in
labor productivity. Skill-biased technology shocks are similar to skill-neutral technological
changes in that they increase labor productivity. However, they have different implications
for other aggregate variables. In particular, a positive SBT shock leads to a much larger
reduction in total hours worked than a skill-neutral technology shock. In addition, SBT
shocks increase the supply of skill in the long run, as we would expect, whereas skill-neutral
shocks lead to reduced supply of skill. For robustness, we show that the impulse-responses
that result from a decomposition of a production function that allows for inputs of high
and low skilled labor as well as capital are similar to the ones from our estimated SBT
shocks.
Having measured that skill-biased technological progress exists and matters over the busi-
ness cycle, we attempt to better understand what drives skill-biased technological change.
In particular, we evaluate the hypothesis, put forward by Krusell et al. (2000), that skill-
biased technological change is the result of an increase in the relative productivity of the
investment-goods producing sector. It is a well-documented fact that, over the same pe-
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riod that the skill premium has risen, the relative price of investment goods (software,
equipment structures) has fallen substantially, providing evidence for investment-specific
technological change (Gordon (1990); Greenwood et al. (1997); Cummins and Violante
(2002)). Krusell et al. (2000) show that if capital and skilled labor are complements in
the aggregate production function, investment-specific technological progress can explain
the increasing trend in the skill premium, because the increase in the capital-labor ratio
makes skilled labor relatively more productive.
We identify investment-specific technology shocks, following Fisher (2006), as the only
shocks that affect the relative price of investment in the long run. An investment-specific
improvement in technology lowers the relative price of investment goods. The remaining
shocks that affect labor productivity in the long run, are then investment-neutral tech-
nology shocks. We find that investment-specific technology shocks have a significant, but
negative effect on the skill premium, while investment-neutral technology shocks have a
positive effect on this variable. Conversely, skill-biased technology shocks, identified as
described above, raise the relative price of investment goods. This evidence is in direct
contradiction with the hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity, suggesting instead that
capital and skill are (to some degree) substitutes in the aggregate production process. We
support this result by simulating data from a model with different degrees on complemen-
tarity and substitutability between capital and skilled labor and estimating shocks and
responses from these data with our structural VAR.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes our empirical
approach. First we define the different shocks to the production technology that we con-
sider, then we discuss how to identify the effects of these shocks using long-run restrictions.
We also describe the data that are necessary to estimate these effects and show some de-
scriptive statistics on the cyclicality of our quarterly series for the skill premium and the
relative supply of skill. In Section 2.3 we discuss skill-biased in technology shocks based on
the structural VAR analysis and the production function decomposition. Section 2.4 deals
with investment-specific technology shocks and capital-skill complementarity. Section 2.5
concludes.
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2.2 Empirical approach
In this Section, we outline our approach to estimate the implications of skill-biased techno-
logical progress for the business cycle. We start by defining different types of of technolog-
ical change, discussing various specifications for the aggregate production function. Next,
we explain how to identify these different technology shocks from the data using either the
functional form of the production function or a VAR with long-run restrictions. Finally,
we describe the data needed for the identification, including quarterly series for the skill
premium and the relative supply and employment of skilled labor, which we construct
from micro data.
2.2.1 Shocks to the production technology
Consider an aggregate production function for output Yt that takes capital Kt, high skilled
labor Ht and low skilled labor Lt as inputs. The production function satisfies the standard
conditions: it is increasing and concave in all its arguments and homogenous of degree
one so that there are constant returns to scale. Shocks to total factor productivity are
neutral technology shocks, in the sense that they affect the productivity of all inputs
in the same proportion. To allow for skill-biased technology shocks, the literature has
typically assumed an aggregate production function of the following form (see e.g. Katz
and Murphy (1992), Katz and Autor (1999), Autor et al. (2008)).
Yt = AtKαt
[
β (BtHt)
σ−1
σ + (1− β)L
σ−1
σ
t
] (1−α)σ
σ−1
(2.1)
Here, At is total factor productivity and Bt is skilled labor augmenting technology. An
increase in Bt can be skill or unskill biased, depending on the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor σ > 0. If high and low skilled labor are substitutes
rather than complements (σ > 1), the substitution effect of improvements in skilled labor
augmenting technology dominates the income effect so that an increase in Bt increases
the demand for skill and therefore the skill premium (assuming the supply curve for skill
is downward sloping). The consensus estimate for σ is around 1.5 (see Katz and Murphy
(1992), Ciccone and Peri (2006), Teulings and van Rens (2008)), so that we can think of
skill-biased technology shocks as increases in Bt.
There are two ways to interpret skill-biased technology shocks to an aggregate production
function as in (2.1). If the production function for all goods in the economy is the same,
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then we can think of an increase in Bt as a technological development that makes skilled
labor more productive in all sectors. Alternatively, we may think that the production in
different sectors i requires skilled labor in different proportions βi of total labor input.
In this case, even if skilled and unskilled labor are neither substitutes nor complements
within each sector,3 a sector-specific technology shock to a skill-intensive sector could still
increase the skill premium.
A particularly interesting case is an economy that consists of a consumption goods pro-
ducing sector and an investment goods producing sector. In this economy there are two
mechanisms, by which sector-specific shocks may affect the skill premium. First, the input
shares for skill might be different across the two sectors as explained above. Because in-
vestment goods are used to build up capital, which is an input in the production process,
sector-specific shocks may also affect the capital-labor ratio used in production. If capital
and skill are complements, as argued by Krusell et al. (2000), then a higher capital labor
ratio increases the relative demand for skilled labor and therefore the skill premium.
Suppose the two sectors have identical production functions except for a difference in total
factor productivity. In this case, as shown among others by Fisher (2006) and Krusell et
al. (2000), the economy can be aggregated to a one-sector economy, where total output is
divided between consumption and investment,
Yt = Ct + ptIt (2.2)
where the relative price of investment goods pt reflects technological improvements in the
investment goods producing sector. An aggregate production function that allows for
capital-skill complementarity is a slightly generalized version of (2.1).
Yt = At
[
β
(
γK
ρ−1
ρ
t + (1− γ) (BtHt)
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
σ−1
σ
+ (1− β)L
σ−1
σ
t
] σ
σ−1
(2.3)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor as before,
except that now it also measures the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled
labor, ρ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor and β and γ are
share parameters. As shown by Krusell et al. (2000), improvements in investment-specific
technology increase the skill premium if and only if the elasticity of substitution between
capital and skilled labor ρ is lower than the elasticity of substitution between capital and
unskilled labor σ, i.e., if the production technology displays capital-skill complementarity.
3This is the case where σi = 1 for all i. In the limit for σ → 1, production function (2.1) becomes
Cobb-Douglas, so that changes in Bt are indistinguishable from changes in At.
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2.2.2 Identification and estimation
Under the assumption that workers’ wages are proportional to their marginal product, we
can calculate the skill premium directly from the production function. Using aggregate
production function (2.1), we get the following expression,
log
(
wH,t
wL,t
)
= log
(
β
1− β
)
− 1
σ
log
(
Ht
Lt
)
+
σ − 1
σ
logBt (2.4)
where wH,t and wL,t are the wages of high and low skilled workers respectively. This
equation can be interpreted as a demand curve for skill. The skill premium is decreasing
in the relative demand for high skilled workers, log (Ht/Lt), where the elasticity of demand
depends on the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers.
Changes in skill-biased technology Bt represent shifts of the skill demand curve or skill
demand shocks. Since the skill premium and the relative quantity of skill are observable,
these shocks can be directly retrieved from equation (2.4), using an estimate for the
elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled workers σ.4 The estimates for the
skill-biased technology shocks obtained this way are identified from the assumption that
wages are proportional to marginal products. A sufficient condition for this assumption
is that labor markets are perfectly competitive, in which case the wage of all workers
equals their marginal product. If there are frictions in the labor market, the weaker
assumption that wages are proportional to marginal products still holds approximately.
However, if there are frictions in the wage determination process, then wages may deviate
from marginal products in the short run. Therefore, we alternatively identify technology
shocks using a structural VAR with long-run restrictions, as suggested by Blanchard and
Quah (1989) and first used to estimate technology shocks by Gal´ı (1999).
Consistent with equation (2.4), we identify skill-biased technology shocks as the only
shocks that affect the skill premium in the long run, conditional on the supply of skill. Since
the identifying restriction is an assumption on the long-run effects of the structural shocks
on the variables in the VAR, it is a weaker assumption than assuming that (2.4) holds in
each period and makes the estimates robust to wage rigidity for example. In addition, the
long run identification does not depend on the exact functional form of the production
function and we no longer need to use an estimate for σ.5 Thus, we use long run restrictions
4An estimate for the share parameter β is unnecessary since this parameter affects only the level of Bt
and we normalize the mean and variance of the shocks to zero and one respectively.
5Of course the assumption is not valid for all production functions. For example, with capital-skill
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in all our estimates, although we compare the results to a direct decomposition using
equation (2.4), see Section 2.3.3, and find that for the simplest estimates the differences
are not large.
The estimation of structural shocks using long run restrictions is implemented in two steps.
First, we estimate a reduced form VAR in the variables labor productivity, hours worked,
the skill premium and in some specifications also the relative price of investment goods.
Second, we map the reduced form coefficients and residuals into structural coefficients and
shocks normalizing the variance of all structural shocks to one and assuming orthogonality
between these shocks, as well as an identifying restriction. The long-run identifying re-
strictions are incorporated using a Cholesky decomposition of the infinite horizon forecast
error variance.6
The specific restriction depends on the type of shock we are interested in estimating.
Skill-biased technology shocks are shocks to the production technology that affect the
skill premium, investment-specific technology shocks change the relative price of invest-
ment goods and in the presence of capital-skill complementarity technology shocks may be
both investment-specific and skill-biased. Neutral technology shocks increase productivity
but do not affect either the relative price or the skill premium. We discuss the specific
identifying restrictions used to identify neutral, skill-biased and investment-specific tech-
nology shocks as we describe our results in Section 2.3. The identification of different types
of shocks using the Cholesky decomposition is then implemented by simply reordering the
variables in the VAR.
Our baseline VAR is estimated on quarterly data from 1979:I to 2000:IV. This period
is relatively short because of data limitations, see Section 2.2.3. All variables are used
in first differences in order to allow for unit roots.7 The reduced form is estimated as
a Bayesian VAR with a Minnesota prior, similar to Canova et al. (2006). The prior
complementarity, as in (2.3), any shocks that affect the capital stock also affect the skill premium in the
long run. However, the restriction can easily be modified to incorporate this case, see Section 2.4.
6The procedure employed here is very similar to the one in Uhlig (2004). We approximate the infinite
horizon with 20 years. The procedure uniquely pins down the effects of the identified shocks on all variables
in the VAR and the results are not affected by additional (superfluous) long-run zero restrictions.
7In the context of the identification of neutral technology shocks, there has been a debate in the literature
whether hours worked should be included in levels (Christiano et al. (2003)) or in first differences (Gal´ı
and Rabanal (2004)). Canova et al. (2006) show that once the very low frequencies are purged out from
the data, the results of Gal´ı (1999) are robust to using hours worked in levels. In all specifications, we
verified that our results are also robust to this choice.
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mean pushes towards a unit root (in levels), the prior variance affects the tightness of
the lags of the autoregressive variables and of exogenous variables. We use this prior
for two reasons. First, in theory one should employ a VAR with an infinite number of
lags in order to correctly identify technology shocks using long run restrictions, see e.g.
Chari et al. (2008). The Minnesota prior allows us to generate sensible results for a large
number of lags simultaneously adjusting the importance (decay) of these additional lags
for the estimation. Here, we use 8 lags and a decay parameter of 3.8 Second, the prior
makes our estimation results more stable in the presence of high frequency variation in the
skill premium that is due to measurement error. The prior does not affect the long-run
restrictions in any way and we show that our results are robust to the strength of the prior
and to estimating the reduced form VAR using ordinary least squares (see Table 2.4).
2.2.3 Data
We construct quarterly series for the skill premium and the relative employment and
supply of skill using individual-level wage and education data from the CPS outgoing
rotation groups. This survey has been administered every month since 1979 so that our
series runs from 1979:1 to 2006:2.9 Wages are usual hourly earnings (weekly earnings
divided by usual weekly hours for weekly workers) and are corrected for top-coding and
outliers. We limit our sample to wage and salary workers between 16 and 64 years old in
the private, non-farm business sector and weight average wages by the CPS-ORG sampling
weights as well hours worked in order to replicate aggregate wages as close as possible.
Education is measured in five categories (less than high school, high school degree, some
college, college degree, more than college) and made consistent over the full sample period
following Jaeger (1997). In an average quarter, we have wage and education data for about
35,000 workers.
Our measure for the skill premium is the log wage differential between college graduates
and high school graduates. The relative employment and supply of skill are defined as the
8The remaining hyper-parameters are chosen as in the RATS manual such that the Minnesota prior is
quite loose: φ1 = 0.2 for the tightness on own lags of a variable, φ2 = 0.5 for the tightness on lags of other
variables and φ3 = 10
5 for the tightness on exogenous variables.
9The BLS started asking questions about earnings in the outgoing rotation group (ORG) surveys in
1979. The March supplement goes back much further (till 1963), but does not allow to construct wage
series at higher frequencies than annual. The same is true for the May supplement, the predecessor of the
earnings questions in the ORG survey.
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Figure 2.1: Skill premium and Mincer return to schooling in the US
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Figure 2.2: Relative employment and relative supply of skill in the US
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log ratio of the number of college graduates over the number of high school graduates in
the population and the workforce respectively. Following Autor et al. (2005), we map the
five education levels in the data to college and high school graduate equivalents and control
for changes in experience, gender, race, ethnicity and marital status. To do this, we first
estimate a standard Mincerian earnings function for log wages. The predicted values from
this regression for males and females at 5 education levels in 5 ten-year experience groups
yield average wages for 50 education-gender-experience cohorts keeping constant the other
control variables. We then calculate the number of workers in each cell as a fraction of the
workforce or population. Dividing by a reference category, this procedure gives us relative
the prices and quantities of skill for 50 skill categories. Finally, we aggregate to two skill
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types by averaging relative prices using average quantity weights and averaging quantities
using average price weights.10
The way we measure the skill premium and the relative employment and supply of skill
allows easy comparison to models with workers of only two skill levels. Yet, the measures
do justice to the greater degree of heterogeneity in the data. This is necessary to ensure
that changes in the price of skill are correctly attributed to changes in the skill premium
and changes in the quantity of skill to the relative employment or supply of skill. Suppose,
for example, that there is an increase in the number of workers with a masters degree.
This represents an increase in the supply of skill. However, a naive measure of the relative
supply, which just counts the number of workers with at least a college degree, would not
reflect this increase. Moreover, if workers with a masters degree earn on average higher
wages than workers with a bachelors degree only, then a naive measure of the skill premium
would increase. In our measures, this increase in the supply of skill would leave the skill
premium unchanged and increase the relative supply measure.
Figure 2.1 plots our quarterly series for the log wage premium of college over high school
graduates.11 As documented in previous studies, the data show a pronounced increase in
the skill premium since 1980, which seems to slow down mildly towards the end of the
1990s. For comparison, the figure also shows a naive measure of the skill premium (the
log wage difference between workers with at least a college degree and those with at most
a high school degree) and the Mincerian return to schooling. The trend and fluctuations
in our measure of the skill premium are similar to those in the Mincer return, indicating
we have adequately controlled for heterogeneity beyond two skill types.
Figure 2.2 shows similar plots for the relative employment and the relative supply of
skilled labor. Again, there is a substantial difference between our preferred measure and
the naive measure of the relative employment of skill. The increase in the employment and
the supply of skill was roughly similar over the last two decades, but the higher frequency
10For the skill premium and relative employment series, we calculate average prices and quantities
weighting individual workers in each cell by hours worked. For the relative supply series this is not possible
since we do not observe hours worked for non-employed workers. For this series, we weight averages only
by the CPS-ORG sample weights.
11Note that all our original data series exhibit large high frequency movements. These fluctuations are
not seasonal effects but reflect measurement error (sampling error). In a first attempt to get rid of this
measurement error the series, as exhibited in figure 2.1 and 2.2, are smoothed using an HP-filter with a very
small smoothing parameter, here λ = 1. The impulse responses are further smoothed by the Minnesota
prior.
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Table 2.1: Unconditional business cycle correlations
Std Correlation with
Output Hours Productivity Invest. Price
Baseline measure
Skill premium 0.0077 0.1017 -0.0598 0.2874 -0.1486
Relative employment 0.0248 -0.3529 -0.2372 -0.2805 0.5123
Naive measure
Skill premium 0.0086 0.0199 0.0788 -0.0898 0.0236
Relative employment 0.0232 -0.3153 -0.265 -0.165 0.4724
Relative supply 0.0114 0.0213 0.0759 -0.0824 0.2430
Notes: Series are HP-filtered with λ=1600.
fluctuations differ markedly as we document below.
The other data series we use in our analysis are the following. Output is non-farm business
output of all persons from the national income and product accounts (NIPA). Hours are
total hours of non-supervisory workers from the Current Employment Statistics establish-
ment survey. Labor productivity is output per hour. All three series are available from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) productivity and cost program. As the relative price
of investment goods, we use a quarterly intrapolation as in Fisher (2006) of the quality
adjusted NIPA deflator for producer durable equipment over the consumption deflator
(Gordon (1990); Cummins and Violante (2002)).12
Table 2.1 shows the business cycle correlations of the skill premium and the relative em-
ployment and supply of skill with output, hours, productivity and the relative price of
investment goods.13 The skill premium is basically acyclical: it is only very mildly pos-
itively correlated with output and even less correlated with hours worked. This finding
is consistent with previous studies (Keane and Prasad (1993); Lindquist (2004)). The
relative supply of skill is acyclical as well, but the relative employment of skill is higher
in recessions than in booms, indicating the presence of a composition bias in employment
as argued by Solon et al. (1994). The correlation of the skill premium with the relative
investment-price is weak and negative. This is a first indication that capital-skill comple-
12We thank Jonas Fisher for making his data available to us. The quarterly relative price data runs
until 2000, which limits our estimation sample.
13The sample used to generate these correlations coincides with the estimation sample used in the next
section, i.e. 1979:1-2000:4.
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Figure 2.3: Gal´ı identification with skill premium
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Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
mentarity does not seem an important feature of the data at business cycle frequencies.
2.3 Skill-biased technology shocks
In this section, we present our results for the effects of technology shocks on aggregate
variables. We start by assessing the degree of skill bias in ‘traditional’ neutral technology
or total factor productivity shocks. We then discuss how exogenous shocks to the supply of
skill may bias these estimates and how we can control for these skill supply shocks. Next, in
Section 2.3.3, we propose a strategy for separating skill-biased technology shocks from skill-
neutral shocks. In Section 2.4, we address the issue of capital-skill complementarity and
evaluate the hypothesis that it is investment-specific technological progress that produces
the skill-bias observed in the data. Finally, in Section 2.4.2, we jointly estimate all three
types of technology shocks and evaluate their importance for business cycle fluctuations
in various aggregates.
2.3.1 Skill bias in ‘neutral’ technology shocks
Gal´ı (1999) identifies permanent technology shocks as the only source of long-run move-
ments in labor productivity. In a wide range of models, closed-economy, stationary, one-
sector RBC models as well as models of the new Keynesian variety, shocks to total factor
productivity are the only shocks that satisfy this identifying restriction. The remaining
disturbances in the structural VAR are non-technology or ‘demand’ shocks, an amalgum
of other possible shocks in the model: government expenditure shocks, preference shocks,
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or shocks to price or wage markups. As a first pass at our data, we evaluate the skill bias
in technology shocks identified in this manner.
Figure 2.3 presents impulse response functions of a VAR as in Gal´ı (1999), extended
with the skill premium as a measure of skill bias in addition to labor productivity and
hours worked, and estimated on our smaller sample. Here, as in all graphs that will
follow, the point estimate is the median from and the dotted confidence intervals are
68 % Bayesian bands from the posterior distribution of the structural impulse-response
coefficients. Introducing the price of skill as an additional regressor and using a different
estimation sample leaves the responses of labor productivity and total hours worked almost
unchanged compared to Gal´ı (1999).
As in his estimates, a positive innovation in technology leads to an almost immediate
increase in labor productivity equal to the long run effect, and an initial reduction and a
subsequent increase in hours worked. The first finding is supportive of the interpretation
of the identified shock as a permanent improvement in technology. The second finding
has typically been interpreted as evidence in favor of price rigidities, which dampen the
substitution effect on impact and thus make the income effect of higher productivity
that increases the demand for leisure dominant in the short run. Note that the skill
premium increases in response to a permanent improvement in technology. The effect
is permanent and is almost fully realized after two quarters. This finding is consistent
with the hypothesis of skill-biased technological change, suggesting that the improved
technology increased the demand for high-skilled labor.
When we include the wages and hours of high and low skilled workers separately in the
VAR, the wage of high skilled workers increases as expected, see Figure 2.8 in the appendix
to this chapter. The wage of low skilled workers stays roughly constant and initially even
decreases a bit. Apparently, the skill bias in the technology shocks is so large that the
relative price effect dominates the average price effect on the wage of low skilled workers.
A different picture emerges for hours worked. Here, hours worked by high skilled workers
decrease, while they increase for low skilled workers. This result is somewhat counter-
intuitive, since we would have expected the relative quantity of skilled labor to increase.
Since we have not properly identified skill-biased technology shocks here, this result could,
however, obscure different kinds of disturbances such as different types of technology
shocks or skill supply shocks.
The estimated technology shocks and their dynamics from the Gal´ı (1999) VAR used here,
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are similar to the direct estimates of total-factor productivity by Basu et al. (2006). As a
robustness check, we use the quarterly series of the Basu et al. (2006) residuals, constructed
by Fernald (2007a), instead of labor productivity in the VAR.14 If the technology shocks
identified by the two approaches were identical, then these impulse responses should be
the same as those shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.8. The results are shown in Figures 2.9 and
2.10 in the appendix to this chapter. Indeed, the responses of the ‘purified’ technology
measure, hours and the premium are very similar, providing support for the identifying
restriction used here. Interestingly, the increase in the wage premium stems from a fall in
the wage of low skilled workers rather than an increase in high skilled wages, however.
2.3.2 Shocks to the supply of skill
In the identification of technology shocks used above, we assumed that technology shocks
are the only shocks that drive productivity in the long run. We showed that these shocks
have asymmetric effects on the demand for high and low skilled labor. Thus, production
does not use a standard Cobb-Douglas technology, but either requires high and low skilled
labor as separate and imperfectly substitutable inputs, as in equation (2.1), or output to
be produced in multiple sectors with different input shares of skilled labor. In these cases,
the identifying assumption of Gal´ı is no longer valid because shocks to the supply of skill
may affect labor productivity in the long run.
Suppose a preference shock causes college enrollment to increase permanently. When
the new, larger cohort of college graduates enters the labor market, the supply of skill
exogenously increases. The resulting lower skill premium leads firms to employ relatively
more skilled workers. Since skilled workers are more productive, this raises average labor
productivity. Thus, this shock to the supply of skill satisfies the identifying restriction for
a technology shock, even though technology has not changed at all.
We separately identify shocks to the supply of skill in order to avoid biasing the estimated
technology shocks. For this purpose, we include a measure of the relative supply of skilled
workers in our VAR. We use a short-run restriction to identify shocks to the supply of
skill: only skill supply shocks affect the supply of skill within a quarter. This restriction
is equivalent to assuming that the supply of skill is predetermined.
14We are grateful to Marty Eichenbaum and Luigi Paciello for drawing our attention to these data and
making them available to us.
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Of course there are many other shocks that may increase the supply of skill endogenously,
through an increase in the skill premium. Skill-biased technology shocks are just one
example. However, the intuition for the identifying restriction is that in order to increase
the supply of skill in response to an increase in its price, workers need to obtain more
education, which lasts at least a year. It seems unlikely therefore, that other shocks would
affect the supply of skill within a quarter.
It is crucial for our identification that we use a measure of the relative supply of skill,
not the relative employment. It is reasonable to assume that the supply of skill is prede-
termined, but the same is not true for the employment of skill. If low and high skilled
workers are imperfect substitutes, then firms may hire relatively more skilled workers in
recessions, when the unemployment pool is larger and these workers are more abundantly
available. This composition bias has been documented by Solon et al. (1994). We mea-
sure the relative supply of skill as the ratio of skilled workers to low skilled workers in the
workforce, whereas the relative employment is the the equivalent ratio among employed
workers, see Section 2.2.3.
The strategy to identify technology shocks conditional on skill supply shocks is recursive.
We first identify skill supply shocks with the short-run restriction and next use the same
long run restriction discussed in the previous subsection to identify technology shocks.
Thus, skill supply shocks are allowed to have a long run effect on productivity. Having
identified fluctuations in productivity (as well as other variables in our VAR) that are due
to skill supply shocks, technology shocks are the only remaining shocks that affect labor
productivity in the long run. The details on the implementation of this combination of
short and long run restrictions can be found in Appendix A to Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
Figure 2.11 in the appendix to this chapter shows the impulse response functions for this
identification scheme. The lower row shows the responses to a one-standard deviation
skill supply shock. By construction, the supply of skill increases immediately in response
to this shocks. The estimates indicate that the effect is permanent: the supply of skill
remains high in subsequent quarters. Somewhat counter-intuitively, labor productivity
falls after a positive skill supply shock, hours jump up on impact and continue to increase
and the skill premium is almost unaffected.
Controlling for skill supply shocks affects the impulse responses to technology shocks very
little. The responses of productivity, hours and the skill premium are all very similar to
the estimates without controlling for skill supply shocks. The response of productivity is
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Figure 2.4: SBT identification
5 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
premium
SB
T 
sh
oc
k
5 10
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
productivity
5 10
−0.5
0
0.5
hours
5 10
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
supply high
5 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
n
e
u
tra
l s
ho
ck
Quarters
5 10
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Quarters
5 10
−0.5
0
0.5
Quarters
5 10
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Quarters
Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
a bit stronger and the response of the skill premium a bit weaker than before. The supply
of skill falls moderately, but significantly, in response to a positive technology shock. We
conclude that, while the direction of the bias is as expected, its size seems to be small.
Nevertheless, we will control for shocks to the supply of skill in all specifications in the
rest of the paper.
2.3.3 Identified skill-biased technology shocks
While the response of the skill premium is consistent with skill-biased technological change,
it casts doubt on the traditional interpretation of these shocks. If these were truly shocks
to total factor productivity, as in equation (2.1), the demand for skilled and unskilled labor
should increase in equal proportions and the relative demand should be unaffected. Here,
we propose an alternative identification strategy to directly identify skill-biased technology
shocks in addition to skill-neutral shocks to productivity.
In Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 above, we interpreted the increase in the skill premium in re-
sponse to a technology shock as a measure of skill bias in technology. Here, we formalize
that interpretation as an identifying restriction, identifying skill-biased technology shocks
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as those shocks that affect the relative price of skill in the long run, see equation (2.4). This
restriction is similar in spirit to the identification of investment-specific technology shocks
as shocks that affect the relative price of investment goods proposed by Fisher (2006).
Controlling for shocks to the supply of skill is particularly important in this context, be-
cause of the standard simultaneity problem in estimation of demand or supply elasticities.
An exogenous, permanent increase in the supply of skill would permanently reduce the
price of skill and thus satisfies our identifying restriction for skill-biased technology shocks.
We control for skill supply as described above in Section 2.3.2.
Precisely, the identifying assumptions are now as follows. First, we identify skill supply
shocks as the only shocks that affect the supply of skill contemporaneously. Next, we
identify skill-biased technology shocks as the only remaining shocks that affect the rel-
ative price of skill in the long run. Both types of shocks could potentially affect labor
productivity. Finally, skill-neutral technology shocks are all remaining shocks that affect
labor productivity in the long run. We implement these assumptions by ordering the
respective variables subsequently in the VAR.
This identification scheme strictly speaking is not a decomposition of technology shocks
as in Gal´ı (1999) into skill-biased and skill-neutral shocks. In principle, there might be
shocks that affect the skill premium but not labor productivity in the long run. However,
as explained in Section 2.2.1, it is hard to imagine non-technology shocks other than skill
supply shocks to affect the skill premium in the long run. Moreover, our estimates indicate
that the shocks we identify as skill-biased technology shocks increase labor productivity,
supporting our interpretation of these shocks as a specific type of technology shock.
Figure 2.4 shows the responses of the skill premium, the supply of skill, labor productivity
and total hours worked to a one-standard deviation skill-biased technology shock (SBT
shock) and skill neutral technology shock. By assumption, a positive SBT shock drives
the skill premium up in the long run. The estimates indicate that half of this effect is
realized immediately and the rest within a year. A skill-neutral technology shock has no
significant effect on the wage premium on impact and by assumption there is no long run
effect either. SBT shocks increase the supply of skill in the long run, as should be expected
with a higher skill premium, but this effect is small.
In response to a positive SBT shock, hours worked significantly and persistently fall. Inter-
estingly, skill-neutral technology shocks barely decrease hours on impact and significantly
and substantially increase hours worked less than a year after impact. This finding sug-
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gests that at least part of the fall in hours worked in response to technology shocks, as
in Gal´ı (1999) and in the estimates in Section 2.3.1, is related to the skill bias in these
shocks. If high skilled workers are much more productive than low skilled workers, then it
is possible that by substituting low skilled for high skilled workers in response to an SBT
shock, firms may increase effective labor input in their production process, while reducing
total hours or employment. Figure 2.12 in the appendix to this chapter confirms this
interpretation: In response to an SBT shock, the wage of high skilled workers increases
substantially, but the wage of low skilled workers actually falls. In contrast, the wages of
both types of workers are affected identically by a skill-neutral technology shock. These
findings indicate that for low skilled workers the relative productivity effect dominates the
average productivity effect of an SBT shock.
Table 2.3 shows a decomposition of the forecast error of the VAR at various horizons. At
business cycle frequencies with periodicities from 8 to 32 quarters, SBT shocks explain
a little over 3% of fluctuations in output, which seems unimportant compared to the
45% of fluctuations explained by skill-neutral technology shocks. Fluctuations in the skill
premium are almost exclusively due to SBT shocks, with skill supply shocks and neutral
technology shocks combined explaining less than 2% of the variance. Thus, it seems that
fluctuations in the skill premium are largely driven by shocks that are unrelated to output
fluctuations. However, to understand business cycles in the labor market, it is important
to allow for skillbias in technology shocks. Skill-biased shocks are responsible for about
10% of fluctuations in hours worked, slightly more than neutral technology shocks.
2.3.4 Robustness
In our baseline estimates, we impose a Minnesota (Litterman) prior on the decay of the
lag coefficients in order to be able to allow for a large number of lags. However, our results
are not driven by this prior. The responses of productivity and the skill premium to all
shocks are virtually unaltered when we change the number of lags, the strength of the
prior, or when we estimate the VAR using ordinary least squares (OLS). The fall in hours
worked in response to skill-biased technology shocks is also robust across specifications and
is significant if we include at least 4 lags in the VAR. The increase in hours in response
to neutral technology shocks is actually stronger in all alternative specifications: whereas
in the baseline the positive effect becomes significant only after 3 quarters, in all other
specifications it is significant at all horizons. These results are summarized in the first
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panel of Table 2.4.
Next we explore to what extent the way we constructed our measure for the skill premium
matters for the results. Using a ‘naive’ measure of the skill premium that does not take
into account the heterogeneity over and above two skill types, we would not have observed
the fall in hours in response to an SBT shock. The likely reason is that this measure picks
up some changes in the quantity of skill as changes in the premium. Thus, the SBT shock
identified off changes in the naive measure would include some skill supply shocks. And
since skill supply shocks would be expected to increase hours worked, this would mitigate
the fall in hours in response to the identified SBT shocks.
Finally, we compare the properties of our identified SBT shocks to a simple decomposition
using equation (2.4), see Section 2.2.2. This decomposition is similar in spirit to a Solow
residual and requires a value for the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled
workers σ. We use σ = 1.5, which is the consensus estimate from the literature based on
several different data sources (Katz and Murphy (1992), Ciccone and Peri (2006), Teulings
and van Rens (2008)). With this value, we can use equation (2.4) to retrieve changes in
skill-biased technology Bt from our data on the skill premium and the relative employment
of skill. After demeaning these changes and normalizing their variance to unity, they are
comparable to the identified SBT shocks from the structural VAR. The difference is in
the identification. Whereas the identified shocks require assumptions only on the long
run behavior of the skill premium, the decomposition requires equation (2.4) to hold in
each period. Figure 2.13 plots both estimates for the shocks over the sample period. It is
encouraging that despite the differences in identification, the resulting estimates for the
skill-biased technology shocks look similar, except at the beginning of the sample. The
correlation between the two estimates is 0.48. Moreover, the decomposition is robust to
the value of σ chosen. In fact, the estimates for the SBT shocks using the decomposition
are similar to the first difference of the skill premium.
To complete the comparison, we compare the response of productivity, hours worked and
the skill premium to the identified SBT shocks and the estimated shocks using the de-
composition. We regress these variables on lags of the shocks, estimated either from the
decomposition using equation (2.4) or as the residuals from our structural VAR, as sug-
gested by Basu et al. (2006). This is a direct estimate of the moving average representation
of the impulse response functions and the results are comparable to the impulse responses
in Figure 2.4. Since the impulse responses in Figure 2.4 seem to flatten out after about 6
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Figure 2.5: Impulse-responses to Solow residual
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First row: Impulse-responses from regression of the skill premium, productivity, hours
worked and the relative supply on six lags of the identified SBT shock.
Second row: Impulse-responses from regression of the variables on six lags of the residual
from the production function decomposition. The black dotted line repeats the estimate
from the first row. Confidence intervals are one standard errors.
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quarters, we use 6 lags of the shocks. The results are presented in the first row of Figure
2.5. The responses to identified SBT shocks estimated in this way are quite similar, espe-
cially in sign, to those directly calculated from the VAR estimates. We now discuss how
the responses to SBT shocks obtained from the decomposition compare to these.
The second row of Figure 2.5 shows the responses to SBT shocks estimated using the
decomposition. Generally, the responses are different from the responses to the VAR
residuals but throughout equal in sign. The responses of the skill premium and hours
worked to the VAR residuals are larger, the respective response of the relative supply of
skill is smaller in absolute value than the responses to the decomposition residuals. The
largest difference in the responses to SBT shocks estimated in the two different ways is the
response of labor productivity. Labor productivity falls below zero on impact and does
overall not respond significantly to a shock to the decomposition. Given the difference
in the identifying assumption underlying both sets of estimates, the difference must be
due to short run deviations of the skill premium from equation (2.4), for example because
of wage rigidities. We have discussed above that we find some evidence for other shocks
affect both the skill premium and/or labor productivity in the long run, for example
neutral technology shocks or skill supply shocks. These shocks are not adequately filtered
out by the decomposition, which justifies using long run restrictions.
2.4 Investment-specific shocks and the skill premium
Over our sample period the relative price of investment goods fell substantially. This find-
ing has been interpreted to mean that technological progress has been faster in investment
goods producing sectors than in consumption goods producing sectors (Greenwood et al.
(1997), Cummins and Violante (2002)). Fisher (2006) has argued that such investment-
specific technological change is important not only for long run trends, but also for busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. Because the increase in the skill premium roughly coincided with
the decrease in the relative price of investment goods, Krusell et al. (2000) argue that
investment-specific and skill-biased technological change might be one and the same. If
capital and skill are complements in the aggregate production function, technological in-
novation in the investment-sector will necessarily lead to an increase in the demand for
skill. If this is the case, then investment-specific technology shocks should lead to business
cycle fluctuations in the skill premium. In this section, we explore this hypothesis and
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find no evidence for capital-skill complementarity.
2.4.1 Skill bias in investment-specific shocks
Consider the alternative aggregate production function (2.3), as in Krusell et al. (2000),
which allows for complementarity or substitutability between capital and skill. Assuming
as before that wages are proportional to marginal products in the long run, expression
(2.4) for the skill premium changes to the following.
log
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= log
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(2.5)
Since investment-specific technological progress raises the long run capital-labor ratio, it
is clear that such technological change will also raise the skill premium if ρ < σ, i.e., if
capital and skill are complements rather than substitutes in production. As a result, our
identifying restriction that skill-biased technology shocks are the only shocks that affect
the skill premium in the long run is no longer valid, and we need to separately control
for investment-specific shocks. In addition, it is interesting in itself to assess the skill bias
in investment-specific shocks, because it will allow us to assess the degree of capital-skill
complementarity in aggregate production.
We follow Fisher (2006) in identifying investment-specific and investment-neutral technol-
ogy shocks using the relative price of investment goods. We estimate the effect of these
shocks on the skill premium in order to evaluate the hypothesis of capital-skill comple-
mentarity. As before, we control for skill supply shocks, so that the exact identifying
restrictions are as follows. First, we identify skill supply shocks using a short run re-
striction as described above. Then, we identify investment-specific technology shocks as
the only remaining shocks that affect the relative price of investment goods in the long
run. Finally, investment-neutral technology shocks are all remaining shocks that drive
labor productivity in the long run. For implementation, skill supply, the relative price of
investment and labor productivity are ordered first in the VAR.
Figure 2.6 shows the responses of the the skill premium, the relative supply of high skilled
workers, labor productivity, hours worked and the relative price of investment goods to
investment-specific and investment-neutral technology shocks. Note that controlling for
skill supply shocks changes the results in Fisher (2006) very little. After an improvement in
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Figure 2.6: Fisher identification with skill supply shocks
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investment-specific technology, the relative price of investment falls, productivity increases
and hours worked increase as well. An investment-neutral technology shock, has no effect
on the relative price of investment, increases productivity and leads to a fall in hours
worked15.
The skill premium and the supply of skill significantly fall after an improvement in
investment-specific technology. While there is certainly evidence for a relation between
skill bias and investment-specific technical change, these estimates point towards capital-
skill substitutability rather than complementarity: investment-specific shocks increase rel-
ative demand for unskilled labor. Because we have already documented that technology
shocks are skill biased, it should not be surprising that investment-neutral technology
shocks increase the skill premium, suggesting these shocks increase the demand for skilled
labor.
The same finding can be documented in an alternative way. In Figure 2.14 in the appendix
to this chapter, we present impulse responses of the relative price of investment goods to
skill-biased and skill-neutral technology shocks, identified as in Section 2.3.3. The graphs
provide the mirror image to those in Figure 2.6: Skill-biased technology shocks increase the
relative price of investment goods significantly, suggesting these shocks are “consumption-
specific” or capital and skill are substitutes in production. Note that these shocks share
the same features as the investment-unspecific technology shocks identified in Chapter 1.
Our findings are in striking contradiction with the argument in Krusell et al. (2000). What
explains the difference is that Krusell et al. (2000) base their argument on a correlation
in the long run trends in the skill premium and the relative price of investment goods.
In our approach, the identifying variation are comovement between those two series at all
frequencies except the trends, which are captured by the constant term in the VAR. It is
possible that the comovement in the trends in both relative prices is a spurious correlation
between two integrated series. It is also possible that the model needed to explain long run
growth trends is different from the model that describes higher frequency fluctuations.16
In any case, our findings reject the hypothesis that there is a stable aggregate production
15Since productivity increases after an investment-specific technology shock in our specification, we do
not need to use an additional assumption on this effect as in Fisher (2006).
16Lindquist (2004) presents a business cycle with capital-skill complementarity and investment-specific
technology shocks and argues that the model can explain fluctuations in the skill premium and the capital-
skill ratio. However, he evaluates the model based on the unconditional correlations of the skill premium
with output and does not consider the correlation of the skill premium with the investment price.
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function with capital-skill complementarity.
2.4.2 Contribution to business cycle fluctuations
Our results suggest that there are at least four different types of technology shocks with
distinct implications for the comovement of aggregate variables: skill-neutral, investment-
neutral; skill-neutral, investment-specific; skill-biased, investment-neutral; and unskill-
biased, investment-specific (or skill-biased, consumption-specific) technology shocks. With
the identifying restrictions discussed above, it is not possible to separately identify all
four different shocks simultaneously. Recall that both investment-specific and investment-
neutral technology shocks affect the skill premium. Conversely, both skill-biased and
skill-neutral technology shocks affect the relative price of investment goods. Hence, if
we use a recursive identification scheme, identifying first investment-specific technology
shocks, then these shocks will include the unskill-biased, investment-specific shocks. In
this case, skill-biased technology shocks will be identified as all remaining shocks that af-
fect the skill premium in the long run and will exclude shocks that affect both the relative
price of investment and the skill premium. Similarly, if we identify first the skill-biased
shocks, then these shocks will include the skill-biased, consumption-specific shocks.
Our solution to this problem is to estimate both orderings and use the estimates as a lower
and upper bound for the contribution of the various shocks. To be more precise, we always
identify supply shocks first as above. Then, in ordering I, we identify investment-specific
technology shocks as all remaining shocks that affect the relative price of investment goods.
These shocks are allowed to affect the skill premium. Skill-biased technology shocks are
identified as all remaining shocks that affect the skill premium in the long run. The
estimates of this VAR provide an upper bound for the contribution of investment-specific
shocks and a lower bound for the contribution of skill-biased technology shocks. In ordering
II, we identify skill-biased technology shocks as all shocks that affect the skill premium
in the long run (conditional on skill supply shocks) and investment-specific shocks as the
remaining shocks that affect the relative price in the long run. This ordering provides
an upper bound for the contribution of skill-biased shocks and a lower bound for the
contribution of investment-specific shocks. In both cases, the remaining shocks affecting
labor productivity are neutral technology shocks.
Table 2.2 shows the variance decomposition of the forecast error in output, hours and
the skill premium. The contribution of skill supply shocks and neutral technology shocks
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Table 2.2: Variance decomposition from joint identification
Horizon 8 16 32
I II I II I II
output
supply shock 5.3 5.9 10.0 10.8 12.3 13.1
invest. shock (ub,lb) 63.9 54.8 60.6 50.7 57.3 48.7
SBT shock (lb,ub) 2.5 9.1 1.9 9.7 1.9 8.9
neutral shock 4.2 4.9 4.3 5.0 4.6 5.2
hours
supply shock 20.6 21.3 30.2 30.7 35.9 36.0
invest. shock (ub,lb) 46.0 26.6 38.8 22.1 31.8 18.7
SBT shock (lb,ub) 1.0 19.4 1.1 17.8 1.1 15.3
neutral shock 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4
premium
supply shock 1.7 1.5 2.0 1.8 2.4 2.2
invest. shock (ub,lb) 11.2 5.4 21.5 2.2 25.2 1.0
SBT shock (lb,ub) 86.0 92.2 76.0 95.6 72.2 96.6
neutral shock 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Notes: Numbers are in percent. The values for the shocks and the (omitted)
residual disturbances add up to 100 for each horizon. The point estimate is the
median, the confidence intervals are 68 % Bayesian bands from the posterior
distribution.
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is very similar in both orderings of the identifying restrictions. This illustrates that we
identify the same shocks in both orderings. Neutral technology shocks explain less than 5%
of business cycle fluctuations in output and play virtually no role for fluctuations in hours
and the skill premium. Investment-specific technology shocks explain up to two thirds
of the volatility in output at business cycle frequencies, about one third of the variation
in hours. This finding is consistent with earlier findings in this literature (Fisher (2006),
Canova et al. (2006)).
Skill-biased technology shocks explain almost all of the entire business cycle variation in
the skill premium. These shocks are important for fluctuations in output and (especially)
hours as well, but only insofar as they also affect the relative price of investment goods.
Investment-specific, skill-neutral technological progress is important for fluctuations in
output, but does not have much of an effect on the skill premium. These results suggest
that shocks that drive fluctuations in the skill premium are largely unrelated to other
variables in the economy. This finding is consistent with the unconditional moments in
Table 2.1, which show the skill premium to be largely uncorrelated with output.
2.4.3 Capital-skill complementarity
Our finding that the skill premium decreases in response to investment-specific shocks,
and the relative price of investment goods increases in response to skill-biased technology
shocks suggest that capital and skill are substitutes rather than complements in the aggre-
gate production function. Yet the estimates by themselves do not give any indication as to
how large this effect is. What parameters of production function (2.3) are consistent with
our estimates? To answer this question, we simulate a simple business cycle model with
a production function as in (2.3) and compare the estimated impulse response functions
from the actual data to those from simulated data for different values of the substitution
parameters. This procedure also allows us to see whether the structural VAR performs
well in capturing the conditional moments of the variables in a model that is consistent
with our interpretation of the results.
The model is a simple real business cycle model with high and low skilled workers. The
model is taken from Lindquist (2004) and combines the two sector model of Greenwood
et al. (1997), in which output can be used for consumption or accumulation of capital
equipment, with the model of Krusell et al. (2000) with two skill types and capital-skill
complementarity. Business cycle fluctuations in the model are driven by shocks to total
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factor productivity and the relative price of investment goods.
For the calibration of the structural parameters of the model we also follow Lindquist
(2004), but we assume the two productivity shocks are highly persistent and uncorrelated
with each other in order to be consistent with the identifying restrictions of our VAR.
The substitution parameters in the aggregate production function (2.3) are σ = 1.67 and
ρ = 0.67. These values were estimated by (2.3) to be consistent with the trends in the
relative price of investment goods and the skill premium. Since ρ < σ in this calibration
the aggregate production function exhibits capital-skill complementarity. In alternative
calibrations, we keep σ constant, because the value of the elasticity of substitution between
high and low skilled workers is well documented, and change ρ to vary the degree of
capital skill complementarity. We consider the cases of capital-skill complementarity (ρ =
0.67), weak complementarity (ρ = 1.17), neither complementarity nor substitutability
(ρ = σ = 1.67), weak substitutability (ρ = 2.17), substitutability (ρ = 2.67) and strong
substitutability (ρ = 3.17) and also an extreme case of substitutability (ρ = 5). In each
case, we recalibrate the other model parameters if necessary to keep the calibration targets
constant.
We simulate the model 1000 times for 88 quarters, the same sample length as in our data.
In each simulation, the model is first simulated for 200 periods, which are then discarded,
in order to remove dependence on the initial conditions. We then estimate the VAR for
each sample of 88 quarters and average the impulse responses across the 1000 simulations.
Figure 2.15 in the appendix to this chapter illustrates this for the calibration in which
capital and skill are neither complements nor substitutes. For better comparison, the
responses are normalized such that they match the responses in the actual data of the
investment price and labor productivity to the two technology shocks respectively. Nicely,
the estimated responses from the simulated data closely match the theoretical ones from
the model.17 This is also the case for other degrees of substitutability of complementarity
between capital and high-skilled labor. Most importantly for our purposes, the estimated
response of the skill premium to investment-specific shocks is positive if capital and skill are
complements, negative if they are substitutes and zero when they are neither substitutes
nor complements.
Figure 2.7 shows the impulse responses of the skill premium to an investment-specific
17The small differences may be due to many reasons: technology shocks in the model are persistent but
not permanent, the prior smoothes the estimated responses, the finite lag length in the VAR, etc.
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Figure 2.7: Capital-skill substitutability
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Notes: Black line depicts response of the premium from the estimated
structural VAR with actual data together with the Bayesian 68% confidence
bands (red dotted lines). The dashed lines show the responses from the
model with ρ = 0.67, ρ = 1.17, ρ = 2.17, ρ = 2.67 and ρ = 5 respectively.
shock from the model simulated for different degrees of capital-skill complementar-
ity/substitutability as well as from the actual data. Comparing the response of the skill
premium to investment-specific shocks in the actual data to that in the model, it is clear
that our estimates suggest a fairly large degree of capital-skill substitutability. In fact, the
estimates suggest an elasticity of substitution between capital and high skilled labor of
around ρ = 5, whereas the elasticity of substitution between capital and low skilled labor
is σ = 1.67. These parameters imply that if the capital stock increases by 1%, firms can
still produce the same amount of output as before if they fire 1.67% of their low skilled
workers or as much as up to 5% of their high skilled workers. One should recall here
that the estimated response to the skill premium is particularly low for the baseline spec-
ification of the estimation. Other estimates will provide lower values of substitutability
between skilled labor and capital.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the implications of skill-biased technological change for the
business cycle. In order to address this issue we have constructed a quarterly series of the
skill premium and skill supply from the CPS outgoing rotation groups. We have identified
conventional neutral and investment-specific technology shocks from structural VARs with
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long-run restrictions using quarterly U.S. data. In addition, we have proposed a strategy
to identify skill-biased technology shocks through reshuffling the variables in the same
VAR that we have used for the identification of the conventional technology shocks. Skill-
biased technology shocks are those technology shocks that drive the skill premium up and
may affect productivity in the long-run. Since they potentially bias the results, we have
additionally controlled for shocks to the supply of skill using a short-run restriction.
We have investigated the effect of neutral and investment-specific technology shocks on
the skill premium and documented that technology shocks are skill-biased at all business
cycle frequencies. Further, there exists no evidence for complementarity between capital
and skill over the business cycle as investment-specific technology shocks do not signifi-
cantly drive up the skill premium. Rather, capital and skill are substitutes in production.
Moreover, we find that skill-biased technology shocks lead to a fall in hours worked and
may thus be suitable to explain what Gal´ı (1999) has documented as the ’hours puzzle’.
As a consequence, skill-biased technology shocks are important to understand the business
cycle fluctuations.
We have addressed a great variety of robustness checks for our results. We have considered
different measures for the skill premium and skill supply as well as various specifications
of estimating the baseline VAR. In addition, we have constructed a measure of skill biased
technology from a production function decomposition, similar to a Solow residual. We have
furthermore simulated artificial data from a model with different degrees of capital-skill
substitutability and complementarity in order to test our identification procedure.
There are nevertheless still some caveats and issues that will need further attention in
future research. For example, the induced dynamics to shocks to the supply of skill do
not fully agree with what they were expected to ex ante. With respect to the capital-
skill substitutability, the biggest open question still lies in the discrepancy of our results
with the evidence of complementarity between these two production inputs in the trends
(zero frequency). The joint coincidence of these two results points to the existence of two
different production functions in the different frequencies. Last, it would be insightful to
study the degree of capital-skill substitutability or complementarity in different sectors
in order to see how this relates to or causes the aggregate substitutability that we have
documented above.
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Appendix to Chapter 2:
Additional Tables and Graphs
Table 2.3: Variance decomposition SBT identification
Horizon 1 8 16 32
output
supply shock 1.39 1.30 2.44 2.97
(1.3,1.4) (0.6,3.2) (0.7,8.1) (0.5,10.7)
SBT shock 1.66 3.12 3.44 3.66
(0.1,7.5) (0.5,11.4) (0.6,13.6) (0.5,14.4)
neutral shock 47.55 45.10 44.46 44.23
(29.5,64.2) (27.7,60.4) (26.5,60.2) (26.2,60.6)
hours
supply shock 7.83 8.21 14.45 17.22
(7.8,7.9) (3.8,14.7) (6.1,25.8) (7.3,31.7)
SBT shock 7.87 10.28 9.90 9.56
(1.6,18.1) (1.9,24.7) (1.7,25.3) (1.5,25.4)
neutral shock 1.75 9.30 9.51 9.16
(0.2,6.6) (2.2,22.2) (2.1,23.3) (1.8,23.3)
premium
supply shock 1.07 0.79 1.04 1.18
(1.0,1.1) (0.3,2.6) (0.3,3.9) (0.2,4.7)
SBT shock 90.98 94.74 96.43 97.40
(80.7,96.7) (89.3,97.9) (92.5,98.5) (93.8,99.1)
neutral shock 0.88 0.84 0.41 0.19
(0.1,4.2) (0.3,2.6) (0.1,1.3) (0.1,0.6)
Notes: Numbers are in percent. The values for the shocks and the (omitted)
residual disturbances add up to 100 for each horizon. The point estimate is
the median, the confidence intervals are 68 % Bayesian bands from the
posterior distribution.
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Table 2.4: Robustness of SBT Identification
SBT shock on hours skill-neutral shock on hours
Baseline specification
-, sign. +, sign. after 3rd quarter
Variation of the baseline specification with baseline wage premium
Minnesota prior with 8 lags changed to
2 lags -, not sign. +, sign.
4 lags -, sign. +, sign.
12 lags -, sign. -, sign. on impact,
+, sign. after 3rd quarter
weaker prior* -, sign. +, sign.
Flat prior (OLS equivalent)
2 lags -, not sign. +, not sign.
4 lags -, sign. +, sign.
Baseline specification with different wage premium series
Naive measure +, small effect, +, sign.
sign. on impact*
Lindquist measure +, small effect, +, sign.
sign. on impact* +, sign. after 3rd quarter
Notes: *Changed decay parameter from d = 3 to d = 1.
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Table 2.5: Variance decomposition Fisher identification
Horizon 1 8 16 32
output
supply shock 0.47 5.48 9.86 11.86
(0.4,0.5) (2.1,9.9) (3.5,17.9) (3.9,21.7)
i-shock 15.21 60.21 56.95 54.21
(7.7,25.2) (47.8,70.5) (42.5,69.4) (37.7,69.1)
neutral shock 17.17 6.65 6.29 6.20
(8.0,29.6) (2.5,13.4) (2.1,13.2) (1.7,14.3)
hours
supply shock 17.25 20.43 28.87 33.22
(17.2,17.3) (14.7,27.6) (19.3,39.9) (22.2,46.1)
i-shock 15.44 41.95 35.79 29.74
(8.1,23.9) (29.9,54.2) (21.2,51.3) (15.5,48.8)
neutral shock 13.65 2.08 1.69 1.53
(5.9,23.3) (0.6,6.8) (0.5,6.1) (0.3,6.1)
premium
supply shock 0.05 2.70 3.17 3.75
(0.0,0.1) (0.9,6.3) (0.8,8.7) (0.7,10.5)
i-shock 3.98 10.39 20.02 23.12
(0.7,10.5) (2.8,22.9) (6.3,37.7) (6.5,43.6)
neutral shock 21.13 31.85 28.59 27.37
(11.7,31.4) (20.3,44.1) (17.5,41.4) (16.0,40.6)
Notes: Numbers are in percent. The values for the shocks and the (omitted)
residual disturbances add up to 100 for each horizon. The point estimate is
the median, the confidence intervals are 68 % Bayesian bands from the
posterior distribution.
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Figure 2.8: Gal´ı identification - additional variables
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Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
Figure 2.9: Gal´ı identification with TFP measure
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Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
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Figure 2.10: Gal´ı with TFP measure and additional variables
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Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
Figure 2.11: Gal´ı identification with skill supply shocks
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Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
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Figure 2.12: SBT identification - additional variables
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Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
Confidence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.
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Figure 2.13: Comparison of SBT shock and decomposition
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Notes: Black solid line depicts identified SBT shock, red dashed line shows the
residual from the production function decomposition.
Figure 2.14: SBT identification - relative price of investment goods
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Figure 2.15: Impulse-responses from model and simulated data
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Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock. Responses from
the model with ρ = σ = 1.67 are dashed lines. Solid lines with 68% Bayesian confidence
bands are estimated from 1000 simulations from the same model. The responses are
normalized to match the responses of the investment price and labor productivity in the
actual data in the longer run (20 quarters).
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Chapter 3
On the Implications of Unobserved
Age and Cohort Effects for
Aggregate Labor Supply
3.1 Introduction
The euro area labor force participation rate, defined as the ratio between the labor force
and the working age population, has increased from below 65% in the early 1980s to 70.9%
in 2007. The increase in the propensity to work or to search for and to be available for
jobs has been the main driver of the substantial increase in euro area labor supply that
has accelerated since the mid-1990s. However, the overall increase reflects substantial
heterogeneity in the evolution of participation behavior across population groups and
across euro area countries. The participation rate of females in the euro area has increased
by more than 15 percentage points over this time period, to 63.3% in 2007, compared to
the participation rate of 78.6% for males (see upper panel of Figure 3.1). The participation
rate of the young (15-24 years old) declined markedly until the mid-90s and has stabilized
to around 45% in the last decade, whereas, following a long period of stable participation
rates, the participation rate of those 55-64 years old increased markedly in the last few
years (see lower panel of Figure 3.1). Also, the extent of the increase in participation
and its composition across worker groups varies across euro area countries, suggesting
an important role for cross-country heterogeneity in the underlying factors that determine
individual labor supply decisions. A number of factors could have contributed to the overall
increase in participation: robust, employment intensive economic growth (in particular
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from the mid-1990s onwards), reforms targeted at groups with lower attachment to the
labor market, changes in cultural attitudes towards work (particularly for women), as well
as demographic factors, such as the larger share of the population in prime working age.
We use harmonized data from the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) and a cohort-based
model to analyze determinants of labor market participation in the euro area and the five
largest euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) over the
last few decades. We refer to two euro area aggregates. The first (EA12) consists of the
euro area 12 countries before Slovenia, and later Malta, Cyprus and Slovakia, entered the
euro area and the second (EA5) an aggregation of the five largest euro area countries.
The cohort-based model is used to decompose time-series of age-specific participation
rates in euro area countries into the impact of the business cycle, observed structural
determinants of participation (such as labor market institutions) and most importantly
unobserved determinants captured by age and birth-year specific (i.e. cohort) effects.
The age and cohort effects are derived from the evolution of the age-participation profile
over time. The propensity to participate evolves over the life-cycle, as reflected in an
inverted u-shape age-participation profile. The age effects in the model capture this feature
of the underlying age-participation profile. At the same time, the age-participation profile
is continuously shifting. The cohort based model captures parallel shifts in the profile
that are specific to a birth-year through the unobserved cohort effects. While cohort
effects generally encompass any factor associated with a particular birth year, they are
likely to reflect the impact of individual participation choices made early on in life (for
example choices relating to starting a family, maternity leave and/or education) that
persist throughout the life-cycle. They may also reflect crowding-out effects or slowly
evolving preferences, cultural factors or institutions.1 Controlling for business-cycle effects,
we first estimate age and cohort effects for the euro area aggregate (EA12) and individual
euro area countries.
While cohort effects explain shifts in the age-participation profile, potential changes in
the shape of this profile are captured through observed time-varying determinants, such
as demographic trends and changing labor market institutions. We use the model with
1For example, Fernandez (2007) builds a model of female participation that is based on culture and
learning. She argues that cultural factors can explain the increase (and the S-shaped time series pattern)
of female participation rates in the United States. Antecol (2000) finds that the home country plays an
important role in participation decisions of first generation female immigrants in the US, suggesting that
culture matters for participation behavior.
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Figure 3.1: Participation rates by worker groups in the euro area (EA12)
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observed determinants to explain changes in trend participation rates over time and also
to project them forward in the five largest euro area countries. We then aggregate these
country trends and projections for the euro area (EA5). Projections that take age and
cohort effects and the changing population structure into account provide a useful bench-
mark scenario for future labor supply in the euro area. In particular, a cohort based model
takes into account the extent of the pass-through of participation behavior from the young
cohorts to the oldest cohorts. Looking forward, demographic factors will become less fa-
vorable with population ageing increasing the importance of positive participation trends
within age and gender groups in sustaining potential growth in the euro area. As we
estimate the model separately for individual euro area countries and aggregate the results,
the results for the euro area also fully incorporate heterogeneity across countries.
Our paper is related to two main strands of literature. First, our main focus is on ac-
curately estimating trends in participation based on both observed determinants and the
unobserved age and cohort effects in the euro area. For this purpose we use a modified
version of the cohort-based model presented in Fallick and Pingle (2007) and applied in
Aaronson et al. (2006) to data for the United States. By simultaneously estimating par-
ticipation equations for single ages for each gender and taking advantage of cross-equation
restrictions the model provides a detailed account of the role of age and cohort effects in
explaining movements in the aggregate participation rate. Fallick and Pingle find that
these effects provide additional insights compared to time series based trend/cycle decom-
positions. For example, they find that the levelling off of the increase in the propensity to
participate at cohorts born around 1950 suggests that increased labor market attachment
is less likely to support an increase in the participation of females in the United States. We
are not aware of a cross-country study of European participation rates that accounts for
these features. Euwals et al. (2007) find using micro-data that cohort effects have played
an important role in explaining the increase in female participation from 1992 to 2004
in the Netherlands. Fitzenberger et al. (2004) use an alternative age, cohort, and period
accounting model to study participation and employment in Germany and find significant
cohort effects for females.2
Second, a number of studies have documented the impact of labor market institutions
on unemployment and employment in European countries (for a recent contribution and
2Other studies that use closely related methods include Beaudry and Lemieux (1999) for Canada and
Fukuda (2006) for Japan. In addition, Carone (2005) and Burniaux et al. (2004) take advantage of cohort
effects to project participation rates for EU and OECD countries respectively.
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review of the literature, see Bassanini and Duval (2006) and Bertola et al. (2007) for
age-group specific analysis). Participation decisions have received less attention in this
context. Blo¨ndal and Scarpetta (1999) and Duval (2006) focus on older workers and their
retirement decisions and Jaumotte (2003) on females. Genre et al. (2005) and (2008)
focus on group specific participation rates in European countries. Using annual data for
a panel of European Union countries, they estimate participation equations for age and
gender groups in order to identify the impact of institutions in participation decisions.
They find that labor market institutions indeed matter for labor supply: higher union
density, more employment protection and more generous unemployment benefits lower
participation rates. Genre et al. (2008) also find using lagged participation rate as a proxy,
that a common (across countries) cohort effect is an important element for understanding
participation rates of older women (those between 55 and 64) in European countries. We
add to these studies by considering disaggregated groups and by evaluating age and cohort
effects and possible observed determinants of participation in the same model. Instead of
the cross-country focus of most previous studies, we exploit the time series dimension of
the data and incorporate the impact of a broader set of factors through the unobserved
age and cohort effects.
We find that analyzing participation behavior both between (age and gender effects) and
within (cohort effects) detailed age and gender groups is particularly useful for modelling
trends in euro area aggregate participation rates and projecting them forward. Our results
suggest that age and cohort effects can explain a substantial part of the recent increase in
labor force participation rates in the euro area, although not the surge since early 2000s.
Cohort effects are particularly relevant for women, with those born in the 1920s and 1930s
less likely and those born in the late 1960s and early 1970s more likely to participate
in the labor market over the life-cycle. There is substantial variation in cohort effects
across the five largest euro area countries that we analyze. Depending on the country,
the estimated cohort profiles suggest an increase of 10 to 30 percentage points in female
participation rates. We also find that a number of observed determinants, such as labor
taxes, union density, unemployment benefits and the average number of children have had
an impact on labor force participation rates, although the specific impact varies across
age and gender groups and countries. Looking forward, while they continue to provide
some upward support to participation rates of women in the euro area, positive cohort
effects are not large enough to compensate for the downward impact of population ageing
on labor force participation rates in the euro area.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe sources and
characteristics of the data employed and the cohort based model of participation. In
Section 3.3 we present results from the model in three parts. We first illustrate the role
of estimated age and cohort effects in determining participation. Second, we analyze the
impact time-varying observed determinants of participation within a full model. Third,
we present projections for participation rates up to 2030 based on the model and compare
them with alternative scenarios. Finally, we summarize our results and conclude in Section
3.4.
3.2 Data and methodology
Participation behavior and its determinants vary systematically by age and gender and
changes in group-specific participation rates translate into the aggregate through an evolv-
ing population structure.3 As a result, analyzing participation behavior of detailed age
and gender groups is essential for understanding aggregate participation developments.
The source for data on population, employment and unemployment for detailed age and
gender groups for euro area countries is the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) compiled by
Eurostat.4 The same LFS data are used by Eurostat to calculate official statistics on
participation and unemployment for EU countries. The LFS data are harmonized across
countries and therefore particularly well-suited for cross-country comparative analysis.
The annual data from 1983 to 2007 are based on the spring (second quarter) results. Data
are available for ages from 15 to those over 70.5
Constructing consistent data over time requires some adjustments. In the case of Germany,
data prior to 1991 have been extrapolated backwards on the basis of the developments in
3Naturally, participation behavior varies also across other personal characteristics, such as education
and skills, immigrant status etc. We focus on age and gender for reasons of data availability: in particular,
LFS data by education categories is only available from the early 1990s onwards. That data shows that
more educated workers tend to have higher participation rates and that an increase in overall educational
attainment over time has coincided with an increase in participation rates, particularly for women.
4A detailed description of the sampling methods and adjustment procedures used in the LFS can be
found in ”The European Union Labour Force Survey - Methods and Definitions, 2001”, the available
variables are listed and described in the ”EU Labour Force Survey database - User guide”. The change
from annual to quarterly periods by Eurostat has resulted in breaks in the LFS survey in many euro area
countries. Therefore we rely on the more consistent spring (second quarter) data throughout the sample
period, except for France and Austria (first quarter).
5Except for Spain where data are available for those above 16.
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West Germany. We refer to two euro area aggregates in the paper. The first consists of the
euro area 12 countries before Slovenia, and later Malta, Cyprus and Slovakia, entered the
euro area. While there is no information available in the LFS for the euro area countries
before they joined the European Union (i.e., for Spain and Portugal prior to 1986, for
Austria and Finland prior to 1995), this has been taken into account in the calculation
of the euro area 12 aggregate. In particular, data for the euro area 12 aggregate prior to
1996 have been obtained on the basis of the growth rate of the largest aggregate available
(i.e., 12 countries in 1995 to 2006, 10 countries between 1986 and 1995 and 8 countries
before 1986). The second aggregate (euro area 5) contains only the largest 5 countries of
the euro area, namely Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. This aggregate
is calculated from the actual and estimated participation rates of the single countries,
weighted with their respective population shares.
Labor supply and participation rates evolve substantially over the life-cycle, tracing a
well-known overall inverted u-shape profile of participation rates that peaks around the
prime working age. Figure 3.8 in the Appendix to this chapter illustrates these profiles
for the EA12 aggregate for males and females in 2007. The participation rates of younger
workers (those below 25) and older workers (those above 50) change substantially from
one age group to another, whereas the substantially higher participation rates for those in
prime working age show a relatively flat profile between the ages of 30 and 50. The age
participation profile for females is always below, peaking earlier than the profile for males.
The gap to the male profile is smaller at younger than at older ages. At the country level,
we can observe somewhat different participation profiles in 2007, pointing to important
heterogeneity in participation behavior. For instance, the gap between male and female
participation rates is more substantial in Italy and Spain than in France, Germany and
the Netherlands, especially for those in prime age. While the participation rates of the
youngest age groups are comparable between most countries (at levels around 10-30%),
they are substantially higher in the Netherlands (at around 60%). Finally, for the oldest
age groups (60-64 years old), differences are mostly concentrated in female participation,
which varies from 10% in Italy to around 30% in Germany, while for males, participation
rates are generally between 30-50%, with the only exception of France (below 20%). The
age effects in the model for the euro area and the different countries will capture these
features of the underlying age-participation profiles for men and women.
These age-participation profiles for males and females are continuously evolving as a result
99
Figure 3.2: Changes in participation rates by age for females in the euro area (EA12)
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Sources: EU LFS (Eurostat)and own calculations.
of changes both between and within age groups. Figure 3.2 plots the overall change in
participation rates for each single age for females in two time periods, 1983-1995 and 1995-
2007. These two periods are comparable both in terms of length and in terms of economic
developments (i.e. the business cycle). Overall, since 1983 the female profile has been lifted
up for those between 25 and 58 years old, in particular for older women who increasingly
stay in the labor market after child-bearing. At the same time, the participation rates for
the youngest women have declined. Since the mid-1990s the latter effect has decreased,
while the hump-shaped pattern of an increase in participation for those between 25 and 58
years old has shifted towards older age groups. This effect is reminiscent of cohort specific
participation effects, i.e., female participation behavior for a particular cohort persists over
time. In terms of the age-participation profile, the estimated cohort effects in the model
describe upward shifts in the profile that are specific to a particular birth-year.
In contrast, participation rates for prime-age males have not changed significantly in the
entire period. However, the participation rates of those between 15-24 years old have
slightly declined, while those of the oldest, between 55 to 64 years old, have increased a bit.
For both males and females, the increases in participation rates for the youngest and oldest
workers may be related to the impact of labor market reforms that have focused on groups
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with a weaker attachment to the labor market. While the cohort effects capture parallel
shifts in the age-participation profile, changes in the shape of the age-participation profile
over time will be captured by time-varying institutions and other explanatory variables
such as the share of youth in education.
We use the output gap to measure the business cycle. The output gap is calculated as
a deviation of real GDP from an Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend. In line with Uhlig and
Ravn (2002), the smoothing parameter in the HP-filter for annual data is set at λ = 6.25.
The real GDP data for both the euro area 12 and the single countries is taken from the
AMECO database. The full model specifications include a number of indicators for key
time-varying institutions. We include OECD indicators for union density, labor taxes,
implicit tax for older workers, the unemployment benefit replacement rate, the share of
youth in education and average number of children also used in Bassanini and Duval (2006)
and a measure of life expectancy from Eurostat. When missing, data for the last few years
has been extrapolated based on past trends. As noted before, we include institutions to
control for changes in the shape of the age-participation profile. This means that we rely
on time-series variation of institutions within a single country to identify the impact of
institutions. Therefore, several important institutional determinants of labor supply that
do not generally vary over time, such as the mandatory retirement age, are excluded from
this analysis.
The estimation strategy is based on the cohort-based model presented in Fallick and
Pingle (2007).6 Specifically, we estimate a system of constrained least squares regressions
for single ages 15 to 70 and over, separately for men and women:
ln
(
LFPRg,t
1− LFPRg,t
)
= αg +
1992∑
b=1917
Cg,b,tβb + λgXg,t + εg,t
The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the participation rate for males
or females. We use the logistic transformation to ensure that predicted participation rates
remain bounded between 0 and 100 and undo the transformation after estimation.
6Closely related models based on age, cohort and period accounting have a long tradition in sociological
and demographic research and have been recently applied to analyze labor supply in Beaudry and Lemieux
(1999) and Fitzenberger et al. (2004). Articles in Mason and Fienberg (1985) provide an early discussion
of basic accounting models and applications that rely on functional form assumptions. From an economic
perspective the pure age, cohort and period accounting approach seems rather ad hoc in nature. The
current model is therefore an attempt to move beyond a pure statistical decomposition by including
observable variables that capture underlying factors that determine participation rates. See also Euwals
et al. (2007) for a discussion and comparison of different modelling strategies.
101
The coefficient α represents an age effect that is constant over time and measures the
average propensity to participate in the labor market at a certain age. The α for all
ages trace an underlying fixed age-participation profile. The coefficients Cg,b,t represent
dummies for the different birth years and are equal to one if the birth cohort b appears in
age g at time t. Within each gender group and country, the coefficient β is constrained to
be the same across equations. This allows an identification of cohort effects separately from
the age and business cycle effects. As a consequence, the coefficients β represent cohort
effects that are constant over time and may be interpreted as the average propensity to
participate in the labor force when born in a particular year. The cohort effect shifts the
underlying age participation profile up and down, depending on the propensity of the birth
year cohort to participate in the labor market throughout their working lives. We include
all cohorts in the estimation which results in considering persons born between the years
1917 and 1992. However, as the most recent birth cohorts are only observed when they
are very young, we estimate the model without the last eight cohorts.7 Later, we assign
a cohort effect to these cohorts after estimation by setting it equal to the last estimated
cohort effect (equal to the cohort effect for those born in 1984).
Finally, X contains other variables that have explanatory power for participation rates
of particular age groups. In the baseline specification, this encompasses business cycle
effects represented by the contemporaneous value and two preceding lags of the output
gap. In addition, both the estimated age and cohort effects are potentially influenced by
time-varying institutions. In the full model therefore X includes also a set of indicators
of observed determinants. Note that the institutions do not vary across ages, although
some institutions are included only in the equations for young (youth in education), female
(number of children) or older workers (implicit tax and life expectancy). The coefficients
of the observed determinants vary freely across ages and therefore allow the underlying
age-participation profile to tilt.
The total system is estimated based on 1400 age-year observations, with 56 equations,
resulting in 56 estimated age and 168 estimated business cycle parameters each and 72
(constrained) cohort parameters. The unconstrained model results in a regressor matrix
that is of reduced rank. With the help of the restrictions on the cohort effects, the
estimation is nevertheless possible as shown in Greene and Seaks (1991). Significance tests
7We do this by replacing the values of the participation rate and the other explanatory variables of the
ages affected with means from the rest of the sample. We also restrict the cohort effects of the last eight
cohorts to equal the average of the remaining cohorts for the respective age.
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Table 3.1: Contribution of population composition to changes in participation rates
1983-1995 1995-2007 2007-2015 2007-2030
15-19 -1.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
20-24 -0.4 -0.8 -0.3 -0.1
25-34 1.9 -2.4 -1.4 -1.9
35-44 1.1 1.9 -1.9 -3.5
45-54 -0.3 1.7 2.2 0.4
55-64 0.4 0.2 1.0 2.8
Total 1.3 0.4 -0.6 -2.4
Change in PR 1.5 5.7 – –
Notes: Numbers in percentage points. Sources: EU LFS (Eurostat) and own calculations.
are based on robust (White-corrected) standard errors. The cross-equation constraints
identify the cohort effects only up to a scale factor. As in Fallick and Pingle (2007), we
therefore normalize the coefficient estimates by setting the parameter of one cohort (here
1969) to one.
Based on the results for labor market participation of the single ages for males and females,
we then construct aggregate participation trends using population weights. In addition to
changes in group-specific participation behavior, Table 3.1motivates how changes in the
composition of the euro area population have affected participation rates over time.8 In
particular, the positive total effect of the population composition of 1.3 percentage points
observed in 1983-1995 declined significantly in 1995-2007 mainly resulting from the de-
creasing share of the prime-age population in favor of older groups with lower participation
rates. Moreover, the supportive contribution of the 25-34 year-old to aggregate partici-
pation in 1983-1995 turned negative in 1995-2007. Note that even though the population
effect declined, the overall participation rate increased much more in the second period
than in 1983-1995.
Finally, in order to construct a scenario for future labor supply, we use population pro-
jections from the New Cronos database by Eurostat (EUROPOP2008). EUROPOP2008
contains statistical information on population projections with reference to projected 1st
8The impact of the change in composition can be measured by applying the change in the population
composition between the two periods to the participation rates of the first period, by age and gender
groups.
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of January population by sex and single year of age, projected vital events (births and
deaths) and assumptions concerning fertility, life expectancy at birth by sex and inter-
national migration. In the projections, we have made use of two variants: the baseline
projection includes migration, while an alternative scenario captures the population de-
velopments without migration. Looking forward, population ageing implies that the older
age groups within the working age population gain more weight: those above 55 years old
that are expected to be around 20% of the working age population in 2015, compared with
17.6% in 2007. In contrast, the weight of the ones below 24 years is expected to decline by
1 percentage point over the same period to 16.5%; and the weight of the group between
35 and 44 years old, i.e., those most attached to the labor market, is expected to decline
by more than 2 percentage points to 21.4%. The mechanical decomposition depicted in
Table 3.1 therefore suggests a substantial decline (by 0.6 percentage points) in the aggre-
gate participation rate, putting downward pressure on total labor supply and potential
growth in the euro area. This downward pressure intensifies significantly (a decline of
2.4 percentage points in the aggregate participation rate) if the horizon is extended up to
2030 when the oldest group (those between 55 to 64 years) is expected to account for one
fourth of the working age population.
Figure 3.3: Estimated age-participation profiles in the EA12
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3.3 Results
We present results in three parts. We first illustrate the role of age and cohort effects
using a basic decomposition of participation rates into age, cohort and business cycle
effects. Second, we add a number of indicators of time-varying observed determinants
of participation behavior, such as labor market institutions, in the model. Finally, we
present projections for male and female participation rates up to 2030. While the focus
is on the euro area, we use country results to illustrate and to account for cross-country
heterogeneity in participation behavior. In particular, the full model with time-varying
observed determinants is estimated separately for the five largest euro area countries (Ger-
many, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) and the results, in terms of trends and
projections, are then aggregated to form a euro area 5 aggregate.
3.3.1 Basic model
For the basic model, we will investigate the results from the decomposition to age and
cohort effects for the euro area (EA12) and the five largest euro area countries. The results
suggest substantial and highly statistically significant age effects that show the familiar
hump-shaped pattern. For males, underlying euro area participation rates increase until
age 30, remain stable until age 50, before gradually declining again (see Figure 3.3). The
overall level of the underlying euro area age-participation profile is lower for females. While
male participation rates are close to 100% in prime-age, female participation is highest
at ages 40-50 at around 45%. In addition, for females the estimated age participation
profile features a pronounced dip around early 30s. The dip suggests that a number
of women leave the labor market temporarily to start a family, returning to work in
their late 30s. The overall pattern of the age effects is similar across euro area countries.
However, both the level and shape of the underlying female age-participation profiles differ
substantially across countries (see Figure 3.9 in the Appendix to this chapter). While
female participation rates peak at close to 70% in France, they do not exceed 40% in
Spain and the Netherlands. The post child-bearing-age increase in participation is visible
in all countries except Italy. These differences point to significant underlying differences
in the participation behavior of European women that are likely to reflect a combination
of time-invariant cultural and institutional factors. The results also point to the need
to model the female participation rate using a flexible functional form that varies across
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Figure 3.4: Estimated cohort effects in the EA12
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countries. While the male age-participation profile could be characterized by a second
order polynomial of age, female age-participation profiles are more complex and cannot
be adequately captured by simple polynomials.
The results from the basic model also confirm that cohort effects are statistically significant
and robust to age and period effects as measured by an indicator of the business cycle.
In line with the descriptive evidence, cohort effects appear more significant in size for
females than males. The normalized cohort fixed effects for the euro area are plotted in
Figure 3.4 for both males and females. The results show a broadly declining profile for
males and an increasing profile for females. The overall pattern of declining cohort effects
for men and decreasing cohort effects for women appears similar to that observed in the
United States (see Figure 8 in Fallick and Pingle (2007)). This mix of a positive cohort
effect for the middle female cohorts and a negative effect for the younger female cohorts
has a large impact on overall labor supply and, as demographic change shifts the weight
between birth cohorts, turns out to be a relevant factor for future euro area labor supply.
Again country results broadly confirm the overall pattern of estimated cohort effects (see
Figure 3.10 in the Appendix to this chapter). The relative decline in cohort effects for
men varies most across countries, with a substantial decline in Italy contrasted with an
increase throughout in the Netherlands.
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Combining the age and cohort effects, and excluding the business cycle and the error
term, provides a measure of trend participation rates for each age group. For both females
and males the actual and trend participation rates show a decline in participation of the
younger age groups (up to 20-24 for females and 25-29 for males). For those in prime
age and for older workers the trends diverge somewhat. For females, actual and trend
participation increase for those in prime working age, and post mid 1990s also for older
workers. For males, actual and trend participation rates are either stable or declining for
those in prime age, whereas a more recent increase in participation rates for older workers
results in a mild u-shaped pattern. Estimated trend participation rates from the simple
decomposition capture actual developments reasonably well for most detailed age groups.
The model does particularly well in explaining the increasing trend of female participation
and the recent increase in the participation of older workers for both males and females
(with different timing across genders). In comparison, the results for some age groups
suggest that the simple model misses important determinants of participation. Aggregat-
ing results for both males and females shows that beyond the broad trends of increasing
participation of females and decreasing participation of males, important medium term
developments are not fully captured by the simple model. For both males and females
this includes a mild slump in participation in the 1990s and the most recent increase be-
ginning around 2004. For males, actual participation rates were also above trend rates as
captured by the model in the early 1980s. Overall, while the simple decomposition does
well in explaining broad trends in participation, in particular for females, for some groups,
age and cohort effects alone are not sufficient to capture trend participation patterns in
the euro area.
3.3.2 Model with observed determinants
Going beyond the basic model, it is likely that other factors, such as time-varying la-
bor market institutions, may have influenced participation trends in the medium term.
Therefore, in a second step, we estimate the cohort model for the five largest euro area
countries with a number of indicators of observed determinants that may matter for par-
ticipation decision. We include union density, labor taxes, implicit tax on retirement for
older workers, unemployment benefit replacement rate, the share of highly educated in
the youth population, average number of children and life expectancy. The list of indi-
cators is suggested by previous empirical analysis on the impact of institutions on labor
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force participation (see Bassanini and Duval (2006) and Genre et al. (2005) and 2008)
and theoretical considerations. In addition, availability of comparable indicators with suf-
ficient time variation limits the list of relevant institutional factors that are considered
(excluding, for example, indicators of employment protection legislation or the retirement
age).
A number of hypotheses about the likely impact of these institutional factors can be put
forward. First, we expect that declining union density in a number of euro area countries
may have contributed to increase participation through its positive impact on expectations
about the availability of jobs to those that have been previously inactive. As unions tend
to compress the wage distribution, the decline in unionization may have more of an impact
on those at the lower part of the wage distribution (more likely to be younger and older
workers). Second, an increase in labor taxes (observed in a number of euro area countries)
over time is also expected to result in lower labor participation by making leisure relatively
less expensive. However, from a household labor supply perspective an increase in labor
taxes for the head of the household may also result in an increased propensity to participate
for other members of the household (more likely to be women). For older workers the
implicit tax on continued work, a summary measure of retirement incentives, is likely to
be more relevant than the overall labor tax. A higher implicit tax rate is expected to lower
incentives to retire early (for the ages 55-64 considered here) and therefore to increase the
participation rate of older workers. Third, observed declines in the generosity of the
unemployment benefits system, as measured by the replacement rate, in a number of euro
area countries is likely to lower the incentive to participate in the labor market by lowering
alternative income when unemployed relative to inactivity. By contrast, unemployment
benefits may also have a positive impact on participation via wage bargaining, with lower
generosity leading to weakening of the insider’s position in the labor market relative to the
outsiders, or as a proxy for the overall generosity of the welfare system. Fourth, longer life
expectancy is likely to lead to higher participation for older workers as they remain active
and may also anticipate a longer period of retirement. Fifth, the higher share of young
in education relative to older workers is expected to lower participation of young workers.
Finally, the number of children is expected to influence female participation rates, with
more children lowering participation rates of women around the typical age for starting a
family. While union density, unemployment benefits and labor taxes are included in the
equations for all age and gender groups (in working age), variables relating to education are
included only for the youngest workers, life expectancy and the implicit tax on continued
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work for the oldest workers and, finally, the number of children for females only.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the aggregated coefficient estimates and their t-statistics of the
observed determinants of participation for three main age groups: young (15-24), prime-
aged (25-54) and older (55-64), for all five countries. To simplify comparisons of coefficient
estimates across groups and indicators, the data on observed determinants has been stan-
dardized. Note that the identification of the impact of institutions here relies only on
available within-country time variation, which is often limited for the indicators of labor
market institutions considered here. As a result, relatively few indicators turn out to be
statistically significant. With this caveat in mind, a number of institutional indicators
seem to matter, although the magnitude, and in some cases the sign, varies across coun-
tries and age groups. Higher labor taxes tend to lower participation rates (as reflected in
16 out 19 statistically significant coefficients). This impact is estimated more consistently
for males in all countries. Higher union density (in 11 out of 15 statistically significant co-
efficients) and more generous unemployment benefits (17 out of 24 statistically significant
coefficients) also tend to lower participation rates. The negative impact of unemployment
benefits is consistent with the interpretation that unemployment benefits impact participa-
tion rates either via their impact on bargaining (with increased power for insiders leading
to higher bargained wages and lower participation rates for outsiders) or via their role as a
proxy of the overall generosity of the welfare state (more generous benefits tend to coincide
with more generous welfare benefits for financing non-participation, lowering participation
rates). Exceptions to this result occur mainly for young people, whose participation rates
in some countries are positively associated with unemployment benefits. The results also
suggest that unemployment benefits increase participation of all males in Germany. While
not conclusive, these results are suggestive of negative incentive effects for the unemployed
stemming from generous unemployment benefits that are also of relatively long duration.
In this case, a decline in benefits over time would lead some unemployed workers (who
may have not been actively looking for jobs) to leave the labor force altogether. Overall,
the results for union density and unemployment benefits are broadly in line with panel
regression results in Genre et al. (2005) and 2008, who also find that higher union density
and more generous unemployment benefits lower participation rates.
For females, with the exception of young females in France and the Netherlands, higher
number of children tends to lower participation. The decline in number of children in most
euro area countries is therefore associated with an increase in female participation rates.
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Table 3.2: Impact of observed determinants: males
LT UD UB TR LE YE
Germany:
Young 0.00 -0.01 0.10 0.05
(-0.22) (-0.33) (5.07) (3.68)
Prime-aged -0.07 -0.03 0.03
(-7.03) (-1.43) (1.97)
Older -0.12 -0.04 0.07 0.03 0.40
(-7.89) (-1.02) (3.34) (0.54) (7.29)
France:
Young -0.16 0.46 0.05 -0.27
(-4.86) (5.14) (2.54) (-5.00)
Prime-aged -0.07 -0.04 -0.02
(-5.10) (-2.10) (-2.28)
Older 0.02 -0.09 -0.06 0.02 -0.09
(0.86) (-2.06) (-5.49) (1.44) (-2.47)
Italy:
Young -0.14 -0.07 -0.32 0.20
(-6.10) (-2.00) (-9.00) (2.95)
Prime-aged -0.11 0.00 -0.10
(-4.83) (-0.15) (-3.85)
Older 0.00 -0.15 0.06 0.04 0.21
(0.08) (-4.43) (1.54) (3.12) (3.06)
Spain:
Young -0.03 -0.04 -0.12 0.05
(-3.18) (-2.24) (-4.27) (0.85)
Prime-aged -0.08 -0.01 -0.11
(-6.52) (-0.50) (-7.65)
Older -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.05
(-1.78) (0.62) (-2.33) (-0.59) (1.49)
Netherlands:
Young -0.08 -0.34 -0.08 -0.02
(-1.91) (-5.21) (-2.97) (-0.25)
Prime-aged -0.03 -0.18 -0.08
(-1.37) (-4.42) (-4.21)
Older -0.11 0.05 0.04 0.42 0.14
(-2.66) (0.71) (1.30) (4.49) (2.20)
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. LT is labor taxes, UD is union
density, UB is unemployment benefits, TR is tax on retirement, LE is life expectancy, YE is youth
education. For each age group, the coefficients and their standard errors have been aggregated from
single ages using labor force weights in 2007.
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Table 3.3: Impact of observed determinants: females
LT UD UB TR LE YE NC
Germany:
Young 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.03 -0.12
(0.35) (4.70) (4.22) (3.26) (-10.04)
Prime-aged -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.01
(-8.08) (1.70) (1.01) (-1.51)
Older -0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.02
(-3.78) (-0.10) (-3.98) (2.12) (-0.95) (-2.07)
France:
Young -0.14 0.51 0.07 -0.29 0.17
(-3.96) (4.18) (3.36) (-5.11) (1.89)
Prime-aged 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
(2.47) (-1.07) (-2.27) (-0.11)
Older 0.06 -0.19 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.08
(1.99) (-3.64) (-1.49) (-1.50) (-2.22) (0.91)
Italy:
Young -0.11 -0.09 -0.22 0.59 -0.04
(-5.79) (-2.14) (-6.94) (8.85) (-1.95)
Prime-aged -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02
(-6.18) (-0.84) (-8.17) (-2.55)
Older -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.00
(-0.28) (-1.29) (-1.75) (0.86) (0.94) (-0.13)
Spain:
Young 0.03 0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.15
(2.31) (1.42) (-3.02) (-0.05) (1.03)
Prime-aged 0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.10
(1.28) (2.88) (-4.02) (-1.29)
Older 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.06
(0.04) (-1.11) (-1.61) (-0.08) (0.35) (0.19)
Netherlands:
Young 0.03 -0.15 0.05 0.04 0.15
(0.71) (-2.41) (2.72) (0.58) (4.73)
Prime-aged -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04
(-0.31) (-3.39) (-2.67) (-2.07)
Older 0.02 -0.11 -0.02 0.20 -0.03 -0.05
(0.32) (-1.67) (-0.42) (2.20) (-0.52) (-0.76)
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. LT is labor taxes, UD is union
density, UB is unemployment benefits, TR is tax on retirement, LE is life expectancy, YE is youth
education and NC is number of children. For each age group, the coefficients and their standard
errors have been aggregated from single ages using labor force weights in 2007.
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This is also in line with the Genre et al. (2008) finding that the fertility rate is negatively
associated with participation rate of prime-aged females.9 Other group specific variables
appear to be estimated less consistently, with both the sign and statistical significance
changing across age groups and countries. Higher implicit tax on retirement, in the few
cases when it is statistically significant, increases participation of older workers. With
few counterintuitive exceptions (older people in France) increased life expectancy also
increases participation of older workers. Both the sign and statistical significance of the
share of youth in education varies across countries, suggesting that investment in human
capital may not be well captured in the model.10
As regards the business cycle, we find that the sum of the coefficients of current and two
lags of the output gap for worker groups are often not statically significant (not shown).
In addition, for a number of groups we find a negative business cycle effect. For some
groups, such as young people and females, this result could reflect ”added worker” effects.
For example, for individuals in families with a main bread-winner, in good times labor
income from the rest of the family members may not be needed, whereas additional income
from a second job is needed in bad times.11 We tried other indicators of the business
cycle (unemployment and employment gap measures) with similar results. We therefore
conclude that the business cycle has little influence on participation decisions in these
countries, in line with results that show that European unemployment and employment
rates are mainly influenced by structural factors or interactions of structural factors and
shocks (e.g. Bassanini and Duval (2006) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)).
In order to illustrate the size of the total impact of observed determinants we compare
the total change in trend participation rates as measured by our model with a scenario of
keeping the observed determinants at their 1995 values. The scenario reflects the view that
the acceleration of labor market reforms from the second half of the 1990s onwards has
9We also experimented with other determinants of female participation, in particular, the tax rate on
second earners and marriage rate. Previous literature has suggested that both are potentially important
determinants (see Jaumotte (2003). The tax rate on second earners was usually not statistically significant
for these countries. We found some (counterintuitive) indication that the marriage rate is positively
associated with participation. Both variables where therefore excluded from the final model. Jaumotte
(2003) and Genre et al. (2008) exploit cross-section variation to establish other potential determinants of
female participation (such as maternity leave) that we do not consider here.
10These effects could be captured better by changes in returns to education. However, we are not aware
of comparable estimates of returns to education with a sufficiently long time-series that we could use.
11Prieto-Rodriguez and Rodriguez-Gutierrez (2000) find these effects to be relevant for women in Spain,
in line with our finding of negative business cycle effects for women of all ages.
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Figure 3.5: Total impact of observed determinants
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contributed positively to participation rates (see for example, Masuch and Force (2008)).
The results are shown in Figure 3.5. The positive impact of observed determinants on
participation is most evident for older males, as reflected in the large gap between the
two bars. The most relevant variable in this respect appears to be life expectancy. The
increase in life expectancy since 1995 has had a positive impact in the participation rate
of older males. Overall, the observed determinants have resulted only in small increase in
participation rates for females, with most of the increase over this time period attributed
to age and cohort effects instead. For young people, the impact of observed determinant
has been to dampen participation rates. This is partly explained by the increase in the
proportion of young people in education. At the country level, it is worth mentioning that
the impact of the change in the institutional framework is broadly based for prime-age
age males and females, and for females aged 55 and over. In contrast, for the young, the
developments are strongly influenced by the results for Italy and France, and for males
aged 55 and over by the results for Netherlands and Germany.
Both age and cohort effects remain jointly statistically significant in all models even after
including business cycle indicators and other time-varying determinants of participation.
These coefficients can be thought of as capturing the impact of other time-invariant cul-
tural or institutional factors (for the age coefficients) or slowly changing impact of factors
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Figure 3.6: Estimated cohort profiles in the EA5
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that are specific to birth years (for the cohort coefficients). The latter may include factors
such as cultural attitudes towards labor market participation (for women in particular)
or institutional factors and reforms that are not captured by the observed determinants.
Figure 3.6 plots the estimated cohort profiles based on the trend participation rates from
the model, aggregated to the euro area five (EA5) level. For males, the lines indicating
participation rates for specific cohorts are mostly overlapping. There is some indication
that most recent cohorts enter the labor market later, reflecting the substantial increase
in the average number of years spent in education. The same impact is visible also for the
youngest female cohort. However, in addition, the cohort profile for females suggests a
substantial shifting up of the age participation profile over time. For prime-aged women,
those in their mid 30s and 40s, the participation rate has increased by more than 20 per-
centage points. Furthermore, while the cohort profile for those born between 1953 and
1962 shows a pronounced dip at child bearing age, this dip is not visible for the next co-
hort (those born between 1963 and 1973). The higher propensity to participate of females
born in the late 1960s and early 1970s has therefore contributed to the increase in female
participation in the euro area.
Country results show that participation behavior differs across the largest five euro area
countries and that again this is most evident for women. For women in their 30s and
40s, the estimated cohort profiles show that participation rates of most recent cohorts has
increased most, by more than 30 percentage points, in the Netherlands and Spain and the
least in France, with roughly 10 percentage points (see Figure 3.11 in the Appendix to
this chapter). The disappearance of the dip at child bearing age is most pronounced in
the Netherlands: while the participation rates of women in the late 20s and early 30s for
those born in 1950s dropped by as much as 20 percentage points, the more recent cohorts
appear to have stayed in the labor market through the child bearing years.
3.3.3 Projections
In a third and final step we use the model results to project participation rates forward until
2030. The results of both trend and projection for the euro area (EA5) are obtained by
aggregating the full model estimates for Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands
weighting the countries with their respective populations. We assume that age and cohort
effects are fixed throughout the sample and keep observed determinants at their 2007
values. In addition, for the young cohorts, i.e., the last eight cohorts of our sample and
115
Figure 3.7: Trend and participation and projections in the EA5 by gender, 1986-2030
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those that enter the labor market after 2007, we fix their cohort effects at the level of
the last cohort effect we estimate, namely those born in 1984. Figure 3.7 shows the trend
from the estimation of the full model for males and females together with the actual
participation rates for the euro area (EA5). The results clearly show that within the
sample period the full model captures both trends and medium-term developments well.
This is confirmed by results for individual ages shown in Figures 3.12 to 3.17 in the
Appendix to this chapter.
The projected euro area participation rate decreases for males throughout the projection
period. In contrast, the euro area participation rate for females increases before stabilizing
at about 70% in 2030. This pattern is in line with the waning impact of the positive cohort
effects for females that continue to support participation rates looking forward. While the
gap between male and female participation rates is expected to decline substantially, at
the end of the projection horizon male participation rate remains 4.6 percentage points
above the female participation rate. Overall, towards the end of the sample the negative
impact of population ageing shifting the larger share of the population to older age groups
with lower participation rates begins to dominate and dampen the overall participation
rate. As a result, the overall participation rate is anticipated to increase slightly up to
2015, by 1 percentage point, but to decline thereafter. However, in 2030 it is still expected
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to remains at just above the 2007 level (see Table 3.4). The underlying country results
from the baseline model are shown in Table 3.5. The results for all countries point to an
ongoing increase in female participation and a decline in male participation. Indeed, in
the Netherlands and France the gap between male and female participation closes by 2030.
Reflecting the continued positive trend in female participation, the overall participation
rate is expected to continue increasing in all countries except Germany.
In order to explore these results further and to evaluate robustness we calculate three
additional scenarios for the euro area (see Table 3.4). First, we compare our results with
a scenario that keeps participation rates by age and gender groups unchanged at their
2007 level, i.e., accounting only for population effects. The model based results imply a
more positive outlook for participation than a scenario based on unchanged participation
behavior. Indeed, in the latter scenario, the overall participation rate declines already in
2015, with a gap of 3.9 percentage points in 2030 between the baseline model results and
the alternative scenario. Second, we calculate a scenario that accounts for the impact of
migration through the population structure. Specifically we compare the baseline model
results with a scenario that assumes no migration and find that the impact of migration
through the population structure is positive. On average, migrants tend to be younger
and therefore to have higher participation rates than the native population. The impact
is relatively small, but its relevance grows over time - the gap in the participation rate
between the baseline migration and non-migration scenario is 0.1 percentage point in 2015,
but reaches 0.8 percentage point in 2030. A comparison of the scenarios by gender shows
that migration is only relevant for the male participation rate, while the impact on the
female participation rate is negligible. Finally, we compare our results with those derived
from the participation rate projections at the country level published by the European
Commission (EuropeanCommission (2008)). We find that there is a significant gap be-
tween our baseline model results and the European Commission projections. According to
the European Commission, the overall participation rate is expected to increase somewhat
more, by 2.2 percentage points in 2015 and 3 percentage points in 2030. This gap reflects
a substantially more positive outlook for male participation in the European Commission
projections - for males the gap in participation is 2.4 and 5.8 percentage points in 2015
and 2030 respectively. While it is not straightforward to decompose the difference in terms
of underlying determinants, the European Commission projections appear to incorporate
more inertia from recent participation trends for males. Note that we keep the effect of in-
stitutional variables unchanged in the model based projections. Therefore, recent changes
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in observed determinants that persist or have lagged effects are not reflected in our model
based scenario. In contrast, reflecting the important role of cohort effects in explaining
past participation trends, our results suggest a somewhat more positive outlook for female
participation.
3.4 Conclusion
We use a cohort based model of labor force participation to analyze determinants of
participation for disaggregated groups of workers in European countries, with a focus on
the euro area. The model identifies significant age and cohort effects for detailed worker
groups as indicators of (unobserved) structural determinants. We use observed structural
determinants and age and cohort effects to construct trend measures of labor supply and to
disentangle the impact of structural and business cycle factors on labor force participation
rates.
Our results suggest that age and cohort effects can explain a substantial part of the recent
increase in labor force participation rates in the euro area, although not the surge since
early 2000s. Cohort effects are particularly relevant for women, with those born in the
1920s and 1930s less likely and those born in the late 1960s and early 1970s more likely to
participate in the labor market over the life-cycle. There is substantial variation in cohort
effects across the five largest euro area countries that we analyze. While cohort effects
generally encompass any factor associated with a particular birth year, we speculate that
the cohort effects that we observe reflect evolving preferences or social norms that vary
across countries. Depending on the country, the estimated cohort profiles suggest an in-
crease of 10 to 30 percentage points in female participation rates. We control for a number
of observed time-varying institutions, such as labor taxes, union density, unemployment
benefits and the average number of children and find that they have had an impact on
labor force participation rates, although the specific impact varies across age and gen-
der groups and countries. Looking forward, while they continue to provide some upward
support to participation rates of women in the euro area, positive cohort effects are not
large enough to compensate for the downward impact of population ageing on labor force
participation rates in the euro area.
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Appendix to Chapter 3:
Additional Tables and Graphs
Table 3.4: Alternative scenarios for future participation rates (EA5)
2007 2015 2020 2025 2030
Total participation rate
PR (baseline model) 72.0 73.0 72.9 72.5 72.5
PR (model - no migration) 72.0 72.9 72.6 71.9 71.8
PR (2007 level) 72.0 71.3 70.3 69.1 68.6
PR (EC) 72.0 74.2 74.6 74.6 75.0
Females participation rate
PR (baseline model) 64.1 67.6 68.8 69.5 70.2
PR (model - no migration) 64.1 67.5 68.7 69.2 69.9
PR (2007 level) 64.1 63.1 62.1 60.9 60.5
PR (EC) 64.1 67.6 68.5 68.8 69.5
Males participation rate
PR (baseline model) 79.9 78.4 76.9 75.4 74.8
PR (model - no migration) 79.9 78.2 76.5 74.6 73.8
PR (2007 level) 79.9 79.4 78.4 77.1 76.5
PR (EC) 79.9 80.8 80.8 75.9 80.6
Notes: Euro area obtained as the aggregation of Germany, Italy, France, Spain and the Netherlands.
PR (2007 level) refers to a scenario based on unchanged participation rates at the 2007 level.
PR (EC) refers to a scenario derived from European Commission (2008); it has been re-based to
the 2007 level derived from the EU-LFS. Sources: EU LFS (Eurostat) and own calculations.
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Table 3.5: Country projections
1987 1997 2007 2015 2020 2025 2030
Germany
Total 69.6 70.4 75.5 75.1 74.3 73.2 72.7
Females 57.6 61.8 70.0 71.4 71.5 71.1 70.8
Males 81.8 78.8 81.0 78.7 77.0 75.2 74.5
France
Total 67.1 68.0 68.6 68.8 68.8 68.7 68.8
Females 57.0 61.1 64.1 66.4 67.6 68.5 69.3
Males 77.6 75.2 73.3 71.2 70.0 68.8 68.4
Italy
Total 59.7 58.7 62.7 66.3 67.0 67.3 68.3
Females 41.9 44.0 50.9 57.7 60.3 62.1 64.1
Males 78.3 73.6 74.5 74.8 73.7 72.5 72.5
Spain
Total 58.3 62.8 72.5 74.2 74.0 73.3 72.8
Females 36.9 47.7 61.9 66.3 67.5 68.0 68.5
Males 80.3 78.0 82.7 82.0 80.3 78.4 76.9
Netherlands
Total 63.9 71.4 78.2 79.6 79.9 80.3 81.0
Females 48.4 61.2 71.8 76.7 78.7 80.4 81.9
Males 79.1 81.4 84.4 82.4 81.1 80.2 80.0
EU LFS (Eurostat) and own calculations.
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Figure 3.8: Age-participation profiles by gender in the euro area (EA12), 2007
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Figure 3.9: Estimated age-participation profiles by country
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Figure 3.10: Estimated cohort effects by country
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Figure 3.11: Estimated cohort profiles by country, females
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Figure 3.12: Trend and participation rates in the EA5: young females
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
16 years
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
17 years
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
18 years
3
5
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
19 years
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
20 years
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
21 years
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
22 years
6
2
6
4
6
6
6
8
7
0
7
2
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
23 years
6
6
6
8
7
0
7
2
7
4
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
24 years
Notes: Trend is a three-year moving average of the estimated trend participation rate.
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Figure 3.13: Trend and participation rates in the EA5: prime-age females
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Notes: Trend is a three-year moving average of the estimated trend participation rate.
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Figure 3.14: Trend and participation rates in the EA5: older females
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Figure 3.15: Trend and participation rates in the EA5: young males
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Notes: Trend is a three-year moving average of the estimated trend participation rate.
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Figure 3.16: Trend and participation rates in the EA5: prime-age males
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Figure 3.17: Trend and participation rates in the EA5: older males
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Conclusion
This dissertation has investigated different aspects of business-cycle and long-run move-
ments of aggregate labor supply and demand. In particular, the three chapters have
addressed the implications of unobserved shocks for the evolution of these two variables
and the resulting equilibrium in the labor market. While Chapter 1 has considered the
importance of technology versus non-technology shocks for the cyclical fluctuations in la-
bor demand, Chapter 2 has investigated the role of skill-biased technological change for
these fluctuations. In addition, Chapter 2 has highlighted the role of these shocks as well
as of shocks to the supply of skill (which may be interpreted as preference shifts in favor of
higher education) for both the business-cycle and economic growth. Chapter 3 in turn has
disentangled business-cycle from cohort effects (which may be interpreted as preference
shifts in favor of participation in the labor market) as determinants for the overall increase
in aggregate labor supply.
Contributing to the recent ongoing debate on the empirical performance of the Mortensen-
Pissarides search-and-matching model, Chapter 1 has judged the empirical performance
of the model on basis of moments conditional on technology shocks and non-technology
shocks rather than on overall unconditional moments. These shocks were identified within
a SVAR framework with conventional long-run restrictions and a combination of long-run
zero and sign restrictions. Chapter 1 has documented that technology shocks cannot be
the source of the high volatility in the job finding rate and unemployment present in the
data. Opposite to the figures in the overall sample, technology shocks induce a negative
co-movement between job finding and productivity and a positive co-movement between
unemployment and productivity. Instead, additional non-technological disturbances are
needed in order to replicate the unconditional volatility and correlations. Chapter 1 has
documented that preference shocks which have been suggested to be important in the
literature can only partly account for this.
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Chapter 2 has investigated the implications of skill-biased technological change for the
business cycle. Based on a new quarterly series of the skill premium and skill supply from
the CPS outgoing rotation groups, this chapter has assessed the effect of technology shocks
identified from a SVAR with long-run restrictions on the skill premium. Here, skill supply
shocks have been controlled for using a short-run restriction. In addition, the chapter has
proposed a strategy to identify skill-biased technology shocks through simple reshuffling
of the variables in the same VAR that was used for the identification of the conventional
technology shocks. Chapter 2 has documented that technology shocks are skill-biased
at all business cycle frequencies. Further no evidence was provided for complementarity
between capital and skill over the business cycle as investment-specific technology shocks
do not significantly drive up the skill premium. Rather, capital and skill are substitutes
in production.
Even though Chapter 2 abstracts from search-and-matching on the labor market, it con-
tains valuable results that may be used in order to enhance the empirical performance of
the models addresses in Chapter 1 in future research. More precisely, Chapter 2 has pro-
vided empirical foundation for a (cyclical, i.e. short- to medium-run) production function
in which low- and high-skilled labor as well as high-skilled labor and capital are substi-
tutes in production. In this framework, skill-biased technology shocks lead to a fall in
hours worked and may thus be suitable to explain the “hours puzzle”. Intuitively, as these
technology shocks make high skilled workers more productive, low skilled workers are sub-
stituted out of production and overall hours fall. Further, skill-biased technology shocks
mirror the dynamics of investment-unspecific technology shocks that have been identified
in Chapter 1 in order to assess shortcomings of the conventional Fisher identification for
investment-specific technology shocks. As a consequence, skill-biased technology shocks
are important to understand the overall business cycle fluctuations that we observe in the
data.
Based on the evidence in Chapters 1 and 2, it is potentially worthwhile to consider business-
cycle labor market dynamics within a New Keynesian model rather than a RBC framework.
New Keynesian models may well incorporate the dynamics driven by both non-technology
and technology shocks that are documented in Chapter 1. These models usually investigate
the effect of labor market frictions on optimal monetary policy. But it can be interesting to
turn this question around: How do real and nominal rigidities in prices and wages influence
the dynamics on the labor market? The answer to this question is not clear a priori. To
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give an example, in the presence of rigid nominal wages and flexible nominal prices and
given a certain wage bargaining setup, firms may strategically affect the real wage through
the setting of the nominal price. Since this potentially has an important effect on the labor
market dynamics different from those in a setup in which nominal wages are fully flexible, it
is possibly worthwhile to investigate this issue further in future research. This assessment
becomes even more interesting when allowing for more heterogeneity on the labor market,
for example with respect to skill.
Chapter 3 also highlights the role of heterogeneity in order to understand the dynamics
on the labor market, in particular those of labor supply. Chapter 3 has used a cohort
based model of labor force participation in order to analyze determinants of participa-
tion for disaggregated groups of workers in European countries, with a focus on the euro
area. The model identifies significant age and cohort effects for detailed worker groups
as indicators of (unobserved) structural determinants and disentangles these effects from
other structural and business cycle factors on labor force participation rates. Indeed, it
has been documented that age and cohort effects can explain a substantial part of the
recent increase in labor force participation rates in the euro area, although not the surge
since early 1990s. Cohort effects are particularly relevant for women, with those born in
the 1920s and 1930s less likely and those born in the late 1960s and early 1970s more
likely to participate in the labor market over the life-cycle. Looking forward, while they
continue to provide some upward support to participation rates of women, positive cohort
effects are not large enough to compensate for the downward impact of population ageing
on labor force participation rates in the euro area.
Against this background, participation decisions of women may also have an important
impact on the labor market dynamics over the business cycle and are worthwhile to be
considered further in future research. In fact, two partners of a household interact with
respect to their choices about market work, home production and leisure. This underlying
heterogeneity plays a role for the individual allocation of time and hence the elasticity of
labor supply. Allowing for this kind of heterogeneity in the aggregate potentially allows
new insights into the determinants of aggregate labor supply and may have important
implications for labor market or fiscal policy.
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Appendix A
Identification and estimation in
Chapters 1 and 2
A.1 Standard long-run identification
Chapter 1 and 2 both employ structural identification in a VAR with long-run restrictions
in order to estimate different types of technology shocks and disentangle them from non-
technology shocks. Identification involves finding a mapping A of the residuals from a
reduced form VAR into so-called structural residuals such that these can be interpreted as
technology shocks. More precisely, name vt the residuals from a reduced form VAR with
E[vtv′t] = Ω. The relationship between the structural and reduced form residuals is then
et = Avt which induces AΣeA′ = Ω. The remaining assumptions in order to pin down A
then need to come from restrictions on the matrix of long-run effects. These assumptions
can be incorporated as zero restrictions in the matrix of long-run effects C ≡ ∑∞i=0ΦiA,
where Φi are the impulse-response coefficients.
In the case of the Gal´ı identification, all identified shocks, i.e. the neutral technology
shock plus the remaining n− 1 non-technology shocks, are assumed to be orthogonal. In
addition, the variance of the structural residuals is normalized such that Σe = I. If labor
productivity is ordered first in the VAR, a lower triangular structure of the matrix C
satisfies Gal´ı’s assumption that only neutral technology shocks drive labor productivity
in the long run. This is easily obtained by decomposing the variance of the k-step ahead
forecast error ηt,k = Xt+k − Et(Xt+k) which is equal to
MSE(k) = (
k∑
i=0
Φi)Ω(
k∑
i=0
Φi)′
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with the Cholesky decomposition1. In the application, k =∞ has to be approximated by
some large value, here k is 80 quarters. It has to be noted that this procedure uniquely
pins down the effect of the neutral technology shock on all variables in the VAR and that
the result is not affected by the additional (unnecessary) zero restrictions in the matrix of
long-run effects.
The reduced form VAR for all baseline specifications is estimated in a Bayesian framework
in the main application. More precisely, I obtain 1000 draws of the posterior distribution of
the reduced form coefficients and then apply the identification procedure to each of these
in order to produce draws of the distribution of the structural coefficients.2 The point
estimates exhibited then correspond to the median and the confidence intervals to the
16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution (this is equivalent to one standard
error).
A.2 Estimation of the BVAR
All baseline results in chapter 1 and 2 are based on the reduced form VAR that is estimated
in a Bayesian framework with a Minnesota prior. The Minnesota prior consists of a normal
prior for the VAR coefficients and a fixed and diagonal residual variance. The prior mean
d0 is restricted such that it represents a random walk structure on the VAR coefficients,
i.e. in the standard case, the prior mean on the first lag is set to unity and the prior mean
on the other lags (remaining parameters) is set to zero. Here, this is reflected by the fact
that all variables enter the VAR in first differences resulting in a zero mean for all lags.
The prior variance Σd0 = Σd0(φ) of the coefficients depends on three hyper-parameters φ1,
φ2 and φ3, that determine the tightness and decay on own lags, other lags and exogenous
variables. Except for the decay, a loose prior is chosen for the hyper-parameters, namely
φ1 = 0.2, φ2 = 0.5 and φ3 = 105. The decay parameter in chapter 1 is d = 7, in chapter 2
it is d = 3. The advantage of the structure of the Minnesota prior is exactly this ability to
separately deal with the lags of the variables, i.e. own and other lags, as well as exogenous
variables. Together with a normal likelihood of the data the Minnesota prior produces a
1See for example Uhlig (2004). Note that the variables important for identification, here labor produc-
tivity, need to enter in first differences in the VAR for this equation to hold.
2This approach goes back to Canova (1991) and Gordon and Leeper (1994) and is feasible if the system
is just identified, that is, if there exists a unique mapping between draws of the residual variance covariance
matrix and draws of the identification matrix A.
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posterior that can be derived analytically. Hence, the estimation does not rely on sampling
procedures.
A.3 Restricted Fisher identification
In the restricted Fisher identification in chapter 1, I implement the identifying assump-
tion for neutral and investment-specific technology shocks as in Fisher (2006). Here, the
restricted Fisher identification is very similar to the Gal´ı identification, apart from a few
issues.3 First, if the the real investment price is ordered first and labor productivity
second in the VAR, the matrix of long-run effects may be lower triangular in order to
impose the first two restrictions, namely that only investment-specific technology shocks
affect the investment price in the long run and only technology shocks may be sources of
long-run fluctuations in labor productivity. In addition, the third restriction implies that
c21
c11
= α1−α , where cii are the respective elements of the matrix of long-run effects C. Since
the lower triangular structure already imposes the number of conditions necessary for the
identification of A, I need to relax one of the other assumptions in order to maintain exact
identification. Here, the third restriction results in a positive correlation between neutral
and investment-specific technology shocks. Hence, Σe is no longer diagonal, but rather
Σe =

1 ρ O
ρ 1 O
O O I
 .
Naming Λ the lower triangular Cholesky factor from the decomposition of the k-step ahead
forecast error, the identification matrix is then A = FB with F = (
∑k
i=0Φi)
−1 and
B =

1 0 O
b
√
(1 + b2) O
O O I
 .
With b =
α
1−αλ11−λ21
λ22
, with λii being the elements of Λ, the correlation between the two
technology shocks is pinned down as ρ = −b√
(1+b)2
.
3Note that Fisher imposes his restrictions in an instrumental variable framework similar to Shapiro and
Watson (1988). I thank Fabio Canova for the solution of the implementation of the Fisher restrictions as
explained above.
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A.4 Alternative identification
The alternative identification in chapter 1 combines long-run zero restrictions as in the
Fisher identification with sign restrictions on the long-run effects of the structural shocks
on the real investment price and labor productivity. Assuming Σe = I, the n elements of
the matrix A that maps the reduced form into structural residuals have to be determined
such that AA′ = Ω and our long-run restrictions are fulfilled. Note that this is equivalent
to finding a decomposition L of the long-run forecast revision variance such that
LL′ = Σ∞ = (
∞∑
i=0
Φi)Ω(
∞∑
i=0
Φi)′.
Consider the same order of variables as in the Fisher identification, i.e. the real price
of investment and labor productivity are ordered first in the VAR. First, I assume that
only the two types of productivity shocks can affect the real investment price and labor
productivity in the long run. This means that l13 = l14 = ... = l1n = 0 and l23 = l24 =
... = l2n = 0 and results in
L1:2,1:2L
′
1:2,1:2 = Σ
∞
1:2,1:2.
Next, I implement sign restrictions on this upper left 2-by-2 system in a similar fashion
as in Peersman (2005). This involves a rotation of L1:2,1:2 using an orthonormal matrix Q
(i.e. QQ′ = I):
Q =
[(
cos(θ) −sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)
)]
.
As in Peersman (and similar to Uhlig (2005)), our VAR is estimated in a Bayesian frame-
work. For each draw of the posterior distribution of the reduced form VAR coefficients, I
calculate the long-run forecast revision variance. I then randomly draw θ from a uniform
distribution [0, pi], use Q to calculate the upper left elements of the matrix L and check
whether our sign restrictions are satisfied. In the application, I draw 100 candidates from
the posterior distribution of the reduced from coefficients and another 100 values of θ for
the rotation. I compute the impulse responses for all draws that satisfy the sign restriction
and report the median and the 16th and 84th percentile from the resulting distribution.
On average over a third of the draws satisfies the sign restrictions.
After having implemented the restrictions, I can now proceed to calculate the remain-
ing elements of the matrix L such that this matrix provides a valid decomposition of
the long-run variance. For the remaining elements of the first two columns, I use that
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L3:n,1:2L
′
1:2,1:2 = (Σ
∞
1:2,3:n)
′. Now I still need to determine the lower right elements of L.
Note that these elements do not impose any of the restrictions nor are they related to the
shocks of interest. I use the information on the first two rows and columns in order to
adjust the lower right elements of the long-run variance. This ’remaining’ block of the
variance is then decomposed using the Cholesky decomposition. Having found all elements
of L, I can then determine the matrix A via A = (
∑∞
i=0Φi)
−1L.
A.5 VAR identification with short- and long-run restric-
tions
This section describes the method to implement the combination of short-run and long-
run restrictions in chapter 2. To implement the short-run restriction which identifies skill
supply shocks together with the long-run restrictions for the various technology shocks,
we seek to find a unique transformation matrix A that maps the reduced form residuals
vt into structural shocks et. Assuming orthogonality between the structural residuals
and normalizing their variance to unity, A therefore satisfies AA′ = Ω where Omega is
the variance matrix of the reduced from residuals. In a VAR with n variables, another
n(n− 1)/2 restrictions are then necessary for exact identification and will come out of the
short- and long-run assumptions.
Similar to before, we can formulate the problem in a triangular structure when the variables
are conveniently ordered. This means ordering the supply of skill first in the VAR and then
ordering the other variables according to the respective specification. The identification
then works as follows. First, one identifies the supply shock through its short-run effect.
More precisely, in order to identify supply shocks we assume that neither i-shocks, nor
SBT-shocks nor neutral or non-technology shocks affect the supply of skill in the short
run (on impact). This is equivalent to restricting a12 = a13 = ... = a1n = 0 (with aij being
elements of A). These zero restrictions in the first row of A, combined with
A1. ∗A′.1 = Ω1. (A.1)
pin down the first column of A. The first column uniquely determines the effects of the
supply shocks on the system of variables.
Second, we need to determine all other elements of the matrix A except for the first row
and column. As in the standard long-run assumptions, the subsequent remaining columns
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should incorporate the effects of the various technology shocks. As before, we therefore
use a Cholesky decomposition of the infinite horizon forecast error variance in order to
measure the technology shocks. However, we only need to use the lower right block of this
matrix, i.e. the part of the forecast variance which remains after the first row and column
of A have already been taken into account. The Cholesky decomposition then delivers the
remaining elements of A.
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